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
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HOUSE OF COMMONS

Third Session—Twenty-sixth Parliament
1965



STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. John R. Matheson.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 1-5

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 9, 1965
THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 1965

Main Estimates of the Department of External Affairs
(1965-1966)

WITNESS:

The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1965

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. John R. Matheson

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and Messrs.


Bélanger,
Brewin,
Brown,
Deachman,
Dubé,
Forest,
Gelber,
Haidasz,

Klein,
*Knowles,
Konantz (Mrs.),
Lachance,
MacEwan,
Mandziuk,
Martineau,

McIntosh,
Nugent,
Patterson,
Pugh,
Regan,
Walker,
Winkler—24.

M. Slack,
Committee Officer.

*Replaced by Mr. Douglas on June 9.



1088769

ORDERS OF REFERENCE

FRIDAY, May 28, 1965

Ordered—That the items listed in the Main Estimates for 1965-66, relating to the Department of External Affairs, presented to this House on May 11, 1965, be withdrawn from the Committee of Supply and referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs, or to the proposed Committee on External Affairs, as the case may be, saving always the powers of the Committee of Supply in relation to the voting of public monies.

FRIDAY, June 4, 1965

Ordered—That the number of Members on the Standing Committee on External Affairs, pursuant to Standing Order 65(1)(1), be reduced to twenty-four (24) and that the Committee be composed of the following Members: Messrs. Bélanger, Brewin, Brown, Deachman, Dubé, Forest, Gelber, Haidasz, Klein, Knowles, Konantz (Mrs.) Lachance, MacEwan, Mandziuk, Martineau, Matheson, McIntosh, Nesbitt, Nugent, Patterson, Pugh, Regan, Walker and Winkler.

WEDNESDAY, June 9, 1965

Ordered—That the name of Mr. Douglas be substituted for that of Mr. Knowles on the Standing Committee on External Affairs or on the proposed Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Attest

LEON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

WEDNESDAY, June 9, 1965

(1)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met this day at 9.10 a.m. for organization purposes.

Members present: Mrs. Konantz and Messrs. Bélanger, Brown, Deachman, Dubé, Forest, Gelber, Klein, Knowles, Lachance, Matheson, McIntosh, Nesbitt, Patterson, Regan, Walker (16).

The Clerk attending, and having called for nominations, Mr. Klein moved, seconded by Mr. Nesbitt, that Mr. Matheson be Chairman of the Committee.

There being no other nominations, the Clerk declared Mr. Matheson elected Chairman and invited him to take the Chair.

Mr. Matheson thanked the Committee and he invited nominations for the post of Vice-Chairman.

Moved by Mr. Deachman, seconded by Mr. Walker,

Resolved,—That Mr. Nesbitt be Vice-Chairman of this Committee.

On motion of Mr. Walker, seconded by Mr. Forest,

Resolved,—That a Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, comprised of the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, and 5 other members to be designated by the Chairman, be appointed.

Moved by Mr. Forest, seconded by Mr. Walker,

Resolved,—That permission be sought to print such papers and evidence as may be ordered by the Committee.

On motion of Mr. Bélanger, seconded by Mr. Patterson,

Resolved,—That the Committee print 750 copies in English and 500 copies in French of its Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence.

Moved by Mr. Klein, seconded by Mr. Nesbitt,

Resolved,—That the Committee request permission to sit while the House is sitting.

The Chairman made a statement relating to areas of special emphasis for discussion on the Estimates. He also referred to previous sittings on genocide and hate literature and to future consideration of this subject.

At 9.30 a.m., the Committee adjourned until 9.00 a.m. on Thursday, June 10.

THURSDAY, June 10, 1965
(2)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 9.15 a.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Matheson, presiding.

Members present: Mrs. Konantz and Messrs. Brewin, Deachman, Douglas, Dubé, Forest, Gelber, Klein, Martineau, Matheson, McIntosh, Nesbitt, Patterson, Walker (14).

In attendance: The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

At the request of the Chairman, the Clerk read the Order of Reference dated May 28, 1965.

The Chairman called for the first item of the estimates of the Department of External Affairs:

1. Departmental Administration . . . and invited the Minister to make a statement.

The Minister reviewed the Viet Nam situation and Canada's role in this conflict, and was examined thereon.

Mr. Martin (*Essex East*) tabled the Special Reports of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, dated June 2, 1962 and February 13, 1965, copies of which were distributed to members of the Committee, and also ordered printed as Appendices to the record of this day. (*Note: For Report dated June 2, 1962, see Appendix "A"; for Report dated February 13, 1965, see Appendix "B"*).

On the suggestion of Mr. Nesbitt, the Committee agreed to increase the printing of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of this sitting by an additional 1,000 copies in English and 500 copies in French.

The Minister tabled a statement by Mr. Tran Van Do, delegate of the Republic of Vietnam, at the Geneva Conference of 1954, which was ordered printed as an Appendix to the record of this day. (*See Appendix "C"*).

The Minister also tabled statements by the Minister of External Affairs of Australia, The Hon. Paul Hasluck, of March 23, 1965, on External Affairs, and by the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Rt. Hon. K. J. Holyoake, of May 13, 1965, on the Vietnam situation.

The Chairman announced the composition of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure as follows: Messrs. Matheson, Nesbitt, Dubé, Brewin, Patterson, Bélanger and McIntosh.

At 12.25 p.m., the examination of the Minister still continuing, the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

M. Slack,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

THURSDAY, June 10, 1965.

● (9:15 a.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I see a quorum.

Mrs. Konantz and gentlemen, the first item is to ask the clerk of the Committee to read the order of reference.

CLERK OF THE COMMITTEE:

FRIDAY, May 28, 1965,

Ordered—

That the items listed in the Main Estimates for 1965-66, relating to the Department of External Affairs, presented to this House on May 11, 1965, be withdrawn from the Committee of Supply and referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs, or to the proposed Committee on External Affairs, as the case may be, saving always the powers of the Committee of Supply in relation to the voting of public monies.

The CHAIRMAN: It is my duty to call the first item in the estimates of the Department of External Affairs, vote number 1, and to invite the Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to make an opening statement. I have been told by Mr. Martin that his statement refers to various areas, and if it pleases the committee perhaps we might take one section at a time and question Mr. Martin on that section, rather than listen to an extended statement which might perhaps cover four separate areas of special interest and concern at the moment. Is this agreeable? I understand it is agreed.

- 1 Administration, Operation and Maintenance including payment of remuneration, subject to the approval of the Governor in Council and notwithstanding the Civil Service Act, in connection with the assignment by the Canadian Government of Canadians to the staffs of the International Organizations detailed in the Estimates, and authority to make recoverable advances in amounts not exceeding in the aggregate the amounts of the shares of those Organizations of such expenses, and authority, notwithstanding the Civil Service Act, for the appointment and fixing of salaries of Commissioners (International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Indo-China), Secretaries and staff by the Governor in Council; assistance and repatriation of distressed Canadian citizens and persons of Canadian domicile abroad, including their dependents; Canadian participation in the Commonwealth Arts Festival to be held in Britain in the Fall of 1965; payment to the Roosevelt Campobello International Park Commission for the purposes and subject to the

provisions of the Act respecting the Commission established to administer the Roosevelt Campobello International Park; a cultural relations and academic exchange program with the French community, and grants as detailed in the Estimates, 13,176,800.

Hon. PAUL MARTIN (*Secretary of State for External Affairs*): Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Konantz and members of the Committee. I am in your hands, of course. There are a number of matters on which I think it is expected I would say something. We have not had the opportunity in the House of Commons to cover in detail some subjects, nor have we had an opportunity to cover other items that I think require some exposition. I would therefore propose that we might, at some point, give time to an examination of the state of east-west relations, particularly in so far as relations of the west with the Soviet Union are concerned. I would want to say something about disarmament. I would like to discuss the critical situation in the United Nations. I would also like to give our views not so much on general developments in the Dominican Republic although touching on them, but our views on the relationship between the regional peacekeeping organizations and the United Nations. And then, of course, I would like to say something more about Viet Nam, which is the most important subject facing us at the present time. In the House of Commons, on Friday a week ago, I did amplify the government's position on this subject. However there was then a limited opportunity for doing so and there was no opportunity for interrogation, nor for rebuttal. Therefore, with your permission, this morning I might deal with the Vietnamese situation. I would want to provide a rebuttal of some of the things that have been said about this situation, not by way of polemic but by way of exposition so that we will have as objective a picture of this critical situation as I think we should have. If this proposal is satisfactory, Mr. Chairman, I will proceed on that basis.

I welcome this opportunity of outlining our thinking on the problem in Viet Nam where the world is confronted with one of the most complex and dangerous situations we have seen in many years. We are aware of course of the great concern, in our country and elsewhere, at the danger that the continuation of the policies now being pursued in Viet Nam by the principal parties could lead to a general conflict.

As far as Canada is concerned, we are not directly involved in this crisis as one of the protagonists, and this, together with our independent position in Viet Nam, gives us a certain freedom of manoeuvre which we have attempted to use as wisely and constructively as we know how, in the interests of world peace. On repeated occasions we have joined in appeals to all sides for restraint. We have done this with the proviso that the appeal be directed equally to all those involved. It was our view, and continues to be our view, that if these appeals were heeded, they could lead to a downward trend in hostilities or even a *de facto* cease-fire which either prior to or during a conference would have a tranquilizing effect on the situation and act as a stimulus to constructive discussion.

We have also explored the possibilities of preliminary contacts which might be provided in the corridors of a conference, let us say, on Laos, a smaller Indo-China country, or, as more recently suggested, at a conference on Cambodia. It is regrettable that the Soviet Union, among others, has not

been willing to follow up their earlier interest in this latter idea and to move forward on the basis of the agreement of the British and United States governments to participate in such a conference.

More than that, we have been taking our own quiet soundings of opinion, probing the positions of the interested parties, to see whether there is any common ground on which we can build or help others to build. Unfortunately, diplomacy, especially in this context, is a form of activity whose success varies inversely with the attendant publicity. Government positions, especially Communist government positions, tend to harden markedly when exposed to the full glare of public attention.

● (9:25 a.m.)

I informed the house on Monday that our role in Viet Nam has not been supine and that we have attempted to use the channels available to us by virtue of our Commission membership to establish contact with North Viet Nam. Our Commissioner in Saigon, over the past eight months, prior to May 31 made several trips to the capital of North Viet Nam, Hanoi.

During these visits he has had discussion with the local leaders and officials in an attempt to assess the North Viet Nam government's position. I asked him to go to Hanoi on May 31 and to see someone senior in the government of Viet Nam, the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister, and this he did.

This is the most recent contact that he has made, and although his report is not an encouraging one, I want to say that we have not abandoned the probing process. Mr. Seaborn, who is our Commissioner, is an officer of considerable experience and ability. He is well qualified for an important assignment of this delicate nature. He had an interview with the Foreign Minister on May 31 in which he expressed Canada's concern, and our willingness to play a helpful role if possible.

He sought clarification of the North Viet Nam government's position including its reaction to the recent pause in the bombings. Naturally I cannot go into any greater detail about it at this time; but I would like to say that the Foreign Minister stated repeatedly that the four conditions which had previously been outlined by the Prime Minister of North Viet Nam on April 8, taken as a whole, represented the Hanoi government's approach to a settlement.

Mr. NESBITT: Could you give us those four points?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I shall be coming to that. The official formula for these conditions is not exactly memorable, and in order to have them permanently recorded, I would like to quote them verbatim from the official text.

First of all I should explain that when the President of the United States, subsequent to the suggestion of Mr. Pearson that there should be a pause in the bombings, announced to the world that the United States would enter into negotiations with Hanoi without any pre-conditions, the government of Hanoi shortly thereafter responded by stating that before this could be done there would have to be compliance with four conditions which I shall now give you verbatim. These were the four conditions which were also confirmed to Mr. Seaborn on May 31 and I quote:

1. "Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva Agreements the United States government

must withdraw from South Viet Nam all United States troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all United States military bases there, cancel its military alliance with South Viet Nam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Viet Nam. According to the Geneva Agreements the United States government must stop its acts of war against North Viet Nam, completely cease all encroachment on the territory and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Viet Nam while Viet Nam is still temporarily divided into two zones the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam must be strictly respected: the two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, there must be no foreign military bases, troops and military personnel in their respective territories.
3. The internal affairs of South Viet Nam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the program of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation without any foreign interference.
4. The peaceful reunification of Viet Nam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference."

Now these are the four so-called "clearcut" conditions laid down by the government of North Viet Nam. I believe that these represent an uncompromising position and I must say that since Mr. Seaborn was in Hanoi we know that there has not been any satisfactory clarification given to some of the points involved in these four conditions.

The real problem is to interpret this position and to see whether any way can be found of dovetailing it with the requirements of the other parties involved. This is a task of considerable delicacy. Since our efforts and those of the other countries are continuing, I cannot go into precise detail without jeopardizing the success of some of these discussions which are in fact now under way.

I would like to assure the committee that we are also in close contact in Ottawa and through our representatives abroad with the British and United States governments, with the South Vietnamese government, and with the authorities in Paris, Moscow, and New Delhi, to mention only some of the more active channels.

In our pursuit of a diplomatic solution there should be no misunderstanding of the root causes of the present hostilities, and of our deep desire for peace. I think it would be dangerous to misjudge the basic responsibilities of those directly involved, and to direct our appeals or our strictures only to those who we know are most likely out of reason and conscience to heed us. To apply pressure only to those who are susceptible to our concerns is, in my judgment, naive. It is definitely dangerous, and I say dangerous advisedly because the consequences of a refusal to base policy on facts and a realistic assessment of objectives can only lead to a worse disaster than the one which it seeks to avert.

In 1930 this was branded appeasement. We all know only too well where it led us.

● (9:35 a.m.)

Now I think in its totality the available evidence—and I shall say something more about this—points unmistakably to the conclusion that what is happening in Viet Nam today is an armed conflict, with its original roots in the theory and practice of so-called “wars of liberation”, and clandestine but crucially important support from the outside. If this form of indirect aggression is allowed to succeed there will be incalculable consequences for world peace. I dealt with this problem at length in the House on May 28. I do not propose to repeat what I said but suffice it to say that if North Viet Nam succeeds in taking over the whole of Viet Nam by force, if the rest of the world is prepared to sit back and see this happen, saying feebly that, after all, it is only a domestic rebellion so why not accept the inevitable, we would, in my judgment, be guilty of an error of the same nature as the mistakes made at Munich and, before that, in the League of Nations. Aggression is aggression, whether it takes place in Europe, in Ethiopia, or in Viet Nam.

I am deeply aware, of course, of the dangers of responding to aggression by military means alone; apart from the prospects of escalation, an exclusively military response runs the dangerous risk of forcing the Soviet Union into a position where it too responds by open military means in order to demonstrate its willingness and its ability to support another Communist power. Of course, such a Soviet response would undermine or destroy the progress that has been made by the West in undertaking a meaningful, if limited, dialogue with the Soviet Union. Such a dialogue is one of the cornerstones upon which world peace rests at the present time. So, an exclusively military response to aggression could defeat one of the very purposes of resisting an outward thrust of a militant Communist policy.

Now, the perspective in these terms is not an attractive one; on the one hand, surrender to Communist aggression only postpones the day when a firmer stand must be taken; on the other, resistance in exclusively military terms raises the spectre of a wider conflict extending beyond the perimeters of Viet Nam. Both alternatives are unacceptable and, because they are unacceptable, it is imperative that our best and most determined efforts should be directed toward finding a solution by some other means.

I have stated repeatedly, and I do so today, that the only acceptable alternative is to negotiate. Our objective is to get negotiations started. We have lost no time and spared no effort in the pursuit of this objective.

As I have stated repeatedly, I do not believe, nor does the government believe, that military measures in this situation will yield a solution, and the dangers of escalation are obvious. The greatest restraint has to be shown on all sides if the conflict is not to be widened. I think there is an appreciation of this. There must be a concerted attempt to negotiate a satisfactory settlement, and the most obvious way of doing so is at an international conference where these problems could be dealt with. Canada has been urging from the beginning the holding of a conference to bring this war to a halt. We have urged a cease-fire from the beginning, whether it comes about as a result of a conference on Laos or on Cambodia, a conference of the Geneva powers, or a conference of another kind that would enable the parties to begin discussions so as to afford at least a temporary climate of tranquility. But, to do this, it must be pointed out, there has to be an agreement on more than one side.

The United States has clearly affirmed its willingness to agree to such a conference without preconditions. The sad fact is that there has been no satisfactory response from Hanoi. We wanted to test this ourselves and we did test it on May 31 through Mr. Seaborn.

I was encouraged to learn that Mr. Stewart, the British Foreign Secretary, informed the British House of Commons last week that—and I quote:

The aim of Her Majesty's government is to obtain a conference so that fighting could end and a lasting settlement be obtained. The continuance and indeed, the intensification of the war makes this all the more necessary.

I fully agree with that statement. As I have said before, not only is this our aim but this continues to be the objective of the diplomatic effort in which we are engaged. But, the problem is how to get such a conference under way.

I was greatly disturbed about this problem some weeks ago and I went down to the United Nations to see the Secretary General. I realized that because of the constitutional and financial crisis at the United Nations this organization was not in a position to provide effective service; but the office of the Secretary General is a powerful one and I wanted to determine myself that U Thant agreed that every effort should be taken by him to try and bring about a meeting of the parties. I am satisfied beyond any doubt that he has worked wisely and assiduously toward this objective. But, any appeal that would be made by the Secretary General, in order to be effective, must be responded to not by one but by both sides. It is not for me to say how the Secretary General should see fit to address himself to this problem, but the fact that he has not done so except through the use of quiet diplomacy I think indicates clearly his appreciation of what the response at the present time would be. It clearly does take two sides to negotiate; it takes a mutual realization that force is inadequate and unacceptable, and it takes a mutual willingness to compose differences peacefully.

The United States has repeatedly emphasized ever since President Johnson's speech on April 7, that the United States is prepared to undertake negotiations. Unfortunately, there has been no comparable demonstration of flexibility from the other side, which has rejected rigidly all suggestions that it is better to talk about differences than to fight about them.

Now, it is true that in this situation there are great prestige commitments or, as it is sometimes known, "face" involved on all sides, and for this reason any progress toward the negotiating table can be made only slowly and step by step. I would recall to the members of the Committee that when the 17 non-aligned powers issued their appeal in Belgrade to all parties for a cease-fire and for the beginning of negotiations to arrest the conflict in Viet Nam Canada was the first country to accept the essential element of this appeal. It was that negotiations should take place without preconditions.

● (9:45 a.m.)

Thus far I have concentrated on the diplomatic efforts we have made and will continue to make. I know you will appreciate the complexity of the situation with which we are dealing. Simple solutions will not do, attractive though they may appear. I would like to reiterate what I said in the House on

May 28; that is, our view has been from the first that a military solution alone in this situation is neither desirable nor practical. Our objective from the first has been to achieve a cease-fire; our objective is negotiation at any place, at any time, provided such negotiation is directed toward an equitable settlement.

We are taking whatever steps we can in concert with other countries or by ourselves to try to see whether in some way we can penetrate this impasse.

In the annals of diplomatic history, I believe the greatest failures have been those solutions to pressing problems which have been put together too hastily, too uncritically and with too shaky a basis on the facts of relevant history.

To solve a problem it is first necessary to understand it. I would like to speak about the nature of the problem in Viet Nam as we see it. No one is happy about the situation in Viet Nam. We all realize the dangerous implications if there were to be an extension of the conflict or a wider participation in it. It involves three of the most powerful nations in the world, including the most powerful nation in Asia and the most populated nation in the world. There is no doubt about the stakes in this situation. However, we have to look at all aspects of the problem in order to be able to fully understand it and to fully respond to it.

I hope it is clear that the position of the Canadian government as a non-combatant, as a member of the Commission, is to do whatever it can to try to bring about pacification. We have had a long experience in Indo-China. We have been on the Supervisory Commission with India and Poland for 11 years. This has given us an opportunity of objective assessment; it has given us a responsibility which we have to discharge in accordance with our international commitments.

To state that what is happening in Viet Nam is "an internal rebellion plain and simple" is clearly at variance with established facts which indicate beyond a shadow of a doubt that the essential element has been North Vietnamese interference, limited at first, but growing steadily in scope and intensity.

In the midst of the lack of experience in self-government in South Viet Nam, following the Geneva settlement of 1954, the Communists were able to build the subversive movement now known as the Viet Cong and it was able to flourish only because of the material support and political direction it received from outside.

When I came in here this morning I thought carefully whether, in this committee, I should go further. I have gone thus far; but this is the best opportunity we, as a government, have yet had to put before a proper body of our parliament the facts involved in our stewardship as a member of that Commission. While I appreciate the risk involved in this aspect of my presentation, I feel there is a duty to put the following facts before this committee and I propose to do so.

Some people contest the claim that North Viet Nam has been deeply involved in or indeed has instigated the war in the South. They say there is no evidence to show any involvement on the part of North Viet Nam and that thus the claim of the United States of America and indeed other countries, like Australia and New Zealand, which now are involved, that they are helping South Viet Nam resist outside aggression, falls to the ground. This argument, I believe, is inadequate in its basis and is dangerous in its impact.

The evidence has not always been adequately presented. Here, of course, security factors are involved; but the evidence does exist, I assure you, and in quantity. Those who argue that North Viet Nam never has been interfering in the affairs of South Viet Nam are ignoring, for example, the conclusions on this question of the International Commission in its special report of June 2, 1962. In this report India and Canada agreed there was evidence to warrant the conclusion that North Viet Nam had, in violation of its obligations under the Cease Fire Agreement of 1954 encouraged, sponsored and supplied activities aimed at the overthrow of the authorities in the South. That special report of 1962 also said other things about the situation in Viet Nam. I want to say more about that later on. For the moment I simply wish to point out there has been an impartial international judgment on this matter and that that judgment is against North Viet Nam. That judgment was pronounced by members of the International Supervisory Commission, by majority composed of India and Canada, the other member of the Commission, of course, being Poland. However, this problem did not come to an end in 1962 with this report; on the contrary it has continued to exist and in fact its scope has increased seriously, and so has the evidence for this claim.

I tabled the special report in the House in March. It is available to the members of the committee and I think it is indispensable reading in order to fully understand the situation in this very complicated and regrettably dangerous matter.

The CHAIRMAN: Would it be agreeable that this be included as an appendix to our Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence for today?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It is a pretty long report.

Mr. WALKER: It has been tabled in the House and so long as it is available to members that might be sufficient.

Mr. DOUGLAS: I think it should be an appendix to our evidence of today.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you feel it should be appended?

Mr. DOUGLAS: Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: It might either be appended or we might have copies made available to us.

Mr. DEACHMAN: If it were appended to the committee's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence it would require translation, typing, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN: That has been done.

● (9:55 a.m.)

Mr. DEACHMAN: Are copies available for distribution to the committee?

Mr. RITCHIE: Yes.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would like to give consideration to tabling the reports we have in our possession from our delegation on the Commission of an interrogation conducted recently by members of the Commission on prisoners captured in military actions against the Viet Cong in South Viet Nam. If I do not table that report, I will be ready at some subsequent time to answer some questions about it within certain limits.

Now to understand the situation confronting us in Viet Nam, I think we must uncover some of the vast complicated history of that little country. It is precisely because so many of these complexities seem to be lost sight of, or

disregarded, in assessing the problem that I wish to point out now some of the relevant factors as I see them.

By the end of the Indo-China war in 1954, during and prior to which France had unsuccessfully tried a variety of constitutional arrangements for Viet Nam, two governments had been established in Viet Nam, both of which participated in the Geneva Conference, and both of which claimed to speak for the people of Viet Nam.

On the one hand, there was the regime of Ho Chi Minh which had begun as an anti-colonial resistance movement—the Viet Minh—under Communist leadership. This leadership quickly established its control over all elements in the movement. Although it was active during the resistance to the Japanese invasion, the Viet Minh cannot, in point of historical fact, be given credit for driving the Japanese out of Viet Nam in 1945. The Viet Minh had been formed in May, 1941, when the Indochinese Communist Party, having decided on a National Front policy, made approaches to various non-Communist groupings. During the war, the Viet Minh aided the allies by providing some intelligence information, distributing propaganda, and organizing the odd attack against the Japanese. At the same time, however, the Indochinese Communist Party consolidated its control over the National Front, eliminating or out-manoeuvring the plethora of disorganized non-Communist nationalist groups. In March, 1945, the Japanese, fearing an allied landing, wiped away the facade of Vichy-French administration. The French army was interned (and remained so until the allies landed to disarm the Japanese), and the French administrators were arrested.

Thus, when Japan suddenly collapsed in August, 1945, catching the allies unprepared for the political consequences which were to follow in all of southeast Asia, a vacuum was created in Viet Nam which the Viet Minh rapidly sought to fill. Two days after the Japanese capitulation, the Viet Minh appeared in Hanoi. Refraining from any attacks on the Japanese, the Communist-led movement concentrated on driving other nationalist movements from the streets of the city. Encountering no resistance from the disorganized non-Communists, from the now uninterested Japanese or from the still imprisoned French, Ho Chi Minh formed a provisional government on August 29, in which the Indochinese Communist party or the Viet Minh held all key posts.

This is, of course, a very condensed view of the vastly complicated period of history in Viet Nam associated with the collapse of Japanese rule. I have for lack of time omitted reference to the role of the Chinese in this period, the re-entry of the French and their unsuccessful attempts to work out an accommodation with the Ho Chi Minh regime. I have mentioned the role of the Viet Minh vis-à-vis the Japanese because this matter was referred to in the House recently and because I wished to point out the movement's origins and the fact that it first came to prominence through the creation of a power vacuum, not through an anti-colonial war. That came later.

Of course, any member of the House of Commons has the duty to put on the record the facts as he sees them. It is equally the duty of those of us who, in the government, have information to give it and that is what I am

now doing here. There was no adequate opportunity to do it in the debate in the House.

But to return to the two Viet Nams at Geneva in 1954. The second Vietnamese voice was that of the Southern regime based on Saigon—the State of Viet Nam as it was called at the time, to which the French had granted full independence at the beginning of the conference. The Southern government, while no less anti-colonial than the Northern, was at the same time anti-Communist not only for ideological reasons but also out of the fear that a Communist Viet Nam might become little more than a protectorate of China, a fate which the Vietnamese have always feared and rejected, as a small nation living close to a larger and more powerful one. Once again, however, it is important to get the historical facts accurate if the problem is to be understood. Although the presence of big powers has been a factor of considerable importance throughout Vietnamese history, it would be an error to see that history as one long struggle against foreign aggression. The Chinese were driven out of Viet Nam in 939 A.D. China continued to exert pressure on Viet Nam but Vietnamese independence was maintained until 1407 when Chinese rule was restored; this period lasted for only twenty years and in 1427 Vietnamese independence was reasserted. The Viet Nam of the time however was not of the same territorial dimensions as today and the period following the last defeat of Chinese rule is characterized by the extension of Vietnamese rule southwards, and by contending Vietnamese dynasties. National unity became established only in 1802, but this unity was forged in feudal, dynastic warfare, not in anti-imperialist struggles in the usual sense of the phrase. Although the French had begun to show a colonial interest in the Indo-China area somewhat earlier, it was not until the 1880's that France succeeded in establishing her rule throughout Viet Nam. It is therefore not really accurate to refer to a brief period of freedom enjoyed by the Vietnamese people in the latter half of the nineteenth century when the Chinese Empire was receding and before the French arrived.

I have given some account of these historical factors—and the summary is by no means complete and could not be in the time available—partly because I wished to have the record straight on certain points and partly because I believe it is essential to understand that the division of Viet Nam is not something created by the West in its own interests, but is something which represents the polarization of Vietnamese political forces into Communist and non-Communist sectors.

● (10:05 a.m.)

It is essential, moreover, to understand who was represented at Geneva in 1954 and who agreed to what before passing judgment on what has happened since then.

The settlement reached in Geneva in 1954 comprised two main elements—a Cease-Fire Agreement, signed by the French High Command of the day and the Peoples Army of Viet Nam (the Viet Minh), and a Final Declaration. The former document is a military agreement providing for regroupment of forces and spelling out other provisions looking to a separation of combatants and a freezing of their military activities and capabilities. The Final Declaration, on the other hand, was essentially a political document. It is there

that we find references to the fact that the 17th parallel is not to be regarded as a permanent dividing line, and to the prospect of nationwide elections in 1956.

I will just make a parenthesis here. You will recall that about a week ago the Chinese Peoples Republic announced that this dividing line need no longer be recognized. I expressed some doubt that there would be public support given to this position of the Chinese Peoples Republic willingly or quickly by the government of North Viet Nam.

It is certainly clear that those who drafted and signed these documents anticipated that a permanent settlement would probably amount to the Viet Minh establishing its control over the whole territory of Viet Nam.

The important part of this analysis, however, is the phrase "those who drafted and signed" the Geneva documents. Realizing only too well what the objectives of the Viet Minh leaders would be, the South Vietnamese leaders rejected the terms of the Geneva settlement, before these documents were signed, on the grounds that the division of Viet Nam was inimical to the interests of the Vietnamese people because under these terms half of Viet Nam was turned over to Communist control. The stand of the Saigon government—and it must be remembered that it was a newly independent political entity trying to resist the attempt of larger powers to impose their terms of settlement on it—was spelled out in a separate declaration issued by Mr. Tran Van Do, who has most recently re-emerged on the Vietnamese political scene, where he is now Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister of South Viet Nam. It might be useful if this declaration could be made available to members of the Committee because it clearly indicates that the government of South Viet Nam did not support the Geneva settlement and, it must also be remembered, neither did the United States.

The rejection of the political portion of the Geneva settlement by the South Vietnamese government and the reason for it is often lost sight of by those who criticize the Saigon government as a creation of the Americans and as a political entity which is alleged to continue in existence in violation of the Geneva settlement.

Having rejected the terms of the Geneva settlement before it was signed, and having explicitly reserved its right to safeguard its own interests, it cannot—as was argued the other day in the House of Commons—be convincingly accused of violating international obligations. To argue otherwise would be tantamount to saying that the great powers should be able to impose their will on a small and weak state. In fact, there is evidence that the division of Viet Nam was a bargain struck at Geneva between the French and the Chinese, the two traditional "imperialist powers" in Viet Nam. This division was accepted by the North Vietnamese because they thought it would be temporary and that they would subsequently get what they wanted—the whole of Viet Nam—by the kind of elections which were imprecisely referred to in paragraph 7 of the Final Declaration.

The South Vietnamese believed that such elections would amount only to a facade for a Communist takeover, and rejected the whole idea from the beginning.

I remember discussing with President Diem the question whether we should continue to maintain the Commission in Indo-China or whether the

time had come for the holding of elections, as was envisaged in the Geneva settlement. He reminded me then, of course, that South Viet Nam was not a party to the settlement, and also that there was need for the Commission to maintain its presence until such time as a truly objective election could take place. I am not trying to suggest that this was a correct position for him to take, but I do give it as part of the impressions that I have in my mind, naturally, as I try to assess this situation.

While reaffirming their belief in the territorial integrity of Viet Nam, the South Vietnamese maintained that nationwide elections looking to the reunification of Viet Nam would be meaningful only if they were absolutely free, and with a Communist regime installed in Hanoi this condition seemed unlikely to be fulfilled in that half of the country. I myself found this confirmed when I spent three days visiting the million refugees just outside of Saigon. They had come from the North. They were mainly Christian refugees who had fled just as others in Europe have fled, from what they thought was the dangerous encroachment of a Communist power.

It is well for us when we are considering this situation to think that there are many parallels to what is happening in Asia today and what happened in Europe that brought about the creation by us of a defensive organization known as NATO to provide for our security. The absence of this kind of arrangement, and an effective kind of arrangement, in Asia today is one of the gaps, and it is one of the reasons perhaps why this situation exists at present.

This stand was consistently maintained by the government of South Viet Nam. The election envisaged in 1956 in the settlement (which had not been signed by the South) did not take place. There were, however, elections within South Viet Nam itself, on a South Vietnamese basis rather than on a nationwide basis.

As the French withdrew from Indo-China in the years immediately following the Geneva settlement, it became clear that the government in Saigon had no intention of passively accepting the absorption which Hanoi had planned for it. There were few observers at the time who expected a life span for the Saigon government of more than a few years. Where Hanoi had inherited the traditions of a victorious struggle against colonialism, Saigon inherited a legacy of collapse and defeat. Since Hanoi had been the administrative centre for the French administration in Indo-China, Saigon found itself with little political experience and without even the physical facilities for an effective administration. But South Viet Nam not only survived, it began to make tangible social and economic progress, partly with outside help but mainly through the determination of the South Vietnamese population itself. This population had by this time been swollen by the million refugees I mentioned a moment ago who chose not to live under the Communist regime in the North. The fact that this mass migration took place—often under the greatest hardship and in the face of active opposition from the Communist authorities—is reflection enough on the contention that the Viet Minh had the wholehearted support of the Vietnamese people. No one who could have seen the plight of these refugees could have believed that there is as much credence as some people give at the present time to a distinction between the ideological motive of the Communist in Asia and the Communist in Europe. Realizing that the administration in the South was not going to collapse or allow itself to disappear as anticipated as a result of

manipulated elections, and indeed that it showed signs of economic progress beyond anything that had come about in the North, the Hanoi regime decided that a more active and aggressive policy was required in order to establish the control of the whole country; this had been denied by South Viet Nam's refusal to implement terms which the North had agreed to at Geneva but which had—I repeat—been then rejected by the South.

● (10:15 a.m.)

One of the basic stipulations of this Cease-Fire Agreement was that there should be a total regroupment of forces, with the French withdrawing into South Viet Nam and Ho Chi Minh's armies into the North. Unfortunately, the North carried out its obligations only partially, leaving behind—this is based on evidence dealt with by a Committee of an International Commission of which Canada is a member—secret caches of armaments and military personnel who shed their military identification and melted inconspicuously into the countryside, ready to organize political action or to resume hostilities if necessary. The fact that the Northern regime intended to interfere in the South was first made public, although very few people have paid attention to this, in a statement of the Vietnamese Workers Party in July of 1954, just at the end of the Geneva Conference.

In part this statement asserted, and I quote:

“Naturally, at a time when our troops and our administrative authority are being withdrawn towards the North, the Party members and co-patriots in Nam Bo—that is South Viet Nam—will continue to remain in the zones on the other side. The war-mongering elements seek to sabotage the Armistice and re-establish a state of war. Our compatriots and our members must continue to wage a hard struggle.

The Party must struggle; its duties must remain with the people educating them, unmasking all activities of war-mongers, maintaining the influence of the Party and the government with the people, and winning the respect of the mass for President Ho Chi Minh.”

Translated from the usual Communist terminology, this statement clearly means one thing. It means that Northern agents would be left in the South to disrupt the government there. This residue of men and arms provided the basis for the beginnings of a Hanoi-directed aggression in the South.

As a partial take-over was seen to be improbable, innocent villagers were terrorized into providing shelter and food for the guerrillas and into helping them to finance their operations. The first target was usually the village administration officer whose murder could be seen as an effective challenge to the government's authority and a demonstration of what happens to those who refuse to co-operate.

In speaking of instability in Viet Nam, in arguing that the Viet Cong have been supported by the peasants, these basic facts must be kept in mind; the Viet Cong has deliberately literally murdered hundreds of trained and responsible administrators. In these circumstances it must be admitted that the phenomenon of instability must be judged cautiously. Similarly, peasant support for guerrillas, which is won by murder and intimidation, is not the same as support which is spontaneously given in the exercise of free choice as we know it.

Now, the suggestion has been made that the government of South Viet Nam has never been able to hold anything but the cities because it has not enjoyed the support of the people. This was argued in the House of Commons, and this is believed throughout this country, as I see in my correspondence. Control of the countryside in South Viet Nam has always been a problem for the central authorities, as might be expected in an underdeveloped country where geographical obstacles are great and communication facilities are limited.

Even the Communists with their police-state apparatus have had to face revolts in the North, and fairly recently. Large areas of the South Vietnamese countryside regularly pass from government to Viet Cong control and back again depending on the local military conditions. Most observers of the Vietnamese scene claim that the peasants want nothing more than to be left alone. However, when they are subjected to techniques of blackmail, assassination and torture by marauding Viet Cong bands, as the Prime Minister of New Zealand pointed out recently in a statement on Viet Nam, it would be an extraordinary act of local defiance to withhold co-operation. Co-operation given in this manner however is vastly different from the sort of popular support which critics of the Southern position in Viet Nam seem to assume the Viet Cong enjoy.

Gradually, in the years after 1956, the scope of these terrorist activities increased to the point where the South Vietnamese government, with the limited resources at its disposal, was unable to cope with the problem of guaranteeing the security of its people against this kind of subversion. In these circumstances the South Vietnamese government did what any government confronted with these problems would do: It appealed for help in the exercise of the legitimate right of self-defence. This is permitted under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. To this appeal the United States responded affirmatively, at the same time making it clear that when the need for military help ended, it would be terminated.

These then, are the basic elements in the historical evolution of the dangerous situation confronting the world today in Viet Nam. Steadily increasing interference by North Viet Nam in the affairs of the South has led to the steady increase of the United States presence. It is imperative that the two should be seen together if our analysis of the problem—let alone our prescription for its remedy—is to have any meaning. These developments have been a source of direct concern to the Canadian government right from the beginning. As a member of the International Commission in Viet Nam we have a firsthand and independent experience of the failure, on all sides, to live up to the terms of the Geneva Cease-Fire Agreement which it is the Commission's task to supervise but not to implement. I repeat, that if all sides were to live up to the Geneva Cease-Fire Agreement of 1954, we could have peace in that area. There are instruments provided in the Agreement for dealing with grievances. However, if there is no disposition to live up to an agreement, a country like ours has no power, certainly by itself, to enforce it. And so, we must observe and report the situation—in terms of violations of the agreement—as we see it. I think that to the best of our ability under the successive Canadian governments we have done so and we will continue to do so in the hope that the objective and impartial discharge of our responsibilities in the face of facts available to us may go some distance towards focusing international attention

onto all the disturbing factors in the situation and persuading all those involved to face up to their own responsibilities for the generation of this tension and conversely for its relaxation.

In the Commission's special report of June 2, 1962, an Indian-Canadian majority presented a balanced assessment of what had been happening in Viet Nam where violations of the Cease-Fire Agreement by both sides were producing a dangerously unstable situation. Since that report was published, the situation has deteriorated even further, as we feared it would in the absence of corrective measures applicable to all violations of the Agreement. The intensification of activities in violation of the Agreement led to the Commission's special message, dated February 13 of this year which, together with the 1962 Report I tabled on March 8. It gives, as Prime Minister Wilson has said, a balanced picture. I would point out that of those countries with whom we are associated in the NATO alliance, no one country has publicly taken a position basically different from the position taken by the government of Canada. This is not without its significance. Since there has been some misunderstanding of the minority report of February 13 presented by Canada, I want to add a few comments by way of clarifying our position.

● (10:25 a.m.)

The Canadian minority statement represents our assessment of the facts available to the Commission in Viet Nam. It was submitted for reasons arising out of our conviction, based on more than ten years of experience, that to report on only one aspect of the situation in Viet Nam, to deal publicly with only one set of violations of the Agreement, is seriously to distort the assessment of the situation.

It has been argued that the Canadian statement condones the policies of South Viet Nam and United States authorities in bombing North Vietnamese installations. I do not know how anyone could possibly come to that conclusion. The sole purpose of the Canadian statement was to augment the presentation of facts in the Indian-Polish report with other and equally significant material including a direct reference to the South Vietnamese authorities' explanation of the events in question.

Our Commission colleagues had been unwilling in the opinion of the Canadian minority report to take these relevant facts into account; this made it necessary for us to do so in order to restore the sense of balance on which the 1962 report was based, but which the majority report in the 1965 message lacked.

If we had signed the Indian-Polish documents—and we did not disagree with the facts which it reports—without augmenting it, we might have run the risk of having the Commission convey the impression that the situation described in the 1962 report had changed; that the only violations of the Geneva Agreement since 1962 had been the air strikes against North Viet Nam, and that therefore responsibility rested on South Viet Nam and the United States for the danger of wider hostilities.

Well, in our statement I think we have indicated that this would clearly present a false impression. There is no change in the nature of the situation, but rather there has been an intensification of the same factors as were noted in the 1962 report.

Mr. DOUGLAS: Before the minister leaves that point, would he be good enough to clarify his statement of a moment ago that the Canadian delegate did not disagree with the report, and clarify the statement which is in the majority report which said that the Canadian delegate dissents from the terms of this report?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Because it was incomplete. We do not dissent from the facts of the statement, as I have just said, because it was not complete.

Mr. DOUGLAS: Can the minister quote the part which says that we agree?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We do not disagree with the facts, but we say that the report did not go far enough, and that it was not a complete report. That is why we felt we should issue a minority report.

Mr. DOUGLAS: Is there any statement in the Canadian delegate's report which would substantiate this?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I shall get it.

The CHAIRMAN: I wonder if we could withhold questions until this statement is over, if possible?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am just about through.

Unless North Vietnamese activities and policies are identified, recognized and taken into account, the Commission would be failing to live up to its full range of responsibilities and would be conveying a misleading impression of the problems before it.

This leads me to make a few brief comments on the contents of the Canadian statement and the materials on which it was based. The first half of the statement relates to the conclusions of the comprehensive legal study prepared and re-edited within the Commission. I discussed this at some length in the House of Commons on March 8 and I explained the nature of this legal submission. What I said then may be perhaps read with what I am saying today.

The second section of the Canadian statement, in referring to recent allegations of Northern aggression, did not purport to be Commission conclusions. Rather, this section was intended to demonstrate that the Commission had, since its special report of 1962, continued to receive serious allegations, the gravity of which was indicated by references to the substance of the complaints, of Northern aggression in the South. The Commission has not given these matters the attention they deserve, it has not established to the best of its ability whether the complaints are supported by sufficient evidence to warrant the Commission drawing firm conclusions comparable to those concerning the earlier cases in the special report.

To ignore these problems by failing to report that they are and indeed have been before the Commission for some time would be to create a seriously distorted image of the full range of violations of the Geneva Agreements of which the Commission has had knowledge.

I am sure that members of the committee will agree that this would be an intolerable deviation from the impartial and objective approach which I am satisfied beyond any doubt Canadian representatives both civilian and military on the Commission have sought to follow since we accepted this responsibility in 1954.

Far from justifying or condoning the policies followed by one or the other of the parties, or both, we have attempted—and when I say we, I

mean the Canadian members of the Commission, some former officers are here today sitting against this wall, who spent many difficult months under trying circumstances in Indo China—to take cognizance of all the relevant facts and to impart a sense of balance to the picture presented to the international community at large by the Commission.

Now I believe that if we are to understand what is at stake in Viet Nam, we must realize that this is no local rebellion arising mainly out of agrarian discontent with an unpopular government, although undoubtedly it contains some of these elements, and in sufficient degree to lend an air of credibility to the argument of those who would so convince us.

It is not uncommon to hear claims made that the Liberation Front,—the political organization of the Viet Cong—and its leadership are drawn from a broad and representative stream of South Vietnamese dissenting opinion, not all of it Communist or even pro-Communist.

For example, it is sometimes asserted that the leader of the Liberation Front is not a Communist. As far as I can judge, this is largely a matter of speculation, and I have material on which to judge, because he is a shadowy figure seldom seen except by Communist journalists such as Wilfrid Burchett. For a political figure who is reported to control the greater part of the country and to command the allegiance of many people, he, no less than his organization, are shadowy presences indeed. As a movement, the Liberation Front has no acknowledged headquarters. Indeed I doubt whether many people even today know the leader's name. That his opposition to Diem was responsible for his leaving Saigon is indisputable, just as it is in the case of prominent figures in the present South Vietnamese administration headed by Dr. Quat, who was likewise an opponent of Diem but whose opposition did not take the form of joining the Viet Cong.

● (10:35 a.m.)

Similarly, it was recently asserted that Hanoi had no more control over the Viet Cong than Stalin had over Mao Tse-Tung. Now, this is a categorical statement made about a relationship, the nature of which deliberately is kept hidden. However, available evidence suggests that precisely the reverse conditions obtain. In this connection the comments of the Viet Nam Commission's legal committee, as quoted in our minority statement of February 13, are of direct relevance.

Now, I have gone into the background of some of our experiences on the Commission in this detail because I thought it important for the committee to understand why in a matter of this grave situation simple solutions will not do, attractive though they may appear.

I would not want anyone to think that in the last portion of my presentation I have sought to give the impression that our approach to this problem was that of a blind protagonist; it is not that at all. We have a responsibility on the Commission, and I have a responsibility on behalf of the government, to accept the submissions of that Commission or to reject them, and I have seen no reason for taking the latter course. Therefore, I felt it was my duty to at least take this opportunity, the first in some time, to put on the record our assessment of some of the factors; but I would not want this assessment in any way to becloud what I said at the beginning.

We appreciate the dangers involved in this situation. We recognize that it would be tragic if this situation in Viet Nam were to expand, if it were to involve more vigorous participation by other countries. I have no

reason to believe that there is any evidence that this will be the case, but in this day when war should no longer be an instrument of national policy it is difficult for a country like Canada, subscribing as it does to the United Nations Charter, to see this kind of conflict being pursued. We have to bear in mind the consequence of capitulation or of defeat for either side. We must bear in mind the advantages of proper accommodation, perhaps through negotiations, without any preconditions, so that we might reach a stage of settlement in an area of Asia which vitally effects strategically not only the mainland but some other countries with whom we have the closest Commonwealth association. I repeat, we are doing everything we can do. I asked myself this morning is there anything more that we, as a nation, can do, having in mind our responsibilities and our over-all obligations and interests, to try and bring about a cease-fire. I can only say I do not know of anything more that we can do. But, I do know we are not going to stop doing what we are doing.

I regret that the United Nations is not capable of intervening in this situation. This is not because of any act of ours, but there is a constitutional and financial crisis which has crippled its effectiveness in this kind of a situation. The Prime Minister has suggested that if a conference took place and conclusions are reached about an independent or neutral Viet Nam, in order to give substance to that conference arrangements must be made to provide guarantees for the observance of the commitments reached.

We have the experience of violations of the 1954 Agreement almost right away, infiltrations beginning from the North, with all the consequences that confront the world today. In view of the mistakes in Asia it would not be realistic for the west and for the nations of Asia, to assume that a final settlement can be reached in the absence of some kind of sanction, some kind of guarantee. The Prime Minister suggested that the United Nations normally would be the body to whom would be assigned this responsibility, but for the reasons I have mentioned this is not practical and there would thereby repose on the international community a responsibility to provide that kind of guarantee. This, I think, is a minimum requirement. But, it will not be easy because this kind of a presence depends in the final analysis upon the acceptance of all the parties concerned, and without their consent such an arrangement is just not practical even though it is undoubtedly desirable.

Then, I would like to say we have given consideration to the suggestion of the President of India, Mr. Radhakrishnan. His proposal for an Asian-African force or presence differs from our Prime Minister's in the fact that while we were thinking of a presence after a conference as a means of guaranteeing the terms of settlement, the President of India was thinking in terms of a presence that would intervene before any conclusions or any settlement was reached.

Mr. Chairman, I think this is all I have to say at this point on this subject except, in answer to Mr. Douglas, that I would like to complete my answer and refer you to what I said in the House of Commons on March 8. I said, first of all:

While not denying the facts on which the majority report of 1965 is based, the Canadian government believes it presents an oversimplified and misleading impression of the root causes of the dangerous instability in Viet Nam. To correct such an impression the Canadian delegation has appended a statement to the majority report in the hope that the special message as a whole might reflect more accurately the full scope of the problem in Viet Nam.

Then, there is the statement of the Canadian delegation which, in effect, says that we do not dispute the facts as stated in the majority report but that they do not represent the whole story. I would like to quote from paragraph 2 on page 12, which reads as follows:

The Canadian delegation agrees that the situation in Viet Nam continues to be dangerously unstable, and events since February 7 in North and South Viet Nam have provided a dramatic demonstration of this continuing condition.

● (10:45 a.m.)

The delegation believes, however, that the causes of this situation must be seen in context, and, therefore, reviewed in the framework of the Commission's full range of responsibilities under the Geneva Agreement. By concentrating on a very limited aspect of the situation in Viet Nam, the majority report runs the serious risk of giving the members of the Geneva Conference a distorted picture of the nature of the problem in Viet Nam and its underlying causes.

In reporting on the events in North and South Viet Nam since February 7, the Canadian delegation, therefore, deems it necessary to set these events in their proper perspective.

Mr. DOUGLAS: All I was seeking to point out is that the majority report itself, in paragraph 2, says:

(While in full agreement that a report should be made to the Co-chairmen, the Canadian delegation dissents from the terms of this majority report and has expressed its views in the attached statement.)

It seems to me this is much stronger than merely suggesting the Canadian minority report was for the purpose of augmenting the majority report.

The CHAIRMAN: Would it be worth while to have the Canadian report appended to our Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence?

Mr. DOUGLAS: Only if the majority report also is appended. The report of India and Poland also should be appended.

The CHAIRMAN: Would it be agreeable that the majority report and the minority report, without the appendices, be appended to today's proceedings? I am not pressing this point, but it might be helpful to anyone who reads our proceedings.

Mr. DOUGLAS: I am quite agreeable to appending both the majority and minority reports for 1965, but will the report of 1962 be appended also?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think they should be put together.

Mr. NESBITT: Because of the very considerable misunderstanding and lack of information, for a number of reasons as the Minister has pointed out, I would think all these reports should be appended and that this committee should give consideration to having a greater number of printings made of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence for today because there may be a number of people interested, from public media and institutions and others, and who very well might wish to have copies of today's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence.

The CHAIRMAN: Would your suggestion be that the printing be increased by a certain amount?

Mr. NESBITT: I think it should be increased, together with the majority of these appendices, so that this information would be available to any member.

The CHAIRMAN: Would it be agreeable that 1,000 additional copies in English and 500 additional copies in French be printed?

Agreed.

Mr. NESBITT: Would that be in addition to the usual number?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Before we move on too far, I think we owe a vote of thanks to the Minister for the very full report he has brought us this morning. I would like to move that vote of thanks.

Mrs. KONANTZ: I would like to second that motion.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not think Mr. Douglas was here when I began. I said, without apportioning responsibility, that I share the feeling which I understand he has, from a statement he has made several times about the inadequacy of discussion in the House. There are a number of problems which I am anxious to have aired through this committee. The Viet Nam situation is one, others are the situation in the U.N.; developments in disarmament; our position with regard to the situation in the Dominican Republic, particularly in so far as the establishment of a regional organization has to do with the U.N. I am at the disposal of the committee to explore these or any other problems.

Mr. DOUGLAS: I think first we ought to consider what course we propose to follow after the Minister's lengthy presentation this morning.

The CHAIRMAN: Prior to your arrival, Mr. Douglas, I suggested—and it was agreed—that the Secretary of State for External Affairs would address himself to one aspect of international affairs which he considered of consequence and then this would be followed by questions in that area before he proceeded on, say, to the Dominican Republic, or problems generally prevailing in the United Nations. Would that be agreeable to you?

Mr. DOUGLAS: I would hope we would go much further and would be able to hear other witnesses on questions of this kind.

The CHAIRMAN: That is a matter we might perhaps consider in due course. I must point out that by the terms of reference we do not actually have the legal right to hear anyone other than the Secretary of State for External Affairs. The only thing before us at the moment is the estimates. Of course, this may be cured in the proceedings in the House as of this coming Friday. Perhaps at this stage we might confine ourselves to the evidence of Mr. Martin. This does not limit us thereafter to developing any aspect of his evidence in any way the committee would be pleased to do.

Mr. DOUGLAS: It seems to me there would not be great difficulty in getting the House to agree to give this committee authority to call witnesses. The Minister has given us this morning what he called a condensed version of the history of Viet Nam. I think in the process of condensation there has been a certain amount of selectivity in the facts that were brought forth. I do not

think there is much use in members of the committee arguing back and forth about the historical facts in Viet Nam. It seems to me this committee might be very wise to call some of the university professors, who are proficient in this field and who have made a study of Viet Nam, in order that we might get this kind of background. Certainly, as the Minister said, an understanding of the present situation is contingent on the historical facts that preceded the present unfortunate situation.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, we have the Minister before us this morning. The usual procedure, from the opening of the committee, when we have a statement from a Minister, is that we confine ourselves to an examination of the statement of the Minister at that time, and matters such as Mr. Douglas is discussing this morning then are referred to the steering committee and the steering committee works out these things. I think it would be a great waste of time to pursue this line of discussion now which is properly part of the business of the committee at some time when the Minister is not here. I would suggest that we move on to the examination of the Minister upon the statement he has given us.

● (10:55 a.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: I first recognize then for questions Mr. Nesbitt, followed by Mr. Gelber.

Mr. GELBER: Mr. Chairman, I want to say something about the procedure. I do not think we are a historical society and I do not think we need professors to tell us what happened in the nineteenth century. I think it was of great interest but it was incidental to the current problem. We are here, I think, to discuss government policy and the Minister had told us and we know that the Government of Canada is concerned with bringing about conciliation. I think while the Minister is here that this aspect should be pursued and we should not get involved in historical disputations about areas of Indo-China history. We are an External Affairs Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Gelber. I am in the hands of the committee and the committee has already decided that we would question Mr. Martin on this aspect of the statement Mr. Nesbitt?

Mr. NESBITT: I have two questions. I realize that the Minister has been here for a very long time.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I do not mind.

Mr. NESBITT: We have been meeting since nine o'clock and there are a number of questions which no doubt wish to be asked. I have two but would reserve the right to ask some more at a later stage. We cannot sit here all day. The first of the two questions I would like to ask the Minister, is this: With respect to attempting to arrange some sort of a conciliation committee or conference of some sort, has any consideration been given by the government or by any other countries to having the North Vietnamese government or the Republic of China approached by countries such as Pakistan, Tanzania or Yugoslavia with respect to continuing conferences in Asia, something in the nature of a conference to promote peace and prosperity?

The reason I ask that question is this. Certainly the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his position as Secretary-General, might not be persona grata in view of the fact that the Republic of China's credentials have not been accepted in the U.N.

Has any approach been made to governments such as Pakistan, Tanzania or Yugoslavia to suggest to the North Vietnamese and the People's Republic of China, and other immediately concerned governments, that they should convene conferences on peace and prosperity in Asia?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I suggested, Mr. Nesbitt, in the early part of my statement that I joined with Mr. Stewart, the Foreign Secretary of Britain, in agreeing in anticipation to any kind of conference on this particular question. It has a much wider reference to Asia as a whole, both in its political and in its economic terms. I have also indicated our own initiative with regard to the indirect value of a conference on Laos. I also indicated that we supported the British appeal for a conference on Cambodia. I stated to the House the day before yesterday that we welcomed the announcement by the United States that it would agree to conferences with Cambodia on the terms set out by Prince Sihanouk, namely that the conference on Cambodia should deal only with the Cambodia border problem.

Seventeen nonaligned powers met at Belgrade in April. They made an appeal which we supported. At that conference they discussed the possibility of foregathering with all the parties concerned. There was a rejection by the Chinese People's Republic of the appeal of the seventeen non-aligned powers. We have had quiet discussions ourselves with certain heads of missions in Ottawa. I have had some discussions myself with certain heads of missions when I was in the United Kingdom recently, and with certain Foreign Ministers, all designed to lead to the object postulated in your question. No effort, I assure you, is being spared in the pursuit of what you had in mind in your question but it takes two sides to bring about an agreement. There has been no firm indication from Hanoi except in terms of the four conditions that I have read out, obviously presenting, at least some of them, possible acceptance. There has not been the slightest indication on the part of the Chinese People's Republic of any encouragement. The Prime Minister of China was in Tanzania over the weekend and he had discussions there with President Nyerere. I believe that our Prime Minister, when he is in London, may take advantage of his presence there to pursue this matter further with some Prime Ministers, including, I hope, President Nyerere of Tanzania and the President of Pakistan, Mr. Ayub Khan. He will be at the Prime Ministers' Conference and advantage will be taken of these contacts to explore continuously the possibilities of finding a way of bringing the parties together. I have thrown out the suggestion that consideration might be given to leaving to the government of North Viet Nam free choice of the delegation that might attend preliminary or substantive discussions. That, of course, will be a matter over which we will have no control. I have just thrown out the suggestion myself.

● (11:05 a.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nesbitt, do you mind if I recognize you after the next person on my list, Mr. McIntosh? Each person may ask one question and then I will come back to you again.

Mr. MCINTOSH: My question is related to Mr. Nesbitt's.

I was interested in what the Secretary of State for External Affairs said about our objective, our aim, or our appeal in the Viet Nam crisis being negotiation. Then he went on to list the four points on which North Viet Nam would negotiate.

My question is this. Can Canada see any merit in any of the claims or any of the four points which North Viet Nam put forward? Is there any ground for mutual understanding between the United States, which is the other party in this affair, and Viet Nam? If there is no common ground on which they can negotiate, then what is Canada's position in regard to the conflict? Are we in favour of the United States point of view or the North Viet Nam point of view? How far will Canada go with the views of the United States?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): May I deal with the first part of your question? If you will look at the four conditions you will see that it is just not possible to say with regard to any one of them whether you accept it because they are very general in their character. They cover a wide range of subjects. You have to analyse each one of them. Take first number one. "Recognition of basic national rights of the Vietnamese people": no one would quarrel with that. But the question is, what are the basic national rights. "Peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity." Peace? Certainly. Independence? Certainly. Sovereignty? Certainly. Unity? What does unity mean? Does it mean a forced union of North and South? That is a matter obviously for very serious negotiation unless you wish to impose on the South—or on the North—a condition which neither one is prepared to accept. Territorial integrity? What are to be the demarcation lines? These are all arguable points. There are some features of these that one could support. The basic one that I think is impossible to accept is the one relating to the withdrawal of the forces of the United States.

Mr. McINTOSH: My question, Mr. Martin, was on what grounds could there be negotiation between the two. Has Canada any suggestion in that regard?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We are suggesting that there should be first of all a ceasefire; that there should be negotiation without any preconditions at all; that the fighting should stop; and that we sit down and discuss it.

Mr. Seaborn did discuss this with the Foreign Minister of North Viet Nam the other day. There have been some discussions with the government of North Viet Nam by other countries. I think I can say accurately that there is a general feeling of a lack of clarification of what these four conditions really imply.

May I now deal with the second part of your question?

We recognize that the South have the right to bring in outside forces to help defend it in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. We have said that we cannot afford to allow this kind of aggression to succeed. If it succeeds in Viet Nam, then it will be repeated some day later elsewhere—in Asia, in Thailand. I have already commented on the situation in Australia and New Zealand and the implications for Malaysia, the Philippines, and so on. So there is no doubt where Canada stands. That has nothing to do, however, with our recognition of the futility of conflict and of its dangers, a recognition which has been proclaimed by the President of the United States himself.

It takes two sides to bring about a settlement. If we cannot get the other side to agree, are we to argue that the United States forces and those of the South must just stay there immobile? This is the terrible dilemma with which one is faced. But capitulation or defeat in respect of the position taken by the United States is something that Canada would regard as unsupportable.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Brewin.

Mr. BREWIN: I would like to ask the Secretary of State for External Affairs whether any reason was advanced as far as he knows by Mr. Gromyko for refusing to go along with the co-chairman, Mr. Stewart, in calling a conference of the Geneva powers. Were any reasons given or were any suggestions made that under different conditions they would be willing to call a conference?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The Soviet Union did say at one point that it was in favour of a conference on Cambodia. It, however, refused to join with Mr. Stewart, the Foreign Minister, the other co-chairman, in trying to urge upon the other original members of the Geneva Conference to agree to the holding of such a conference.

I am sure that the Soviet Union is greatly concerned about developments in Indo-China. I wish it were possible for the Soviet Union to take a more positive position. I think I understand some of its concern and some of its problems. I cannot speak about these. I do not think I want to say anything at this time that would be misunderstood in that quarter, but I would simply reiterate that I think the appeal made by the other co-chairman, Mr. Stewart, to the Soviet Union is one that the Soviet Union in the long run would find in its interests to follow. What I am seeking to convey in this last comment is obviously that some of the hesitations of the Soviet Union in this matter involve these complex relations with China and North Viet Nam.

Mr. BREWIN: I was wondering if it had ever been suggested by the Soviet Union or by any other person that the cessation of air strikes or bombing by the United States Air Force of Viet Nam has perhaps become a necessary precondition to a conference to solve these problems?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I can say, Mr. Brewin, that there was a five-day pause. I would hope if this regrettable situation should continue that there will be further diminutions in these attacks that will give opportunity for reconsideration on the part of the North as to the desirability of beginning talks.

Mr. BREWIN: I wonder if the Canadian government has ever directly suggested to the United States or to anyone else that it would be helpful at this stage, with a view to the settlement that we all desire, were there to be a cessation of the air strikes in North Viet Nam.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I can only refer you, Mr. Brewin, to the speech made by the Prime Minister in New York about seven weeks ago and to the speech made by him at Temple University in Philadelphia about a month ago. I can give you assurances that these matters are the subject of very active discussion.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Gelber.

● (11:15 a.m.)

Mr. GELBER: Mr. Martin, we certainly have reached a tragic and most serious impasse. The Americans have said they are prepared to negotiate without condition, or without precondition—but with whom? Whatever their history, there is a *de facto* government in much of South Viet Nam with which neither the South Vietnamese government nor the United States would be prepared to negotiate. I am wondering whether the conditions laid down by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Viet Nam are as important as the question whether the national liberation front in the South would be allowed

to come to the negotiating table. The United States should certainly not negotiate with them as long as the South Vietnamese government will not recognize them. I am just wondering whether negotiations should be undertaken at some other level and whether there could be effective negotiations as long as this *de facto* government which exists in South Viet Nam—the rebel government—is excluded?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): This would undoubtedly be one of the considerations. I said a moment ago that I had thrown out the suggestion that consideration might be given to giving North Viet Nam the freedom to select its own delegation. Whether this would be acceptable to the other parties is a matter that only the other governments can say. This is one of the conditions, of course, that would be imposed from the North.

In considering this I suppose the United States, for one, would want to give consideration to what happened when the French dealt with the Viet Minh. However, I have thrown out the suggestion in the form that I have, and it partly answers your question.

Mr. DOUGLAS: Mr. Chairman, I want to ask the Minister the following question: Have the four conditions laid down by the government at Hanoi and transmitted to Mr. Seaborn on, I think, May 31, been passed on to the government of the United States for their consideration, and if so, which, if any of them, are acceptable to the United States Government?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): You will remember that on April 7, I think, the President made a statement in which he said that they were prepared to negotiate without preconditions. There was no direct response to that offer, but at about the same time, there was a speech made publicly by the North Vietnamese Prime Minister stating that North Viet Nam was prepared to approach the problem only on the basis of four conditions, and these four conditions are before us. The difficulty is to understand precisely what some of the conditions really mean.

Mr. DOUGLAS: May I ask this question: Two of the conditions are perfectly clear: one that Mr. Gelber has pointed out, that the Viet Cong must be included in any negotiations, and, two, that the Geneva accord of 1954 be the starting point. Is there agreement to accept these two conditions?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): On the last point, that is not what is provided for. That would have been a very satisfactory base, and that has been the main contention we have been making: If you observe the provisions of the Geneva Agreement there is no reason for any dispute. The only reference to the Geneva Agreement in the conditions is the proposal that, pending the peaceful reunification of Viet Nam there be a division made into two zones, these zones being in the military provisions provided for in the 1954 Geneva Agreement.

Mr. DOUGLAS: I would interpret the conditions laid down by Hanoi, when they talk about unity and the right of self-determination, as the very basis of the Geneva accord, and is this not exactly what is meant when it is suggested that the provisional border be on the 17th parallel, and when they talk about elections to let the people decide whether or not there would be reunification?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would doubt there would be any agreement now on elections under these circumstances, under the terms that are proposed

in these four conditions. I have seen a synthesis made of these four conditions by people who purport to speak for the North, and what is clear, I think, is that they now want the United States out—this would be a precondition. They also want the Viet Cong to be one of the negotiating partners. You ask me: Have we ascertained from the United States its reaction to these proposals, which I say have not been properly clarified. I am sure that the condition asking the United States to withdraw is wholly unacceptable. We would not support that.

As to the participation of the Viet Cong, I have made the suggestion that the government of the North might be free to select its own delegation. Now, what the reaction to that would be, I do not know, but I want to emphasize that if there is this feeling of uncertainty regarding what the four conditions fully imply, effort is being made now to try and get greater precision of the conditions. Obviously in the first condition there are several objectives with which one would not quarrel but which themselves do not necessarily provide the basis for negotiations regarding what the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people are. As I said earlier, there would be no difficulty in accepting the objectives of "peace, independence and unity," but "unity" when, under what conditions? It will not be easy in the face of the developments since 1954 to bring about that unity any more than it has been easy in our time to bring about the unification of a divided Germany.

Mr. DOUGLAS: Mr. Chairman, may I say with great deference that the Minister has told us what the North Vietnamese will not accept. I am also trying to find out what the United States would be prepared to accept. Do I take it the United States has not indicated, either publicly or to the Government of Canada, that it is prepared to include the Viet Cong in negotiations?

Hon. Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I cannot go any further than what I have said. I have said that I have thrown out a suggestion that the government of the North should be free to select a composition of its own delegation at a conference.

Mr. DOUGLAS: The other question which I wish to ask is this.

The CHAIRMAN: Is your question on another subject? Could we put your name on the list again? I would be grateful if members would endeavour to ask one question at a time and then receive an answer, and not engage in a series of questions. Quite a number of members still wish to ask questions during this period.

Mr. DOUGLAS: How long will we sit?

The CHAIRMAN: As long as we can, until 12.30 or 1 o'clock.

Hon. Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Could we stop at 12 o'clock?

The CHAIRMAN: We will stop at 12 o'clock.

● (11:25 a.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Walker?

Mr. WALKER: What do you consider would be the consequences of an American withdrawal at this time?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think no doubt that there would be a complete overrun of the whole of Viet Nam by the North, and by the Viet Cong. The consequences of what the position China would be, I do not know. But

the most serious part of all would be the consequences for Thailand, Burma, India, New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. What it would mean for us would be that the barriers would be brought closer to home, perhaps right to our own doorstep. While we must recognize that Asia must be allowed to work out its own destiny, and that it has great prerogatives, and that these must not be usurped by the west, nevertheless there is involved in this tragic situation the deepest implications for us, and for many countries with whom we have the closest ties. I did not mention Japan, but I might well have mentioned her.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Martineau?

Mr. MARTINEAU: Mr. Chairman, the minister has given us a very thorough account, I think, of Canada's activity, and especially of its efforts to reach a compromise solution. But my question to the Minister would be, do the principal participants recognize Canada's presumed role as a peacemaker in that part of the world? In other words, have the offices of Canada been requested by any participant, either the Viet Nam, or the United States, or anybody else? Does Canada's wish and initiative in this matter come with the worthy objective of furthering world peace, or has Canada received some commitment from some of the participants to fulfil this role? Could the minister amplify on that?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well we are, as I say, a member of the Commission.

Mr. MARTINEAU: I mean outside of that.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I say we are a member of the Commission. That is our status and our only status, apart from our natural interest as a member in the society of nations. When we asked Mr. Seaborn to go to Hanoi the other day this was done at our instance.

Mr. MARTINEAU: So?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I prefer not to go any further than that.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Klein?

Mr. KLEIN: Mr. Minister, is it not possible that the reason that North Viet Nam has laid down these important conditions as a precedent to a solution is to obtain strategic military positions of strength which they feel that in time they can accomplish, and then sit down and negotiate from the point of view that they have won over strategic positions rather than really wanting to sit down and discuss a settlement? Is it not possible too that if the allied countries support the United States position we might be creating a deeper and deeper split between Red China and the Soviet Union over a period of time?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I have not any doubt that among their objectives the North hope to achieve an improvement in their status quo position at the time of the conference. They began work to this end shortly after the Geneva conference of 1954, and their efforts have gradually increased. I am not anxious to say anything that adds to or complicates our situation with regard to other countries, but I think it is reasonable speculation that it might be thought to be in China's interest to see the war continue as a means of narrowing or rather of increasing the gap between the Soviet Union and the West. And *per contra* an intensification of the war could very well

have the result of making the gap between the East and West greater and of moving the Soviet Union closer to China. I do not want to say anything more.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Dube?

Mr. DUBE: I would like to go back to the Geneva Agreement of 1954. I believe the minister stated that one of the parties refused to sign. Was that the government of South Viet Nam?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The government of South Viet Nam and the United States.

Mr. DUBE: What was the reason?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): They did not agree with the division of the country.

The CHAIRMAN: The Minister referred in his evidence to a declaration of Mr. Tran Van Do, the delegate of Viet Nam.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, we will table it.

The CHAIRMAN: Is it agreed that this will be printed as a third appendix?

Mr. DOUGLAS: What is its value?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It was a statement by the representative of the South Vietnamese government as to the reasons it refused to sign the Agreement of 1954. In other words, that they are not bound by the Agreement.

Mr. DOUGLAS: The Truce Commission thought they were.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): How could they be bound if they did not sign it?

Mr. DOUGLAS: The Truce Commission assumed all along that they were bound.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, never. I know who said that.

Mr. DOUGLAS: The Canadian representative said it.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Deachman?

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Minister, what is the exact position?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): For the record, I could not accept it that the Canadian representative took that position.

Mr. DOUGLAS: The Canadian report of July 1962 said in effect—and I will read it as follows:

The commission is also of the view that, though there may not be any formal military alliance between the governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Vietnam, the establishment of a United States of America Military Assistance Command in South Vietnam, as well as the introduction of a large number of United States of America military personnel beyond the stated strength of the MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group), amounts to a factual military alliance, which is prohibited under article 19 of the Geneva Agreement.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is a different matter.

Mr. DOUGLAS: How can the South Vietnamese have violated the Agreement if they were not bound by it?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Because there were members of the so-called alliance that did sign; but no Canadian spokesman ever said that South Viet Nam was bound by the Geneva Agreement, because they never signed it.

Mr. DOUGLAS: The Canadian representative said that South Viet Nam had violated the Agreement. How could they violate it if they had never signed it?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think the Commission has received reasonable co-operation from South Viet Nam but it has never recognized any of the legal obligations upon South Viet Nam as a result of its failure to sign the Agreement.

● (11:35 a.m.)

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Minister, what is the exact position of Australia and New Zealand relative to Viet Nam? Could you indicate what part they are playing in negotiations at the present time and what military involvement there is, as well as other forms of assistance?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Australia has decided to send a battalion to assist the South.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Is that in addition to support relative to the Indonesian problem?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, but that is a separate problem. They have one or two battalions in Malaysia. New Zealand has agreed to send an artillery unit to the South. In addition to that Australia is providing about \$2½ million worth of external aid. I have forgotten the exact New Zealand figure.

Apart altogether from that Australia, naturally, is very anxious to see pacification, I am sure Australia can be said to be doing all in its power to achieve this end. The Prime Minister of Australia did take a position with regard to the situation in Viet Nam in which he thought—I had better look up exactly the way he stated it because I would not want to do him an injustice. He did take a different position than the position taken by ourselves, the British and some other countries.

Mr. Ritchie has suggested, and I think it would be very useful, that I make reference to the statements made by Mr. Paul Hasluck, the Secretary of State for External Affairs for Australia in the Australian parliament on this subject, when they were discussing the dispatch of a battalion. I think it would be useful if I tabled that with the committee. It is a notable speech.

The CHAIRMAN: Is that agreed?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you proceed now, Mrs. Konantz.

Mrs. KONANTZ: Mr. Minister, I understand there are a great many other nations of the free world which are helping South Viet Nam in one way or another, either militarily or economically, and I wondered if they are voicing their opinions at this time as to how negotiations might come about.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Oh, yes. This is a subject of considerable discussion among most countries at the United Nations. For instance, I mentioned the activities of the 17 non-aligned countries, when they met in Belgrade in April, and this was one of the subjects that engaged their attention. I am sure when the conference in Algiers meets the week after next there will be very considerable discussion because all nations are vitally concerned. This is reflected in my continuous consultations and talks here with the heads of missions and ambassadors of other countries. There is a genuine concern about this situ-

ation, and there should be. But, it is very significant that in the Belgrade appeal of these non-aligned nations the appeal was made to both sides. It was not directed to the United States; it was directed to the United States and to China, and to the North Vietnamese and to the South Vietnamese. The President of the United States, apart from Canada and Britain, was the only one that gave a favourable reaction to that appeal, which was summarily dismissed by the Chinese People's Republic.

Of course, a number of countries are giving a lot of economic assistance. We ourselves have an economic assistance program for Viet Nam in the total sum of \$1.2 million; this includes an additional \$500,000 we announced about eight months ago. As you know, the President proposed a \$1 billion economic development program, and we were the first country that has said that we would support this Southeast Asia economic development scheme along the Mekong. As a matter of fact, Canada has spent a considerable amount of money now on this very project; we did the initial mapping. There has been a total of over \$67 million pledged or contributed to the Mekong development project already, and it would be very satisfying if our energies and our resources, as well as those of other countries, could be channelled into this kind of endeavour. But, it is unrealistic and unfair to suggest that if this is not the case the fault lies on one side, because it does not.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Patterson is next and then, if he has any questions, Mr. Forest; then I will get back to those persons who indicated they had other questions, namely Mr. Nesbitt and Mr. Douglas.

Mr. PATTERSON: Mr. Minister, you have mentioned the number of nations that naturally are very concerned about the situation in Viet Nam. But, I believe there is a regional alliance in the area known as SEATO. I was wondering if this alliance is at all active in this particular situation. Could you tell us whether it has been seized with this problem and if it has made any recommendations or endeavoured to negotiate and work out some solution to the problem?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, the United States is a member of SEATO, but it is the only member involved in SEATO apart from Australia. SEATO is not the same kind of alliance as, for instance, NATO, and the limited participation of some of its members, together with the relatively weak military position of most of them renders that alliance less able to participate in the situation. But, undoubtedly, one of the reasons for Australia's decision to send a battalion arises out of the fact that it is a member of SEATO. It is a member of SEATO because it is in Asia and because it has a direct geographical interest based upon proximity.

Mr. PATTERSON: But, leaving the military aspect out of it, they have not taken a position from a moral point of view.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, but France, which is a member of SEATO, has indicated its withdrawal from SEATO in the terms of this Viet Nam context.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you proceed now, Mr. Nesbitt.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, I have a brief question in respect of something the Minister mentioned in reply to a question put by Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. Minister, I do not expect you to answer in detail but could you indicate to the committee whether or not the government has information at its disposal that would indicate if South Viet Nam were to fall into the hands of North Viet Nam that, for instance, Thailand and perhaps Malaysia and other countries subsequently would fall victims in the very near future?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would hope they would not fall. I would think the dangers were very great. The Thais themselves are very much confident of their own capacity to resist.

Mr. NESBITT: What I am getting at is this; we have indications that this is the type of activity that has gone on over the years in South Viet Nam at the instigation of North Viet Nam and, perhaps, others, and that the same kind of activity would take place in Thailand or elsewhere.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not think there is any doubt about that. As a matter of fact, China has announced that Thailand is next on the list.

Mr. NESBITT: My next question is a follow-up on the one I put previously. As I understand the Minister's remarks, the purpose of having a conference on Cambodia was to get parties concerned in this matter in Viet Nam at least in the same building and perhaps informal discussions might take place outside the formal conference on Cambodia. Since this has not been adopted by certain powers, would the Minister think there might be a wider conference—as I was attempting to indicate earlier—on perhaps the peace and prosperity of Asia, convened by another country such as Pakistan, or some country like that.

● (11:45 a.m.)

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have already indicated we would welcome this proposal; we would welcome any proposal that would bring the parties together. Apart altogether from the situation in Viet Nam, this would be from the point of view of development of the whole region, a very important and necessary thing to do. This suggestion already has been made by the United States itself. Mr. Stevenson the other day I think made a rather valuable suggestion about the desirability of trying to meet the whole problem of Asia in terms of economic development through such a wide and extended conference. However, the immediate problem is how to get the other side to the table.

Mr. NESBITT: Would not such a conference be more acceptable to the North Vietnamese if it were under the auspices of a power other than the United States?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The conference would not be called by the United States; it would be a conference on Asian affairs. It would be expected that the United States, with its great resources would be an essential contributor. We spend a lot of time criticizing the United States, but I do not know where we would be were it not for the generous position it has taken since the end of the second world war with regard, first of all, to Europe and to many other sections of the world. It would be prepared, I know, to play a useful part in economic terms in such a proposal; but the big problem we come back to is that I doubt very much whether we are going to settle the war in Viet Nam by a conference of many nations. What is important now is that contact be established and that some give and take take place on both sides. It may be

that the best way to do this is by continuing the course that is now being pursued very vigorously in many capitals of the world.

The CHAIRMAN: Could we break off for five minutes and then come back for another fifteen minutes?

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, how many other members have indicated they have questions they wish to ask?

The CHAIRMAN: I have three other members.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Could we adjourn for two minutes?

—After recess

● (11:55 a.m.)

Mr. CHAIRMAN: I will recognize you, Mr. Douglas.

Mr. DOUGLAS: I wanted to ask the Minister if, in the light of his remarks this morning, the Canadian Government is taking the position that the 1954 Geneva Agreement does not apply to South Viet Nam?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The legal position is clear. South Viet Nam has co-operated and it is a fact that the Commission has acted toward South Viet Nam as though it had a legal obligation. However, you put to me earlier a strict question and I gave you a strict answer that it did not sign the agreement and that is it. France signed the agreement but has withdrawn. The United States did not sign but accepted the cease fire. It is a fact that we have acted, or the Commission has acted, as though the South had legally committed itself to the agreement and, generally speaking, it has acted in those terms.

Mr. DOUGLAS: What is the value of Canada acting on the International Truce Commission if the Truce Commission has no jurisdiction in the matter of South Viet Nam?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I think it has a jurisdiction that has been consented to by the South. A government may not be a government by the laws of a particular country; it might have an immunity, but there is nothing to prevent a country making itself subject to them. That in a sense is the way the South on the whole has acted vis-a-vis the Commission. I remember in 1956, I think I mentioned this, discussing with President Ngo Dinh Diem, the desirability of the Commission withdrawing. It had been there by then for two years and he pointed out the great importance of the Commission merely as a presence, if for no other purpose. Well, there was no legal compulsion on him or his government to accept it. I think I have answered part of your question as to why Canada continues on the Commission. If there had been no Commission I think that we would not be in the position to have some of the important information that we have now from responsible and independent members. Certainly Canada is a disinterested member. It is costing us a lot of money. Even though the Geneva Conference in theory pays for the operation of the commission, I think it costs us over a million dollars a year. We are in there because we believe that this is part of our international responsibility. If we have a government in the South, that has not signed the agreement but is willing to be treated as though it had, I think that this has all been to the good. However, having said all this, I do want to take advantage of the opportunity to point out the limitations of this particular instrumentality. There has been criticism of the Commission. Mr. Adlai Stevenson, some months

ago, criticized the Commission in the Security Council, not because there was not a desire to make it work on the part of its components, but that it was not constitutionally endowed to do a fully effective job. It is not a supervisory organization but is simply a fact-finding body that has had the incidental value of providing a presence which has been effective. It has rendered very valuable services in Laos.

Mr. DOUGLAS: Mr. Chairman, I just want to make one further point. The Canadian representatives signed the majority report of June 2, 1962. In paragraph 20 it says:

Taking all these facts into consideration, and basing itself on its own observations and on authorized statements made in the United States of America and the Republic of Viet Nam, the Commission concludes that the Republic of Viet Nam has violated Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement in receiving increased military aid from the United States of America in the absence of any established credit in its favour.

Now it seems to me extremely difficult to see how the Canadian representative can say that the Government of South Viet Nam has violated the Agreement if it is not bound by the Agreement. There is one more point. It seems sheer hypocritical humbug for the head of the government to constantly say that conciliation lies in returning to the Geneva accord and everybody living up to the Geneva accord if, at the same time, we say the Geneva accord does not apply to South Viet Nam; because the whole essence of the accord was the idea that the boundary between North and South was a temporary measure and eventually there would be an opportunity to vote over the whole of Viet Nam to determine what government they would have. Now to deny that, of course, is to deny the right of self-determination for the Vietnamese. If South Viet Nam is not bound by this, then what value is there in both the Minister and the House of Commons and the President of the United States saying from time to time: All we want to do is get back to the Geneva accord, if the Geneva accord only applies to the North Viet Nam and does not apply to the South Viet Nam?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, with great respect, Mr. Douglas, I do not think it is humbug. I think the position that the President has taken is a very sound position. We have treated and we have been permitted to treat South Viet Nam as legally obligated because of its own attitude to the Commission. Legally, it would have been correct in paragraph 20 to make the indictment France, France being legally obligated. However, that does not alter the fact that South Viet Nam did not sign, and gave its reasons for not signing, one of them being that it was opposed to division of the country. That was predicated on the knowledge of the intentions of the North. I must say if I had been living in that country I would have shared the same view. We have all kinds of precedents for the consequences of that kind of division. But the fact is; you are quite right in saying that in Article 20 the language is such as to warrant the belief that there was a clear legal obligation on the part of the South. I can only say that as the South did not sign, there is no legal obliga-

tion, but the Commission has treated the South all along as being obligated to the terms of the agreement and the South has not denied or has not refused to accept the implications of this recognition of that statement. I think it is largely a matter of semantics in which you and I are engaged at the moment.

● (12:05 p.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Martineau.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Mr. Chairman, I have a question for the Minister.

There was a report yesterday out of Washington to the effect that the United States forces in Viet Nam would be participating directly in the operations against the Viet Cong; and there were similar reports from Hanoi that if that happened there would be direct participation by the North Viet Nam forces, and an appeal to friendly powers on the North Viet Nam side.

Has the Minister made any contacts, or has the Minister been in communication with Washington to ascertain if in fact the intention of the United States government is for greater commitment of its forces in Viet Nam? If the Minister has ascertained that such were the intentions, has he made any representations of any sort to the United States government in that regard?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): When I saw this story I was in touch with our Ambassador in Washington, and I asked him if he could get clarification of the situation. Very shortly thereafter, there was a statement issued by the White House. Perhaps I could read it.

Mr. MARTINEAU: Yes, please do.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It was issued at noon on June 9 and it states as follows:

There has been no change in the mission of U.S. ground combat units in Viet Nam in recent days or weeks. The President has issued no order of any kind in this respect to General Westmorland and recently or at any other time. The primary mission of these troops is to secure and safeguard important military installations like the air base at Danang. They have the associated mission of active patrolling and securing action in and near the areas thus safeguarded. If help is requested by appropriate Vietnamese commanders, General Westmorland also has authority within the assigned mission to employ these troops in support of Vietnamese forces faced with aggressive attack when other effective reserves are not available and when, in his judgment, the general military situation urgently requires it. If General Westmorland did not have this discretionary authority, a situation could easily arise in which heavy loss of life might occur and great advantage might be won by Viet Cong because of delays in communications.

This discretionary authority does not change the primary mission of U.S. troops in Viet Nam which has been approved by the President on the advice and recommendation of responsible authority. However, I would emphasize any such change of primary mission would obviously be a matter for decision in Washington.

I have since had further clarification of this, in fact today, this morning.

Mr. MARTINEAU: I take it, then, that the Minister does not interpret that statement as meaning greater involvement of United States forces in the actual military operations in Viet Nam.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): With what I have been told, no, I do not give that interpretation to it.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am basing my question, Mr. Martin, on the assumption that there are two different views on how to spread Communism by the two different Communist groups, that of Russia, where they say co-existence, and that of Red China, where they say military might. Which of these two has the most influence on the Viet Cong? If your answer is Red China—military might—then can the United States or the Western powers let the thought be left with the world that military might is right and will eventually win out?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not believe that military might is right, and I have said I do not think a military solution is the only solution to this problem. I have said, however, that there is a form of aggression which has to be met. I would hope that it has been met. I would hope that those who are faced with the responsibility of meeting with it will also take into account the consequences.

It is clear—and I hope I have made it clear—that we recognize the validity of the United States posture in Viet Nam. This does not mean to say that we are in full agreement with every step that has been taken or will be taken. It does certainly mean we believe that now the time has come, in the interests of Asia itself, when there should be negotiations for a settlement. The fact is that the United States has accepted this proposal without any reserve and that the other side has not.

That is the situation. That is the dilemma in which the United States and others are placed.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Could you answer the other part of the question? Which of these two points of view has the most influence with the Viet Cong?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think an answer to this would be speculation. I do not think my reply would be very helpful.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Is there anything that Canada can do to further the peaceful approach which Russia is apparently advocating?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Right at the beginning we urged a cease fire. We urged a pause in the bombing. We urged a convocation of the Conference of Laos. We urged the convocation of a conference in Cambodia. We have agreed to any kind of conference that will bring the parties together. We have made suggestions that we think could refine some of the conditions that the North laid down. We have just thrown out the suggestion that the North ought to be allowed to select their own delegation at a conference aimed at a settlement. We have subscribed to the 17 unaligned nations' appeal for a cease fire and for peaceful negotiations. We are now engaged in what I hope might be fruitful talks with other countries.

We are doing everything we can, Mr. McIntosh, and I hope it will not be misunderstood when I say that I find it difficult to understand some people who seem to think that Canada in this instance is engaged in warmongering tactics. I received a letter this morning from a friend of mine with whom I

went to university and who knows the interest that I have had in these matters over the years. He suggested that I was contributing to warmongering in the world. Well, I prefer to think that this is the observation of a sincere but misguided man who has not examined the facts and who is not aware of all the things that Canada is doing to try to bring about negotiations that will lead to what we hope will be a settlement in this vital and strategic area in Asia.

I do not know what more we could do, but we are not going to let up. At the same time, I do not want anyone to think that we are weak and that we fail to recognize the consequences if the conflict has to go on, of capitulation or of defeat.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forest.

Mr. FOREST: Mr. Martin, you have said that the main purpose of the International Control Commission was that it be a fact-finding body. I suppose in the circumstances of today the Commission has the means to pursue that role. Is it worth while maintaining that Commission to provide for agreement between North and South, or is it there merely with the role of observer and with nothing to do?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It has a lot to do. It has the role of observation and, while there may be obstructions to this capacity for observing, the role of observation continues, and the opportunity for examination of prisoners continues. While the team sites have been removed in the North at the instance of the government in the North, there is a continued representation of the Commission in Hanoi. You will remember I made a statement in the House of Commons about the withdrawal of the five team sites in the North. The Commission was reluctant to remove these team sites. It was not unduly concerned about the problem of security; it did not feel that at that time there was a grave problem of security involved. But the fact that it had to withdraw these five team sites undoubtedly did impair its capacity for assessment in those northern regions. However, there continues to be a very great need for the Commission. It would not have been possible for us to make the contact that we did make on the 31st of May if we were not on the Commission. I would hope that there may be an increased opportunity given to us and to other members of the Commission to play a role in the future. The fact that we have as our colleague on the Commission a representative of Poland means that I, as the Canadian Foreign Minister, find it useful, desirable and dutiful to keep in contact with the thinking of the Polish government.

● (12:15 p.m.)

Our other colleague is the representative of the Indian government with whom we naturally have very close ties. Today we will be welcoming the Prime Minister of that great Asian nation, and undoubtedly the Prime Minister, I and others, will take advantage of this to exchange views. The fact that we have been colleagues together for 11 years on a very difficult assignment in the three Indo-China countries has given us an opportunity and an insight which would not have been available otherwise. I think it would be most regrettable, notwithstanding the cost and the sacrifices of our personnel—very great sacrifices—if the Commission was not enabled to carry on. Its usefulness, I think, lies in the fact that there is no disposition on the part of any of the combatting parties to see its liquidation take place.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is my pleasure to thank the Secretary of State for External Affairs who will, I hope, be available before long to come before us again. If it is agreeable, the next meeting will be at the call of the Chair.

May I indicate to all members of our committee—I am grateful that so many did turn up this morning—that the steering committee consists of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman and Messrs. Dubé, Brewin, Patterson, Bélanger and McIntosh. Perhaps you would assist the Chairman by working through this steering committee with respect to what you see as being the most useful development of our study through the estimates.

Thank you, the meeting is adjourned.

APPENDIX "A"

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND
CONTROL IN VIET-NAM

SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam presents its compliments to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China and has the honour to refer to paragraph 2 of their message of 8th May, 1956, in which the Co-Chairmen asked the Commission to inform them in case the Commission encountered any difficulties in its activities which could not be resolved on the spot and simultaneously had urged both the Parties in Viet-Nam to extend to the Commission all possible co-operation and assistance. The International Commission had assured the Co-Chairmen in its message of 27th May, 1956, that it would continue to persevere in its efforts to maintain and strengthen peace in Viet-Nam and affirmed its determination to perform its duties within the framework of the Geneva Agreement.⁽¹⁾

2. The International Commission has, from time to time, submitted to the Co-Chairmen Interim Reports giving a resumé of its activities as well as a brief review of the progress made by the two Parties in the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement. In these reports, apart from other things, the Commission had pointed out its difficulties, particularly with regard to the tendency of the Parties to refuse to accept and implement the Commission's recommendations and decisions and their persistence in maintaining their own stand in certain cases. The Co-Chairmen were also informed about the difficulties which the Commission's Fixed Teams were experiencing with regard to the performance of their mandatory tasks of control and inspection in terms of their responsibilities under Articles 35 and 36 (d) of the Agreement.

3. In its 11th Interim Report, which covered the period from 1st February, 1960, to 28th February, 1961, the Commission had mentioned that, in spite of certain difficulties and the lurking dangers in Viet-Nam, the active presence of the Commission and its work had helped in preserving peace.

4. Since the presentation of the 11th Interim Report, the situation in Viet-Nam has shown signs of rapid deterioration. The Commission is obliged to make this Special Report to the Co-Chairmen with regard to the serious allegations of aggression and subversion on the part of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam against the Republic of Viet-Nam and the serious charges of violation of Articles 16, 17 and 19 of the Geneva Agreement by the Republic of Viet-Nam, in receiving military aid from the United States of America.

The Polish Delegation dissents from the views expressed in this Special Report. The Statement of the Polish Delegation is forwarded herewith.

5. Reference is invited to paragraph 24 of the 10th Interim Report and paragraph 32 of the 11th Interim Report, in which mention was made of the concern which the Republic of Viet-Nam has been expressing over the problem

(1) "Miscellaneous No. 20 (1954)." Cmd. 9239.

of subversion in South Viet-Nam. Mention was also made in paragraph 61 of the 11th Interim Report to the complaints, which the Commission had received from the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, accusing the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam of aggression in the Kontum and Pleiku provinces during October, 1960. Complaints of this nature continued to increase during 1961. In June, 1961, the Commission made known its stand regarding its competence to entertain and examine complaints of this nature in terms of specific Articles of the Geneva Agreement.

6. The Commission also received several complaints from the High Command of the People's Army of Viet-Nam (PAVN) making serious allegations with regard to the increased introduction of U.S. military personnel into South Viet-Nam, along with substantial quantities of war material, in contravention of Articles 16 and 17. All these allegations were forwarded to the South Vietnamese Mission for comments. The Party in most cases denied these allegations. But the Commission was not in a position to make a precise assessment as to the correctness or otherwise of these allegations, as the Commission's Teams at most points of entry have not been able to carry out effective inspections and controls. However, the South Vietnamese Mission did state in July, 1961, that whatever American aid its Government was receiving was meant to fight Communist subversion in South Viet-Nam, and in support of this contention it had also referred to the text of the communiqué published after the visit of the U.S. Vice-President Johnson to Saigon, in May, 1961.

7. While the Commission continued to function in this difficult atmosphere, a communication was received on 9th September, 1961, from the Liaison Mission of the Republic of Viet-Nam, alleging the PAVN forces had launched another action in the Kontum region on 1st September, 1961. The letter containing these allegations was forwarded to the Liaison Mission of the PAVN High Command for its comments. In its reply under its letter No. 492/CT/I/B dated 11th December, 1961, the Mission stated that "the PAVN High Command will resolutely reject all decisions taken by the International Commission relating to the so-called 'subversive activities' in South Viet-Nam, a question which has no relevance to the Geneva Agreement". It further informed the Commission that "henceforth the Mission would find itself constrained to resolutely reject all possible requests for comments of this kind".

8. In the meanwhile, in early October, 1961, the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam alleged that Colonel Hoang Thuy Nam, the Chief of the Vietnamese Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission, had been kidnapped. Later, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the Commission of the murder of Colonel Nam. The complicity of the authorities in the North in the kidnapping and murder of Colonel Nam was alleged. Reference is invited to the Commission's message No. IC/ADM/V-5/61/4097 dated 9th November, 1961, in this regard. Since the allegations were of a serious nature, the Commission requested the South Vietnamese Mission to furnish *prima facie* evidence to support their charge of the complicity of the Northern Party in this incident. The Commission received detailed communications from the Mission on 24th October, 1961, and 16th November, 1961, with a large number of documents and photographs, in support of their contention. The Mission also stated that the

"Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam is confident that the case of Colonel Hoang Thuy Nam should be taken, not as an isolated case, but as part of the extensive plans of subversion and terrorism deliberately decided by the Hanoi authorities, a plan which, with this assassination enters a new phase of execution and is designed for seizing power in South Viet-Nam". In November, 1961, the Commission considered these letters containing numerous allegations, and referred them to its Legal Committee for examination "with a view to determining whether the allegations and evidence therein *prima facie* attract any provisions of the Geneva Agreement".

9. The Legal Committee has made a careful examination of the various allegations and the evidence produced to support them, in the form of documents and other material evidence, and has made the following report, with the Polish Member dissenting:

"We have studied the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam, the South Vietnamese Mission's letter No. 4660/PDVN/CT/TD/2 dated the 24th October, 1961, and No. 5078/PDVN/CT/TD/2 dated the 16th November, 1961, and related references from the Commission together with the evidentiary material made available by the South Vietnamese Mission in connection therewith, and reached the following conclusions:

- (1) The Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam proceeds on the principle of the complete cessation of all hostilities in Viet-Nam, respect by either Party of the Zone assigned to the other, and the inescapable responsibility of the Parties for the fulfilment of the obligations resulting therefrom.

Article 10 of the Agreement states expressly the obligation of the two Parties to order and enforce the complete cessation of all hostilities in Viet-Nam.

Article 19 of the Agreement casts the obligation on the two Parties to ensure that the Zones assigned to them are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.

Article 24 of the Agreement proceeds on the principle of the inviolability of the Demilitarized Zone and the territories assigned to the two Parties and states expressly that the armed forces of each Party shall respect the territory under the military control of the other Party and shall commit no act and undertake no operation against the other Party.

Article 27 of the Agreement affirms expressly the responsibility of the Commanders of the Forces of the two Parties of ensuring full compliance with all the provisions of the Agreement by *all elements* and military personnel under their Command.

It follows that the using of one Zone for the organisation or the carrying out of any hostile activities in the other Zone, violations by members of the Armed Forces of one Party of the territory of the other Party, or the commissions by any element under the control of one Party of any act directed against the other Party, would be contrary to the fundamental provisions of the Agreement which enjoin mutual respect for the territories assigned to the two Parties.

- (2) Having examined the complaints and the supporting material sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Committee has come to the conclusion that in specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South with the object of supporting, organising and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the South. These acts are in violation of Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam.
- (3) In examining the complaints and the supporting material, in particular documentary material sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Committee has come to the further conclusion that there is evidence to show that the PAVN has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South. The use of the Zone in the North for such activities is in violation of Articles 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam.
- (4) The Committee considers that further investigation is necessary to reach a final conclusion as to whether the kidnapping and murder of Colonel Nam, late Chief of the South Vietnamese Mission, was a part of the activities referred to in sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) above and prohibited under Articles 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement. The South Vietnamese Mission has furnished *prima facie* evidence to warrant such a full investigation of the case by the Commission.

2. We shall submit in due course a full report setting out in detail the complaints made by the South Vietnamese Mission, the evidence forwarded in relation to these complaints, and our specific observations thereon."

10. The Commission accepts the conclusions reached by the Legal Committee that there is sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt that the PAVN has violated Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 in specific instances. The Polish Delegation dissents from these conclusions. On the basis of the fuller report, that is being prepared by the Legal Committee covering all the allegations and incidents, the Commission will take action as appropriate in each individual case.

11. Concurrently with the developments referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8 above, and subsequently, the Commission received communications from the PAVN High Command and its Liaison Mission alleging direct military intervention in South Viet-Nam by the Government of the United States of America, and ever-increasing import of war material and introduction of military personnel in violation of the Geneva Agreement. The allegations, amongst others, were:

- (a) the conclusion of a bilateral military Agreement between President Ngo Dinh Diem and United States Ambassador Nolting;

- (b) the gradual introduction of about 5,000 United States military personnel into South Viet Nam, "which will soon be increased to 8,000";
- (c) the arrival of 4 aircraft carriers—*Core*, *Breton*, *Princeton* and *Croton*—on different occasions, bringing in helicopters, other aircraft, military equipment and military personnel;
- (d) the introduction by the United States of America of approximately four companies of helicopters, many jet fighters, fighters/fighter bombers and transport planes, along with military vehicles and other stores;
- (e) the visits of a large number of high United States military experts and dignitaries to Saigon for inspection and guidance, particularly those of General Maxwell Taylor, Admiral H. Felt and General Lemnitzer;
- (f) the establishment of a United States Military Assistance Command, with a four-star General, Paul D. Harkins, as its Chief.

12. Since December 1961 the Commission's Teams in South Viet-Nam have been persistently denied the right to control and inspect, which are part of their mandatory tasks. Thus, these Teams, though they were able to observe the steady and continuous arrival of war material, including aircraft carriers with helicopters on board, were unable, in view of the denial of controls, to determine precisely the quantum and nature of war material unloaded and introduced into South Viet-Nam.

13. On the other hand, the Commission received a communication from Liaison Mission of the Republic of Viet-Nam dated 9th December, 1961, stating that: "In the face of the aggression, directed by the so-called 'Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam' against the Republic of Viet-Nam, in flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreement, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has requested the Government of the United States of America to intensify the aid in personnel and material which the latter was already granting to Viet-Nam. The right of 'self-defence' being a legitimate and inherent attribute of sovereignty, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam found itself constrained to exercise this right and request for increased aid, since North Viet-Nam continues to violate the Geneva Agreement and to do injury to life and property of the free people of Viet-Nam.

"These measures can end as soon as the North Viet Nam authorities will have ceased the acts of aggression and will have begun to respect the Geneva Agreement."

14. The Commission considered this communication from the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and drew the attention of the South Vietnamese Mission to the provisions of Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement and the procedures laid down thereunder by the International Commission for the import of war material and the introduction of military personnel, and to the obligations resulting therefrom. The Commission also informed the Mission that its complaints regarding allegations of subversion and aggression by the North were under active examination of the Commission separately.

15. In the light of the stand of the Commission as stated in paragraph 14 above, the numerous allegations received from the PAVN High Command have been receiving the attention of the Commission with a view to the strict implementation of Articles 16 and 17 of the Agreement and the procedures laid down thereunder.

16. A summary of the allegations made by the PAVN High Command, from December, 1961, up to 5th May, 1962, would place the number of military personnel and the quantum of important war materials introduced into South Viet-Nam at approximately 5,000 personnel ("which are likely to increase to 8,000 shortly"), 157 helicopters, 10 reconnaissance aircraft, 34 jet aircraft, 34 fighters/fighter bombers, 21 transport aircraft, 35 unspecified aircraft, 40 armoured and 20 scout cars, "numerous" armoured boats and amphibious craft, 3,000 tons and 1,350 cases of war material, and 7 warships (exclusive of 5 destroyers of the United States Seventh Fleet alleged to have come for training). Most of the letters containing the allegations, referred to in this paragraph and paragraph 11 above, were sent to the Liaison Mission of the Republic of Viet-Nam for its early comments; but no satisfactory replies have been received. Also, in some cases the Southern Party has been asked to state reasons, if any, why violations of Article 17(e) relating to prior notification, as well as violations of Articles 16 and 17 governing the introduction of military personnel and war material themselves, should not be recorded against it.

17. As the Commission has been denied mandatory controls, as pointed out earlier in paragraph 12 above, it has not been able to make a precise assessment of the number of military personnel and the quantum of war material brought in. However, from 3rd December, 1961, up to 5th May, 1962, the Commission's Teams have controlled the entry of 72 military personnel, and observed but not controlled 173 military personnel, 62 helicopters, 6 reconnaissance aircraft, 5 jet aircraft, 57 fighters/fighter bombers, 25 transport aircraft, 26 unspecified types of aircraft, 102 jeeps, 8 tractors, 8 105-mm. howitzers, 3 armoured carriers (tracked), 29 armoured fighting vehicle trailers, 404 other trailers, and radar equipment and crates, 5 warships, 9 LSTs (including 4 visiting LSTs), 3 LCTs, 5 visiting aircraft carriers and spares of various kinds. In respect of some of the instances of import of war materials between 3rd December, 1961, and 16th January, 1962, violations under Article 17 (e) as well as violation of Article 25, have been recorded against the Republic of Viet-Nam for its failure to notify arrivals and imports as required by the Geneva Agreement, and for not affording all possible assistance to the Commission's Teams in the performance of their tasks.

18. In regard to claims for credits made by the Southern Party in justification of certain imports, the Commission wishes to point out that in so far as major items of war material are concerned, except in a limited number of cases, there is no established credit in favour of the Republic of Viet-Nam. On the other hand, for some of these items, there is already a debit against it. In this context, it must be borne in mind that, even where credit exists, according to Article 17 (b) of the Agreement, the Party can only import war material "piece-for-piece of the same type and with similar characteristics". However, controls not having been permitted, the Commission is not in a

position to satisfy itself whether this essential requirement has in fact been fulfilled even in cases where credit exists.

19. As regards the allegation of the PAVN High Command that a U.S. Military Assistance Command has been set up in South Viet-Nam in violation of Article 19, the Commission requested the Party to furnish the following information:

- (i) whether such a U.S. Command has been set up;
- (ii) the basis on which it has been established;
- (iii) the purpose for which it has been constituted;
- (iv) its strength
- (v) the scope of its activities.

The South Vietnamese Mission in its letter dated 15th March, 1962, has not furnished the necessary information required by the Commission, other than stating that this Military Assistance Command is not a military command in the usual sense of the term, and that its only function is to supervise and manage the utilisation of American personnel and equipment. The Mission stated further that there was no military alliance between the United States of America and the Republic of Viet-Nam as no treaty of this nature had been ratified by either Government.

20. Taking all the facts into consideration, and basing itself on its own observations and authorised statements made in the United States of America and the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Commission concludes that the Republic of Viet-Nam has violated Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement in receiving the increased military aid from the United States of America in the absence of any established credit in its favour. The Commission is also of the view that, though there may not be any formal military alliance between the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Viet-Nam, the establishment of a U.S. Military Assistance Command in South Viet-Nam, as well as the introduction of a large number of U.S. military personnel beyond the stated strength of the MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group), amounts to a factual military alliance, which is prohibited under Article 19 of the Geneva Agreement.

21. The Commission would also like to bring to the notice of the Co-Chairmen a recent and deliberate tendency on the part of both the Parties to deny or refuse controls to the Commission's Teams, thereby completely immobilising their activities and hindering the Commission in the proper discharge of its obligations to supervise the implementation of Article 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement. During the last few months, there has been a near-complete breakdown so far as this important function of the Commission is concerned. The Commission considered the situation and addressed detailed communications to the two Parties recommending the resumption of normal controls immediately. (Copies of the letters sent to the two Parties are attached as Annexure I to this Report). The Commission, however, regrets to inform the Co-Chairmen that there has been no improvement in this regard.

22. The International Commission wishes to draw the serious and earnest attention of the Co-Chairmen to the gravity of the situation that has

developed in Viet-Nam in the last few months. Fundamental provisions of the Geneva Agreement have been violated by both Parties, resulting in ever-increasing tension and threat of resumption of open hostilities. In this situation, the role of the Commission for the maintenance of peace in Viet-Nam is being greatly hampered because of denial of co-operation by both the Parties. The Commission, therefore, earnestly recommends to the Co-Chairmen that, with a view to reducing tension and preserving peace in Viet-Nam, remedial action be taken, in the light of this Report, so as to ensure that the Parties—

- (a) respect the Zone assigned to the other Party;
- (b) observe strictly the provisions of Articles 16, 17 and 19 of the Geneva Agreement in respect of the import of war material and the introduction of military personnel;
- (c) commit no act and undertake no operation of a hostile nature against the other Party;
- (d) do not allow the Zones assigned to them to adhere to any military alliance and to be used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy;
- (e) co-operate with the International Commission in the fulfilment of its tasks of supervision and control of the implementation of the provisions of the Geneva Agreement.

23. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam takes this opportunity to renew the assurances of its highest consideration to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China.

(G. PARTHASARATHI)
India

(F. G. HOOTON)
Canada

Saigon,

2nd June, 1962

ANNEXURE I

LETTER TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE LIAISON MISSION

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND
CONTROL IN VIET-NAM

No. Ops/VIII(1)/1327

SAIGON,
5/6 Apr 62.

The Secretary General presents his compliments to the Chief of the Vietnamese Mission in charge of relations with the ICC and has the honour to refer to the question of mandatory controls by the Commission's Teams as laid down in the Geneva Agreement and the Instructions for Teams.

2. The Commission has observed that its Teams have been denied controls, and have not been afforded all possible assistance and co-operation necessary for the execution of their mandatory tasks. Certain specific instances are given as examples in the attached Appendix. Controls have been denied or rendered ineffective because—

- (a) documents and manifests were not made available for inspection and spot checks were not permitted;
- (b) transport was stated to be not available;
- (c) Teams were informed that controls were not permitted by higher authorities;
- (d) controls were not permitted on particular days being holidays;
- (e) restrictions were placed on the free movement of Teams for various reasons;
- (f) the LO* was reported to be sick and no replacement was provided;
- (g) the LO was not available to the Team;
- (h) the LO stated that he had referred the matter of the particular control to the Mission;
- (i) it was stated that security could not be provided;
- (j) no proof of internal movement was provided.

3. It is of the utmost importance for the preservation of peace in Viet-Nam that the Parties afford all co-operation and facilities to the Commission's Teams in the execution of their mandatory tasks in terms of Article 25 of the Geneva Agreement. The Secretary General has been directed to state, therefore, that the Commission views with great concern that controls have been denied on various grounds listed in para 2 above, which are untenable or where remedial action could have been taken. The Commission also wishes to point out that recently it has found that the Mission has been consistently withholding notification and denying control of war material entering the country. Under the circumstances, the Commission may have to draw its own conclusions as to the number of military personnel and the quantum of war material that are being brought in.

* Note.—LO refers to the Liaison Officer of the Mission attached to the Commission's Teams.

4. The Commission would urge the Mission to afford the fullest co-operation to enable the Commission to discharge its responsibilities under Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement. The Secretary General has been further directed to state that if the Mission fails to afford the necessary facilities and co-operation in this regard, the Commission shall be obliged to report to the Co-Chairmen that the work of the Commission continues to be hindered by the Mission.

5. The Secretary General takes this opportunity to renew the assurances of his highest consideration.

D. K. ROBERTSON, Lt.-Col.
For Secretary General.

The Chief of the Vietnamese Mission
in charge of relations with the ICC.
SAIGON.

Appendix to OPS/VIII (1)/1327 Dated 5/6 Apr 62.

SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONTROLS AND INSPECTIONS HAVING
BEEN DENIED OR RENDERED INEFFECTIVE

1. Documents/manifests were not made available for inspection and spot checks were not permitted

(a) QUINHON Team

On 17 Jan 62, the Team observed a Vietnamese ship in the harbour unloading cargo. The LO did not make the manifest/documents available to the Team.

(b) SAIGON Team

(i) On 11, 12, 14, 15, 16 and 17 Feb 62, the Team observed several ships in the harbour. The LO did not produce documents/manifests in respect of any of these ships.

(ii) On these days the Team also observed some aircraft at TAN SON NHUT airfield. The LO did not produce documents/manifests pertaining to these aircraft.

(c) TOURANE Team

On 4 Dec 61, the Team observed two transport and one fighter aircraft. On inquiry the LO said that they belonged to TOURANE Air Base. The LO did not produce any documents relating to the aircraft and declined to take the Team closer on the ground that it was a military area.

2. Transport was stated to be not available

CAP ST JACQUES Team

- (a) During the weeks ending 27 Jan 62 and 10 Feb 62, the following controls could not be carried out due to transport not having been made available by the LO:
 - (i) The weekly control of the river CUA-DAI.
 - (ii) The weekly control North up to THAN THIET exclusive but including the main road/railway line.
 - (iii) The twice weekly control of the delta of the MEKONG and BASSAC rivers, the complete AN-XUYEN peninsula, the coastal area up to the Cambodian border and including the control of road RACH GIA and HA TIEN.
- (b) The weekly control of river CUA-DAI was scheduled for 15 Mar 62 and due notice was given to the LO. He stated that no boat was available for the time being. The control could not be carried out.

3. Teams were informed that controls were not permitted by higher authorities

(a) CAP ST JACQUES Team

On 23 Jan 62 the Team observed three vessels in the harbour. The LO declined to give any details and stated that no manifests would be made available hereafter to the Team and that he was not authorised to produce any manifests at the Customs Office for scrutiny by the Team.

(b) NHATRANG Team

From 16 Jan 62 onwards the LO has not produced documents for ships and planes coming into NHATRANG. The reason given by him was that he had orders from higher authority not to produce documents.

(c) SAIGON Team

14 Dec 61—The Team requested the LO while on harbour control to take them to the bank of the river at the small harbour to make observations. The LO replied that this harbour belonged to a private company and the company authorities would not permit the Team to use their harbour for observation.

4. Controls were not permitted on particular days being holidays

(a) QUINHON Team

Controls were not carried out on 5, 6 and 7 Feb 62 due to TET Festival.

(b) TOURANE Team

On 18 Mar 62, the harbour was closed as it was a Sunday and as such control could not be exercised.

5. Restrictions were placed on the free movement of Teams for various reasons

(a) *SAIGON Team*

(i) 26 Dec 61—The Team observed one aircraft on the airfield. On enquiry the LO informed the Team that it was a US Embassy plane No. 706 which is included in the list of planes given to the Team. The Team asked the LO to take it nearer or bring the aircraft to a place from where the marking on the plane could be verified. The LO regretted that he was unable to accede to either of the requests.

(ii) On 25 Jan 62, the Team observed 10 aircraft with US markings at TAN SON NHUT airfield. The Team asked to be taken across the runway for better observation and spot check of the aircraft. This was not permitted by the LO on the ground that the area of the hangars was a restricted military area.

(b) *TOURANE Team*

From 27 Jan 62, the Team has not been taken inside the airport. From this date onwards the Team has been asked to carry out the control from the airport waiting room.

6. The LO was reported to be sick and no replacement was provided

NHATRANG Team

Daily control of harbour and airport was not carried out on 22 Jan 62 due to LO's sickness and no replacement was provided.

7. The LO was not available to the Team

SAIGON Team

At 1520 hrs on 3 Mar 62, the Team decided to carry out an emergency control of SAIGON harbour. The control could not be carried out as no LO was available.

8. LO stated that he had referred the matter of the particular control to the Mission

SAIGON Team

(a) On 16 Jan 62, the Team observed 6 ships and an aircraft carrier with a number of aircraft aboard. The Team asked the LO for manifests and documents relating to the ships. The LO stated that these manifests and documents were not available with him. The Team then asked for a spot check of these vessels. The LO expressed his inability to arrange this on the ground that this was not permitted by his authorities. The LO further stated that in so far as the berthing of the aircraft carrier in this area was concerned he would refer the matter to his superior authorities.

(b) On 24 Feb 62, the Team observed 5 ships. The Team requested the LO to produce the manifests and documents. The LO replied that no documents were available with him. The LO was asked to arrange for the spot check but he replied that this was not

permitted by the Captain of the ship. The Team then asked about the unloading of the military aircraft from the HER-KIMER. The LO replied that no information was available with him and he would request his superior authorities for the required information

9. It was stated that security could not be provided

(a) SAIGON Team

On 23 and 27 Jan 62 and 11, 12, 14, 15, 16 and 17 Feb 62, the control of NHA BE harbour was denied to the Team by the LO on the ground that security arrangements could not be made.

(b) TOURANE Team

The LO was given 48 hrs notice for South control up to SA HUYNH exclusive. He said, "Regret, the local authorities could not make security arrangements".

10. No proof of internal movement was provided

TOURANE Team

Harbour—On 20 Dec 61, a ship THANH LONG was unloading. The LO said that the ship had come from SAIGON. The Team made a request for documents. The LO replied that he would ask for instructions from the Liaison Mission in SAIGON. As such the Team requested that a spot check be carried out. He replied "It cannot be carried out and I refuse to allow". The Team waited for some time but could not satisfy itself in regard to the reported internal movement.

LETTER TO THE LIAISON MISSION OF THE PAVN HIGH COMMAND

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND
CONTROL IN VIET-NAM

No OPS/VIII(1)/1328

SAIGON,
5/6 Apr 62.

The Secretary General presents his compliments to the Chief of the Liaison Mission of the PAVN High Command and has the honour to refer to the question of mandatory controls by the Commission's Teams as laid down in the Geneva Agreement and the Instructions for Teams.

2. The Commission has observed that its Teams have been denied controls, and have not been afforded all possible assistance and co-operation necessary for the execution of their mandatory tasks. Certain specific instances are given as examples in the attached Appendix. Controls have been denied or rendered ineffective because—

- (a) documents and manifests were not made available for inspection and spot checks were not permitted.
- (b) transport was stated to be mechanically defective or not available;
- (c) Teams were informed that controls were not permitted by higher authorities;
- (d) controls were not permitted on particular days being holidays;
- (e) restrictions were placed on the free movement of Teams for various reasons;
- (f) the LO* was reported to be sick and no replacement was provided;
- (g) the LO was not available to the Team;
- (h) the matter of a particular control was under correspondence with the Commission;
- (i) local control was not arranged on particular days on the ground that a mobile control had been carried out the same day;
- (j) the frequency of control decided by the Commission was contested.

3. It is of the utmost importance for the preservation of peace in Viet-Nam that the Parties afford all co-operation and facilities to the Commission's Teams in the execution of their mandatory tasks in terms of Article 25 of the Geneva Agreement. The Secretary General has been directed to state that the Commission views with great concern that controls have been denied on various grounds listed in paragraph 2 above, which are untenable or where remedial action could have been taken. The Commission wishes to express its concern over the denial of controls on grounds of this nature particularly in view of the serious allegations made concerning the introduction of war material into North Viet-Nam.

4. The Commission would urge the Mission to afford the fullest co-operation to enable the Commission to discharge its responsibilities under Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement. The Secretary General has been further

* Note.—LO refers to the Liaison Officer of the Mission attached to the Commission's Teams.

directed to state that if the Mission fails to afford the necessary facilities and co-operation in this regard, the Commission shall be obliged to report to the Co-Chairmen that the work of the Commission continues to be hindered by the Mission.

5. The Secretary General takes this opportunity to renew the assurances of his highest consideration.

(Sd.) D. K. ROBERTSON, Lt.-Col.
For Secretary General.

The Chief of the Liaison Mission
of the PAVN High Command,
HANOI.

Appendix to OPS/VIII(1)/1328 Dated 5/6 Apr 62

SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONTROLS AND INSPECTIONS HAVING
BEEN DENIED OR RENDERED INEFFECTIVE

1. Documents and manifests were not made available for inspection and spot checks were not permitted

(a) DONG DANG Team

(i) On 20 Nov 61, the Team controlled an incoming train from CHINA. The Team proposed a spot check of one of the wagons to satisfy itself that the contents of the wagon were as specified in the manifest. The LO stated that he could not arrange for a spot check as he had produced all the manifests.

(ii) On 12, 13 and 14 Feb 62, the LO failed to produce manifests in respect of outgoing trains.

(b) DONG HOI Team

On 29 Sep 61, the Team observed one LI-2 aircraft with registered number 58199 with North Viet-Nam Government markings of the Yellow Star on Red Background, land at Dong Hoi airfield. 18 persons got down from the plane. No previous intimation was received about this plane. When asked the LO replied that it was a North Viet-Nam Government plane and it was on internal movement. He stated that it was on a test flight. The Team asked for documentary proof. The LO did not produce documents. The Team asked for a spot check which the LO refused.

2. Transport was stated to be mechanically defective or not available

(a) HAIPHONG Team

The control North up to CAMPHA Port inclusive and the control of River TIEN YEN, River PHO CU, TIEN YEN airport, road junction at TIEN YEN and road junction immediately West of TIEN YEN

were scheduled for 22 Feb 62. The required notice of 24 hrs was given to the LO but the controls could not be carried out as he informed the Team that two out of three jeeps were out of order and the controls were not possible this week.

(b) *DONG DANG Team*

On 22 Feb 62, the Team was denied local control by the LO as transport was not made available on the ground that the drivers were tired after the mobile control.

3. Teams were informed that controls were not permitted by higher authorities

HAIPHONG Team

DO SON area, observation from fixed Points "A" and "B" is a mandatory task for this Team. Since August 1961, this control has not been permitted. During the week ending 6 Jan 62, DO SON area Points "A" and "B" could not be controlled as the LO stated that the military authorities had not given permission for the Team to enter that area.

4. Controls were not permitted on particular days being holidays

LAOKAY Team

(a) On Sunday 28 Jan 62 and Sunday 18 Feb 62, local controls were not arranged by the LO on the ground that they were national holidays.

(b) No controls were carried out at LAOKAY airfield on 11 Mar 62, as the LO expressed his inability to arrange for these controls on ground that it was a national holiday.

5. Restrictions were placed on the free movement of Teams for various reasons

HAIPHONG Team

The control of CAT BI airfield has not been permitted since August 1961 on the ground that it was being utilised as a Sports Club by the Civil Aviation Department and as such entry was restricted to members only. For example this airfield was not allowed to be controlled during the week ending 6 Jan 62.

6. The LO was reported to be sick and no replacement was provided

(a) *VINH Team*

On 18 Jan 62, control could not be carried out due to the sickness of the LO and no replacement was provided.

(b) *DONG DANG Team*

On 9 Feb 62, the local control could not be carried out due to the sickness of the LO and no replacement was provided.

7. The LO was not available to the Team

DONG DANG Team

(a) On 26 Aug 61, the control of the Railway Station could not be carried out owing to the absence of the LO who was reported to have gone to LANG SON.

- (b) On 27 Aug 61, at 1500 hrs the LO was given notice for control of the incoming train from CHINA which was scheduled to arrive at 1600 hrs. At about 1630 hrs the LO sent a message with the hotel manager to inform the Team that he considered that the Team was still on mobile control. The Team sent word to the LO to come and discuss the validity of his reasoning but he did not turn up and the control was not carried out.

8. The matter of a particular control was under correspondence with the Commission

HAIPHONG Team

Mobile control South up to SAM SON exclusive was not carried out during the week ending 2 Sep 61, as the LO stated that the matter was under reference to the Commission by the PAVN Liaison Mission.

9. Local control was not arranged on particular days on the ground that a mobile control had been carried out the same day

DONG DANG Team

On 4, 9, 12 and 18 Jan 62, the LO did not arrange local control on the ground that on these days the Team had carried out mobile controls.

10. The frequency of control decided by the Commission was contested

(a) *LAOKAY Team*

As per IC letter No. OPS/IV/(2)5894 dated 29 Dec 61, the control is to be carried out at least once a day. PHO MOI Railway Station is to be controlled in accordance with Paragraphs 3 (b) and (c) of Appendix "O" to the Instructions for Fixed Teams and their mobile elements. From 5 Sep 61 up to 20 Jan 62, controls were allowed only twice a week. From then on, controls have been allowed four times a week. PAVN letter No. 70/QT dated 15 Feb 62 states that instructions have been given to the Liaison Officer concerned requesting him to extend to the LAOKAY Team all possible assistance with a view to an effective control of PHO MOI Railway Station. Even after this date, however, controls have been permitted only four times a week, except for the week ending 17 Mar 62, when five controls were permitted as opposed to the full quota.

(b) *VINH Team*

As per the Commission's decision, the control of the road (CR 7) up to the Laotian border and river NAM MO is required to be carried out once a fortnight. This has been communicated to the Mission vide IC letters Nos. OPS/III(2)/2107 dated 26 Apr 61 and Ops/III(2)/-3830 dated 14 Aug 61. However, no controls have been given since Dec 1960, as the frequency of control is still being contested by the Party.

On 6 Jan, for example, the LO expressed his inability to take the Team on the control as he had not received orders to do so from the PAVN.

STATEMENT ADDRESSED TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE GENEVA
CONFERENCE BY THE POLISH DELEGATION TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIET-
NAM

The Polish Delegation to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam presents its compliments to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China and has the honour to state the following in connection with the special report submitted to them herewith by the Indian and Canadian Delegations which the Polish Delegation declines to sign:

2. In their special report the Indian and Canadian Delegations have presented a picture of the situation in South Viet-Nam which in the opinion of the Polish Delegation does not correspond with the real state of affairs. It places on the same level doubtful and legally unfounded allegations of one of the Parties, on the one hand, and grave and undeniable violations of the Geneva Agreement substantiated by records and findings of the International Commission on the other. The majority report wrongly admitted unfounded allegation of aggression and subversion brought by the Republic of Viet-Nam against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in spite of the fact that they do not find any legal justification in the stipulations of the Geneva Agreement and furthermore are not substantiated and based on any evidence. These artificial allegations have been advanced in the report as a most important item before a problem described in insignificant terms of receiving military aid from the United States of America. This formulation hides serious and important allegations which have been brought out by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam namely the conclusion by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam of a military alliance with the Government of the United States of America, the introduction into South Viet-Nam of a great number of the United States military personnel, weapons and war material, the direct participation of this personnel in hostile activities against the population of South Viet-Nam as well as the establishing in South Viet-Nam of a special operational Military Command of the United States of America to direct the Vietnamese and American armed forces. These allegations have been substantiated by the findings of the Commission in previous reports as well as find expression in the current special report of the majority. In the opinion of Polish Delegation this development of the situation constitutes a flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreement, threatens peace in this area and as such should be urgently considered by the International Commission for Supervision and Control and brought to the immediate attention of the Co-Chairmen with a request for action.

3. Furthermore, the majority has ignored in its special report violation of Article 14 (c) of the Geneva Agreement by the authorities of the Republic of Viet-Nam by persecutions of former resistance members followed by the persecutions of all democratic elements which is certainly one of the most important causes of the widespread movement against the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam which recently has taken various forms of dissatisfaction and struggle.

4. In the opinion of the Polish Delegation another cause of this movement is the refusal of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to act towards

the reunification of Viet-Nam as foreseen in the Geneva Agreement in spite of the repeated proposals made by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and efforts of the International Commission in the past towards facilitating negotiations by the Parties.

5. In order to cope with this widespread national movement the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has asked for military assistance of the United States of America which has of late reached a dangerous stage of direct participation of the American armed forces in military operations in South Viet-Nam. The Commission, being a serious obstacle in this development, has been put by the South Vietnamese Party under a constant and growing pressure which made it impossible for the Commission to discharge its duties effectively in accordance with the mandate given to it under the Geneva Agreement. The Commission had to express to the Co-Chairmen in its letter from the 9th November, 1961, its grave concern for the future activities of the Commission in Viet-Nam if attempts are made to coerce it and requested the Co-Chairmen to impress on the Republic of Viet-Nam its solemn responsibilities towards the International Commission in Viet-Nam.

6. The Polish Delegation is compelled to draw the attention of the Co-Chairmen to the gravity of the situation that has developed in South Viet-Nam and to the danger to peace in South-East Asia resulting therefrom. Fundamental provisions of the Geneva Agreement have been violated by the South Vietnamese Party, resulting in an ever-increasing tension, bloodshed and threat of the resumption of hostilities. This tension grows as a result of the operation in South Viet-Nam and neighbouring countries of a steadily increasing number of the armed forces of the United States of America. This danger has been recently high-lighted by the landing of the American troops on the Thai territory along the frontier of Indo-China. In this situation therefore the Polish Delegation requests the Co-Chairmen to take adequate and immediate measures with the view to reducing tension and preserving peace in South Viet-Nam by the withdrawal of the United States armed personnel and war material, dissolution of the United States military assistance Command in South Viet-Nam as well as the observance by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam of Article 14(c) and of all other provisions of the Geneva Agreement. This in the opinion of the Polish Delegation is the only means which shall enable the Commission to perform its mandatory tasks in full accordance with the Geneva Agreement and in the large interest of the Vietnamese people and of peace in South-East Asia.

7. The Polish Delegation to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam takes this opportunity to renew to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China the assurances of its highest consideration.

LEONARD POHORYLES,

Ambassador,

*Representative of the Polish Peoples'
Republic on the International Com-
mission for Supervision and Control
in Viet-Nam.*

SAIGON,

2nd June, 1962.

STATEMENT OF THE INDIAN DELEGATION

The Indian Delegation has considered the Statement of the Polish Delegation. It does not agree with many of the views expressed by the Polish Delegation in its Statement, nor with its interpretation of the Special Report. The Indian Delegation reiterates its stand and findings, as formulated in the Special Report, which are strictly in terms of the Commission's responsibilities under the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam. It is the fervent hope of the Indian Delegation that the Special Report will enable the Co-Chairmen to consider jointly the measures necessary to restore respect for the Geneva Agreement, relax tensions and improve the situation in Viet-Nam.

G. PARTHASARATHI,

*Representative of India on the
International Commission for Super-
vision and Control in Viet-Nam.*

SAIGON,

2nd June, 1962.

PRESS RELEASE

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

For Immediate Release

No. 33

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Howard Green, commented today on the special report of the International Supervisory Commission for Vietnam. He said:

The International Supervisory Commission for Vietnam, by majority vote of its Indian and Canadian members, has concluded:

- (a) that "armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies" have been sent from North Vietnam into South Vietnam "with the object of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the armed forces and administration" of South Vietnam;
- (b) that the North Vietnamese authorities have allowed North Vietnamese territory to be used "for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the zone in the south aimed at the overthrow of the administration" in South Vietnam;
- (c) that South Vietnam has received military aid from the United States in quantities which appear to be in excess of those permitted by the Geneva Agreement of 1954, and has made military arrangements with the United States which amount to a factual—though not to a formal—military alliance.

These are the principal conclusions of a special report signed in Saigon on June 2 by the representatives of India and Canada. The report, which was addressed to the foreign ministers of Britain and the Soviet Union, acting as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1954, which drew up the Agreements ending the Indo-China war, was made public today. The third member of the International Commission, the representative of Poland, dissented from the findings of the majority.

The Canadian Government fully endorses these conclusions of the International Commission. It considers that the report establishes beyond any reasonable doubt that North Vietnam has engaged, for a number of years and with rising intensity in 1960 and 1961, in subversive activities of an aggressive nature directed against South Vietnam. The Commission's report also makes clear that the increased military aid which South Vietnam has received since December 1961 was requested for the purpose of dealing more effectively with these subversive activities. The report brings out the fact that the South Vietnamese Government has undertaken to end these extraordinary measures "as soon as the North Vietnamese authorities have ceased their acts of aggression and have begun to respect the Geneva Agreement".

The recommendations of the Commission, directed to preserving peace in Vietnam by ensuring compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Agreement, have the full support of the Canadian Government.

I earnestly hope that these recommendations of the International Supervisory Commission for Vietnam will be heeded, and that the "threat of resumption of open hostilities", which the Commission reports to be growing in that country, will thereby be averted. Canada remains prepared to cooperate effectively to that end with its partners in the Commission.

APPENDIX "B"

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND
CONTROL IN VIETNAM

Special Report to the Co-Chairmen

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam presents its compliments to the co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference and wishes to draw their immediate and earnest attention to the following situation.

(While in full agreement that a report should be made to the co-Chairmen, the Canadian Delegation dissents from the terms of this majority Report and has expressed its views in the attached Statement).

On February 7, 1965, a joint communique was issued by the Acting Premier of the Republic of Vietnam (R.V.N.), acting under the authority of the National Security Council, and the Ambassador of the United States, acting under the authority of his Government. This communique announced that military action had been taken against military installations in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN). A copy of this communique is at annexure 'A'.

On the same day, the Liaison Mission of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) transmitted the text of a communique which was issued by the Ministry of Defence of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam referring to the bombing and strafing of the DRVN; subsequently the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam issued on February 8, 1965 a communique on these events, which was communicated by the PAVN Liaison Mission in their letter to the International Commission. The Liaison Mission of the PAVN brought to the notice of the International Commission that again on February 8, 1965, bombing and strafing of a number of places had taken place and requested the International Commission "to consider and condemn without delay these violations of utmost gravity and report them to the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China". These documents are at annexure 'B'.

On February 8, 1965 it was officially announced that further military action on the territory of the DRVN had been undertaken by RVN and US aircraft. This is at Annexure 'C'.

These documents point to the seriousness of the situation and indicate violations of the Geneva Agreement⁽¹⁾.

The International Commission is examining and investigating these and connected complaints still being received by it concerning similar serious events and grave developments, and will transmit a report to the co-Chairmen as soon as possible.

In the meanwhile, this Special Report is submitted for the earnest and serious attention of the co-Chairmen in view of the gravity of the situation. The International Commission requests the co-Chairmen to consider the desirability of issuing an immediate appeal to all concerned with a view to reducing tension and preserving peace in Vietnam and taking whatever measures are necessary in order to stem the deteriorating situation.

(1) "Miscellaneous No. 20 (1954)", Cmd. 9239

June 10, 1965

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam takes this opportunity to renew to the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China the assurances of its highest consideration.

M. A. RAHMAN

*Representative of India on the
International Commission for Super-
vision and Control in Vietnam.*

R. B. STAWICKI

*Acting Representative of the Polish
People's Republic on the Inter-
national Commission for Super-
vision and Control in Vietnam.*

SAIGON:

February 13, 1965.

Annexure "A"

The following joint announcement of the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam and the American Embassy was released to the press at 7.30 P.M. on February 7, 1965:

"The Acting Prime Minister of the Republic of Viet Nam, acting under the authority of the National Security Council, and the United States Ambassador, acting under the authority of the United States Government, announced this evening that military action has been taken today against military installations in North Viet Nam.

These installations had been employed in the direction and support of those engaged in aggression in South Viet Nam, such as the attacks earlier this morning against installations and personnel in the areas of Pleiku and Tuy Hoa."

Annexure "B"

Telegram dated February 8, 1965.

FROM: COL HA VAN LAU CHIEF OF THE
LIAISON MISSION OF VIETNAM
PEOPLES ARMY HIGH COMMAND

TO: THE AMBASSADOR MA RAHMAN
CHAIRMAN ICSC VIETNAM

I have the honour to forward to the Chairman the Feb 8 1965 statement of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Feb. 7 1965 statement of the Defence Ministry of the Democratic Republic Vietnam regarding the bombing and strafing of a number of places in North Vietnam by the US air force on Feb 7 1965. I would like to bring further to the notice of the Commission that today Feb 8 1965 the US again sent aircraft to strafe and bomb in several waves many places which were already attacked in the afternoon on Feb 7 1965 and a number of other places in the Vinh Linh zone. The army unit and the other peoples armed forces in the area dealt with deserved rebuffs at the US aggressors. Over the past two days ten piratical US aircraft were shot down and a number of others damaged. As pointed out by the statement of the Government a new extremely serious US war act against Democratic Republic of Vietnam. A most brazen violation of international law and the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam and intolerable challenge to the worlds peoples. The Vietnam Peoples Army High Command strongly denounces and protests against the above mentioned most dangerous US war acts against the Democratic Republic of VN under orders from the high command I request the IC to consider and condemn without delay these violations of the utmost gravity and report them to the co-Chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China and take firm action to secure from the US Government abandonment of its policy of provocation and sabotage against the DRVN ending of aggression war in South Vietnam respect for and correct implementation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam. I take this opportunity to renew to you Mr. Chairman and to the members of the International Commission the assurances of my highest consideration.

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF VIETNAM DATED FEBRUARY 8, 1965 REGARDING THE BOMBING
AND STRAFING OF A NUMBER OF PLACES IN NORTH
VIETNAM BY THE US AIR FORCE ON FEBRUARY 7, 1965.

With a view to carrying out their scheme of sabotaging the 1954 Geneva Agreements in Indo-China the US imperialist have unleashed a special war in South Vietnam. But they have come up against the resolute and vigorous struggle of the South Vietnamese people and have sustained heavy defeat. In an attempt to retrieve their defeat they have been endeavouring to step up the dirty war in South Vietnam while increasing provocation and acts of sabotage

against North Vietnam. Most typical of these is the August 5 1964 air attack, an extremely serious act of aggression which has been dealt a well deserved rebuff by the army and the people of the North Vietnam and has been vehemently condemned by progressive mankind. Since August 5, 1965 in defiance of the protests of world opinion the US has staged over 20 air or naval raids of provocation and sabotage against North Vietnam while endeavouring to expand the war in Laos and perpetrating repeated violations of the territory of Cambodia. On Feb. 7, 1965 at about 1400 hrs, under orders from US President L. B. Johnson jet planes taking off in several waves from aircraft carriers of the US 7th fleet anchored in the South China attacked a number of points in Dong Hoi town Quang Binh province and an Con Co (Tiger Island) in Vinh Linh area they even bombed and strafed the hospital of Dong Hoi and many civilian houses causing human and material losses to the local population. In order to protect the life and property of the people and defend the territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the armed forces and the local populations resolutely fought back, shooting down four enemy aircraft and damaging a number of others. The Feb 7 1965 air attack is a new extremely serious act or war perpetrated by the US against the DRVN, a most brazen violation of international law and the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam and an intolerable challenge to the world's people. What is more the US Government has impudently decided to send additional US military forces to South Vietnam. The above facts show that in an attempt to retrieve its critical situation in South Vietnam the US has deliberately perpetrated war acts against the DRVN, has endeavoured to increase US military forces in South Vietnam and has frantically put into execution its scheme to extend the hostilities beyond the limits of South Vietnam, thus aggravating the danger of a war fought with incalculable consequences in Indo China and South East Asia. The Government of the DRVN energetically denounces and protests against the new US war act against the DRVN and the despatch of additional US troops and weapons to South Vietnam. It resolutely demands that the US Government correctly implement the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, respect the sovereignty independence unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam and stop at once the aggressive war in South Vietnam and all acts of war against the DRVN. The US Government must bear full responsibility for the consequences arising from its policy of war and aggression in this part of the world. The Government of the DRVN earnestly requests the co-Chairmen and the Governments of the participating countries of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo China, the socialist countries and all peace-loving countries of the world to take timely and effective action with a view to checking the hands of the warlike and aggressive US imperialists, ensuring a correct implementation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam and defending peace in Indo China and South East Asia. The Government of the DRVN declares no US action whatsoever to intensify and expand the aggressive war can by any means give the US from its defeat in South Vietnam. By striking at the DRVN a socialist country the US aggressors should unquestionably be punished by the Vietnamese people and meet with a vigorous opposition from the peoples of the socialist countries and the whole world. The Vietnamese peoples who are fighting for their sacred national rights will certainly not be cowed by the US attempt at intimidation instead they will increase their forces will step up the struggle and are confident

that their just cause will elicit stronger support from the world's peoples and that the vile acts of aggression of the US imperialists will be even more strongly condemned by the opinion of progressive mankind. Victory will certainly belong to the Vietnamese people. US imperialists are doomed to ignominious defeat.

STATEMENT DATED 7TH FEB 1965 OF THE DEFENCE MINISTRY OF
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM REGARDING THE
BOMBING AND STRAFING OF A NUMBER OF PLACES IN
NORTH VIETNAM BY THE US AIR FORCE ON FEB 7 1965

On Feb 7, 1965 towards 1400 hrs the American imperialists without any justification sent combat jet planes coming from the south in several waves to bomb and strafe the zone of the provincial capital of Donghoi and other localities of the Quang Binh province and the Vinh Linh zone thus violating impudently the sovereignty and territory of the DRVN. Once again the American pirates received a deserved punishment: at first news the anti-aircraft defence the navy and the peoples army of Quang Binh-Vinh Linh fought valiantly brought down 4 (4) enemy planes and damaged a number of others.

It is notoriously public that since July 1964 the American imperialists and their South Vietnamese agents have not ceased intensifying provocations and sabotage against the DRVN, and have sought to spread the war to the North in the hope of saving themselves from defeat in the aggressive war in South Vietnam. In their act of war they have seen themselves being inflicted crushing blows by our army and our people nonetheless they have obstinately made their war planes and ships undertake repeated intrusion in the air space and territorial waters and raids against numerous localities in the north of our country.

After the war act of Aug 5, 1964, the unjustified air raids launched by the American imperialists against the provincial capital of Donghoi and a certain number of localities of Quang Vinh-Vinh Linh on 7th February 1965 constitutes a new aggressive act of extreme gravity. Once again the American imperialists have impudently violated the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam and provoked consequences extremely dangerous for peace and security in Indo-China and South East Asia.

The present act of impudent aggression of the American imperialists happened just when George Bundy, special assistant of US President Johnson is at Saigon, that further discloses dark manoeuvre to intensify and spread the aggressive war in South Vietnam and to take up provocations sabotage and war acts against the DRVN according to plans elaborated in Washington.

The Defence Ministry of the DRVN issues a severe warning to the American imperialists and their agents: they should bear the entire responsibility of the extremely grave consequence flowing from their aggressive acts.

The DRVN Defence Ministry warmly congratulates the troops and the population of Quang Binh-Vinh Linh, who gave a deserved retaliation to the aggressors, for the valour in combat.

The DRVN Defence Ministry energetically denounces before world opinion the above mentioned aggressive acts of American imperialists and demands that the US Government immediately cease at in provocative and war like acts against the DRVN and stop the aggressive war in South Vietnam.

Enthused by the victories they have won the people and peoples armed forces of Vietnam redouble in hate against the American imperialists aggressors raids their revolutionary vigilance and united like one man will resolutely break all dark manoeuvres of the American imperialists and their agents.

Annexure "C"

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE OFFICIAL RVN PRESS AGENCY
VIETNAM PRESS.

"Twenty-four VNAF fighter-bombers at 3.30 p.m. this afternoon attacked a number of North Vietnamese military installations and training bases in the Vinh Linh area close to the demilitarized zone north the 17th Parallel. The raids, with cover provided by USAF aircraft, were carried out under the personal leadership of the Air Force Commander, Brig. Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky."

STATEMENT OF THE CANADIAN DELEGATION

The Canadian Delegation considers it necessary to append a minority statement to the foregoing majority report.

2. The Canadian Delegation agrees that the situation in Vietnam continues to be dangerously unstable, and events since February 7 in North and South Vietnam have provided a dramatic demonstration of this continuing condition. The Delegation believes, however, that the causes of this situation must be seen in context and, therefore, reviewed in the framework of the Commission's full range of responsibilities under the Geneva Agreement. By concentrating on a very limited aspect of the situation in Vietnam, the majority report runs the serious risk of giving the members of the Geneva Conference a distorted picture of the nature of the problem in Vietnam and its underlying causes.

3. In reporting on the events in North and South Vietnam since February 7, the Canadian Delegation, therefore, deems it necessary to set these events in their proper perspective. In the view of the Canadian Delegation, they do not stem from any essentially new factors in the situation in Vietnam, nor can they be seen in isolation; rather, they are dramatic manifestations of a continuing instability which has, as its most important cause, the deliberate and persistent pursuit of aggressive but largely covert policies by North Vietnam directed against South Vietnam. The Commission's Special Report of 1962⁽²⁾ drew attention to the fact that "armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies have been sent from the zone in the North to the zone in the South with the object of supporting, organizing, and carrying out hostile activity" and that "the PAVN has allowed the zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging, and supporting hostile activities in the zone in the South aimed at the overthrow of the administration in the South", thus showing, beyond reasonable doubt, violation of various articles of the Geneva Agreement by the People's Army of North Vietnam. This judgment by the Commission was based on conclusions reached by the Commission's Legal Committee after exhaustive examination of allegations and evidence pertaining to this problem. The final paragraphs of those conclusions read as follows:

"The Legal Committee concludes (reference paragraphs 742 to 746 and paragraph 754 in Section VI) that it is the aim of the Vietnam Lao Dong

(2) "Vietnam No. 1 (1962)", Cmnd. 1755.

Party (the ruling Party in the Zone in the North) to bring about the overthrow of the Administration in the South. In September 1960, the Third Congress of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party held in Hanoi (in the Zone in the North) passed a resolution calling for the organization of a 'Front' under the leadership of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party for the overthrow of the Administration in the South. Such a 'Front for Liberation of the South' was, in fact, constituted under the sponsorship of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party. There are present and functioning in the Zone in the South, branches of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party and the Front for Liberation of the South along with its armed branches, namely, the 'Forces for Liberation of the South' and the 'People's Self-Defence Armed Forces'. The Vietnam Lao Dong Party and the Front for Liberation of the South have the identical aim of overthrowing the Administration in the South. The Vietnam Lao Dong Party, the Front for Liberation of the South, the Forces for Liberation of the South and the People's Self-Defence Armed Forces have disseminated in the Zone in the South propaganda seeking to incite the people to oppose and overthrow the Administration in the South. There exists and functions a 'Voice' of the Front for Liberation of the South and a 'Liberation Press Agency' which assist in the above-mentioned activities. It is probable that Hanoi Radio also has assisted in the said activities. Propaganda literature of the Front for the Liberation of the South and in favour of the activities of of the Front has been published in the Zone in the North and has been distributed abroad by the official representatives of the DRVN.

"The Legal Committee further concludes that:

- (1) The Vietnam Lao Dong Party in the Zone in the North, the various branches of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party in the Zone in the South, the Front for Liberation of the South, the Forces for Liberation of the South and the People's Self-Defence Armed Forces have incited various sections of the people residing in the Zone in the South, including members of the Armed Forces of the South, to oppose the Administration in the South, to overthrow it by violent means and have indicated to them various means of doing so.
- (2) Those who ignored their exhortation and continued to support the Administration in the South have been threatened with punishment and in certain cases such punishment has been effected by the carrying out of death sentences.
- (3) The aim and function of the Front for Liberation of the South, the Forces for Liberation of the South and the People's Self-Defence Armed Forces are to organize and to carry out under the leadership of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party, hostile activities against the Armed Forces and the Administration of the South by violent means aimed at the overthrow of the Administration of the South.

"The Legal Committee concludes also that the PAVN has allowed the Zone in the North to be used as a base for the organization of hostile activities in the Zone in the South, including armed attacks, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South in violation of its obligations under the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam."

4. Since the date of its Special Report, the Commission has continued to receive from the South Vietnamese Liaison Mission complaints of an increas-

ingly serious nature, alleging an intensification of aggression from the North. In these communications, the Liaison Mission has brought to the Commission's attention mounting evidence to show that the Government of North Vietnam has expanded its aggressive activities directed against the Government of South Vietnam and has infiltrated growing numbers of armed personnel and increasing amounts of military equipment into South Vietnam for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of South Vietnam by force. The Liaison Mission has informed the Commission that, as a result, the Government of South Vietnam has been obliged to request increased foreign aid for self-defence.

5. In its letter No. 383/PDVN/CT/2 dated January 27, 1965 (attached as Appendix I), for example, the Liaison Mission has provided the Commission with details of secret bases and related installations established in South Vietnam with the support of the Government of North Vietnam and other communist countries. In the same letter, the Liaison Mission has provided the Commission with a recapitulatory list of arms, munitions, and equipment of communist origin, the seizure of which has been reported to the Commission since the date of the Commission's Special Report of June 2, 1962.

6. In letter No. 539/PDVN/CT/TD2 dated February 12, 1965 (attached as Appendix II), the Liaison Mission has reported to the Commission that, during the period 1959 to 1964, more than 39,000 men have been introduced into South Vietnam from North Vietnam in violation of the Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam. The Liaison Mission has provided details of the selection, training, infiltration routes, arms and equipment of these men, based on declarations obtained from prisoners of war, defectors and captured documents.

7. The Liaison Mission, in its letter No. 0512/PDVN/CT/TD.2 dated February 9, 1965 (attached as Appendix III), concerning events in North and South Vietnam since February 7, has informed the Commission that, "the intensification of the aggressive activities of North Vietnam has recently been manifested by large-scale attacks launched against various military installations in South Vietnam, such as those directed against the Bien-Hoa airfield on 1st November 1964, and the military bases of Pleiku and Tuy Hoa on the night between 5th and 6th February 1965". The Liaison Mission goes on to explain that "in order to cope with these acts of marked aggression, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam which, hitherto, has restricted itself to defensive measures, has found itself compelled to take appropriate military actions against the North Vietnamese strategic bases which, as known to everyone, have been utilized actively for the training and infiltration of Viet-Cong elements into South Vietnam" and to stress that "the retaliatory operations were limited to the military areas which supplied men and arms for the attacks against South Vietnam".

8. It is the considered view of the Canadian Delegation that the events which have taken place in both North and South Vietnam since February 7 are the direct result of the intensification of the aggressive policy of the Government of North Vietnam. In the opinion of the Canadian Delegation, therefore, it should be the chief obligation of this Commission to focus all possible attention on the continuing fact that North Vietnam has increased its efforts to incite, encourage, and support hostile activities in South Vietnam, aimed at

the overthrow of the South Vietnamese administration. These activities are in direct and grave violation of the Geneva Agreement and constitute the root cause of general instability in Vietnam, of which events since February 7 should be seen as dangerous manifestations. The cessation of hostile activities by North Vietnam is a prerequisite to the restoration of peace in Vietnam as foreseen by the participants in the Geneva Conference of 1954.

J. BLAIR SEABORN

*Representatives of the Government of
Canada on the International Commis-
sion for Supervision and Control in
Vietnam.*

SAIGON,

February 13, 1965

Appendix I

TRANSLATION

FROM

Mission in charge of relations with
the ICSC—SAIGON.

TO

SECRETARIAT GENERAL of the ICSC
in Vietnam—SAIGON.

Letter No. 0383/PDVN/CT/TD/2 dated 27.1.1965

The Mission in charge of relations with the ICSC presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the I.C. and has the honour to inform the I.C. of the following:

II. By letters Nos. 3712 dated 30th September 1964 and 4759 dated 18th December 1964, the Mission has drawn the Commission's attention to the recrudescence of the military activities of the regular forces of North Vietnam fighting in South Vietnam under the name of the self-styled "Forces for Liberation of the South".

In order to enable the Commission to complete the already overwhelming dossier of the communist aggression directed by the Hanoi regime against the Republic of Vietnam the Mission has the honour to communicate to the Commission the following new proofs:

- one statement of the principal secret bases and installations of the so-called "Forces for Liberation of the South" recently destroyed in South Vietnam.
- an up-to-date statement of the principal arms of communist origin captured in South Vietnam.

These statements add to those already forwarded to the Commission by letters of the Mission Nos.:

- 370 dated 29 January 1964
- 496 " 6 February 1964
- 1731 " 7 May 1964
- 2750 " 17 July 1964
- 3712 " 30 September 1964
- 4759 " 18 December 1964.

III. An examination of the above mentioned lists will enable to affirm once more and in an undeniable way that the Hanoi authorities, with the ever increasing support of the Peking Government and of other communist countries, continue to direct, supply and maintain their campaign of aggression against South Vietnam, in grave violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam.

a) The statement A reveals the existence of 2,699 military installations of all kinds (arms workshops, supplies store-houses, training centers and transit stations etc.) amongst the various clandestine communist bases illegally installed in the provinces of Giadinh, Bienhoa, Kontum, Phu Yen, Quang Ngai, Darlac, Pleiku, Phy Bon, Binh Duong and Tay Ninh.

If the number of previously destroyed military installations are added to the above, the global figure will amount to 6,620 installations of all kinds.

Such installations could never have been built without the external aid from North Vietnam and from other communist countries.

b) The statement B of captured arms of communist origin, is fully significant, on the other hand, of the important support in war material provided by the communist countries and North Vietnam to the self-styled "Front for Liberation of the South".

These arms, which are of all kinds and all calibers, consists notably of:

- Russian rifles Mossin Nagant (Photo enclosed No. 1) of which 580 specimens have been seized up to this day.
- Czech K.50 sub-machine-guns (Photo already communicated to the I.C. by letter No. 370 of 29.1.1964) of which 150 specimens have been seized up to this day.
- 75m/m recoilless SKZ rifles of Communist Chinese make (Photo already communicated to the I.C. by letter No. 370 of 29.1.64) of which 5 specimens have been seized up to this day.
- 57m/m recoilless SKZ rifles made in Communist China (Photo already communicated to the I.C. by letter No. 370 of 29.1.64) of which 9 specimens have been seized up to this day.
- Communist Chinese made sub-machineguns of Russian model Kalashnikow (Photo enclosed No. 2) of which 49 specimens have been seized up to this day.
- Automatic rifles of caliber 7.62m/m, model 56, inspired from Russian model Degtyarev RPD, of Communist Chinese make (Enclosed Photo No. 3 of a specimen bearing the trade mark in Chinese characters) of which 16 specimens have been seized up to this day.
- BRNO automatic rifles of caliber 7.92m/m, of Communist Chinese make; (Photo enclosed of a specimen bearing the following trade mark in Chinese characters). of which 14 specimens have been seized up to this day.

[1,951.3, in Chinese numerals which are not reproduced here.]

- G.E.W. 38 k. rifles of caliber 7.92m/m, of East German make. of which 5 specimens have been seized up to this day.
- MG.34 Heavy machinegun, of caliber 7.92m/m, for anti-aircraft firings (Photo enclosed No. 5) of which 3 specimens have been seized up to this day.
- Bomb-launchers of Communist Chinese make bearing the trade mark in Chinese characters (Photo enclosed No. 6). of which 4 specimens have been seized up to this day.

The Mission draws the Commission's attention particularly to the following very important lot of modern communist arms recently seized during the operation "Dan Chi 100/SD" launched from 27th to 29th December 1964 at 15 kms East of Soc Trang, against the battalions 303, 306, 207 and U Minh I of the so-called "Forces for Liberation of the South":

- 1 Bazooka of Communist Chinese make
- 2 75m/m recoilless rifle (Photo already communicated to the Commission by letter of the Mission No. 370 of 29.1.64)
- 5 anti-aircraft heavy machineguns of .50
- 1 machinegun of a new type
- 7 automatic rifles
- 10 Czech submachineguns
- 6 Russian rifles
- 1 carriage for anti-aircraft heavy machinegun
- 8 sights for anti-aircraft heavy machinegun
- 45 shells for 60 and 81m/m mortar.
- 52 shells for recoilless rifle of 57 and 75m/m
- 15,000 cartridges for heavy machinegun
- 33 cases of munitions for machinegun .30 and .50
- 22 anti-tank mines.
- 570 grenades M.26
- 6,000 cartridges for Russian rifles
- 4 bomb-launchers of Communist Chinese make
- 5,000 cartridges for Czech sub-machineguns
- 6 telephone apparatus of Communist Chinese origin
- 1 compass of Communist Chinese origin.

3. The above facts prove that:

- the so called "Front of Liberation of the South" is but a puppet organization maintained and directed from the outside;
- North Vietnam as well as the communist countries, and chiefly Communist China, continue to furnish to this Front an important aid in arms, munitions and war material without which the said Front would never have been able to pursue its war activities in South Vietnam.

The Mission expresses its gravest concern over this situation. In the name of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, it makes an urgent appeal to the I.C., so that an energetical action may be undertaken to put the Hanoi regime before its responsibilities and to compel it to rest the 1954 Geneva Agreement on the cease-fire and to give up its aggressive policy towards the Republic of Vietnam.

4. The arms, munitions and materials listed in the Statement B are kept at the disposal of the I.C., in case it wishes to examine them.

5. The Mission takes this opportunity to renew to the Secretariat General of the I.C. the assurances of its high consideration.

Sd/Colonel NGUYEN VAN AN

*Chief of the Mission in charge of
relations with the ICSC.*

(SEAL)

STATEMENT A

STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPAL INSTALLATIONS DESTROYED IN
THE COMMUNIST SECRET BASES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(Period from May to end of December 1964)

SNo.	Circumstances	Losses suffered by the Viet-Cong
(1)	(2)	(3)
1	Operation "Chuong Duong 10" launched at Pleiku on 4th May 1964.	301 barracks 120 quintals of paddy burnt
2	Operation launched on 24th May 1964 at Can Gio, Giadinh province.	1 district base 1 section base 1 liaison station destroyed
3	Operation "Dan Chi 132" launched on 29th May 1964 at Chuong Thien.	1 Engineering workshop destroyed.
4	Operation "Chinh Nghia" launched on 30th May 1964 at 14kms South East of Bienhoa.	1 district base 1 training base for section cadres destroyed.
5	Operation "Quyet Thang 303" launched on 31.5.64 at 40kms North East of Toumorong, Kontum province.	675 lodgings 4 secret bases 1 liaison station destroyed
6	Operation launched on 2.6.64 at North West of Phuoc Vinh, Tay-Ninh province.	1 training center destroyed 8 sacks of military equipments seized.
7	Operation "33/64" launched on 17.6.64 in the special sector of Rung Sat, Giadinh province.	17 lodgings 1 base of political commissariat of Nha-Be, Binh Chanh. 1 propaganda and training base of the Can Gio district destroyed.
8	Operation launched on 9th July 1964 at 13kms South East of the Thu Duc, Giadinh province.	2 military formation camps destroyed.
9	Operation "Chinh Nghia 36" launched on 10th July 1964, at 6kms South of Duc Hoa, Hau Nghia province.	1 arms workshop destroyed.
10	Operation "Quyet Thang 404" launched from 16th June to 12th July 1964 in the Phu Yen province.	412 lodgings 1 military formation center 78 tons of cereals destroyed 1 receiver-transmitter set 1 important lot of documents seized.
11	Operation "Quang Ngai 16" launched from 14th to 16th July 1964 at 14kms West South West of Son Tinh, Quang Ngai province.	167 lodgings destroyed. 1 important lot of documents seized.
12	Operation launched on 26 July 1964 at 46kms East of Lac Thien, Darlac province.	30 military installations destroyed.
13	Operation "Le Loi 9" launched from 23rd to 30th July 1964, at 24kms South West of An Tuc, Pleiku province.	90 military installations destroyed.
14	Operation launched on 2nd August 1964 at 7kms West of Tuy An, Phu Yen province.	3 installations destroyed 1 Communist Chinese compass. 1 important lot of pharmaceutical products, of military equipments and of documents seized.
15	Operation launched on 4th August 1964 at 17kms South East of Go-Cong	2 arms workshop destroyed. 1 generating set seized.

STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPAL INSTALLATIONS DESTROYED IN
THE COMMUNIST SECRET BASES IN SOUTH VIETNAM (Concluded)

SNo.	Circumstances	Losses suffered by the Viet-Cong
(1)	(2)	(3)
16	Operation launched on 12th August 1964 at 30kms North East of Le Trung, Pleiku province.	1 secret base destroyed 1 important lot of pharmaceutical products and of documents seized.
17	Operation "Tu Cuong 124" launched on 13th August 1964 at 5 kms East of Duc Pho, Quang Ngai province.	1 secret base destroyed.
18	Operation "Dan Chi 54" launched on 15th August 1964, at 8kms North of Kien Thien, Chuong Thien province.	1 arms workshop destroyed.
19	Operation "Quyet Thang 606" launched on 17th August 1964 at 44kms North West of Cheo Reo, Phu Bon province.	304 lodgings 7 control posts 2 training centers destroyed
20	Operation "Lien Lu 7" launched from 19th to 22nd August 1964, at 15kms North of Tay Ninh	1 supply centre 1 camp destroyed.
21	Operation "Thang Long 18" launched from 20th to 29th August 1964, at 28kms North West of Le Trung, Pleiku province.	1 training camp 200 lodgings destroyed.
22	Operation "Binh Thuan 39" launched from 27 to 29 August 1964, at 11kms North of Muong Man, Binh Thuan province.	500 lodgings destroyed.

TOTAL:—12 Viet-Cong secret bases destroyed.

—2,699 Viet-Cong barracks and military installations destroyed.

STATEMENT B

STATEMENT OF ARMS, MUNITIONS AND EQUIPMENTS OF COMMUNIST ORIGIN AND OF WHICH THE SEIZURES HAVE BEEN REPORTED TO THE I.C. DURING THE PERIOD FROM 2nd JUNE 1962 TO END OF DECEMBER 1964

I. Communist Chinese Origin:

1) 75m/m recoilless SKZ rifle, made in Communist China after the American model M.20, and provided with a carriage of Russian model.	5 specimens
2) Shells for 75m/m SKZ rifle. These shells bear inscriptions in Chinese characters. On some, these characters have been scraped away and replaced by false American marks.	138 "
3) Recoilless SKZ rifle of 57m/m caliber.....	9 "
4) Shells for 57m/m SKZ rifle.....	196 "
5) Mortar of 80m/m caliber.....	1 "
6) Mortar of 60m/m caliber.....	7 "
7) Shells for 60m/m mortar.....	205 "
8) Anti-tank Bazooka of 90m/m.....	1 "
9) Sub-machineguns.....	49 "
10) Machinegun "Maxim 08" of 7.92m/m caliber. A heavy arm copied from the German model MG.08, water-cooled and provided with a carriage permitting anti-aircraft firings.	6 "
11) Degtyarev automatic rifles. Arm made in Communist China after the air-cooled Russian model DPM Degtyarev (Model 1953), of cal. 7.62m/m, with circular 47-cartridge magazines, capable of firing 600 shots per minute and having an inscription in Chinese characters on the breech-block.	16 "
12) Rifles of Communist China make.....	4 "
13) Heavy machineguns.....	3 "
14) BRNO automatic rifles (arm manufactured in Communist China and inspired from the Czech model Brno ZB (1925), of caliber 7.92m/m, air-cooled, and capable of firing 500 shots per minute.)	14 "
15) Bomb-launchers: of caliber 40m/m, inspired from the Russian model RPG.2: anti-tank arm, with smooth barrel of stainless steel, provided with an adjustment system for firings of 50, 100 and 150 shots per minute.	4 "
16) Automatic Pistols, inspired from the American model M3A1.....	9 "
17) M.P.82 flares.....	142 "
18) I.N.T. explosive.....	1,373 packages
19) Chlorate of Potassium.....	19 T.0150
20) Cartridges for 7.92m/m machinegun.....	100,000
21) Detonators for 60m/m mortar shells.....	150 specimens
22) Compass.....	1 "
23) Red Phosphorus.....	1 barrel
Inscription on the barrel: "Red Horses Brand Red Amorphous Phosphorus Made in the People's Republic of China Net weight: 5 kilos Inflammable Dangerous Keep Dry Handle with care.	

II. Czech Origin:

1) Sub-machinegun K.50, of caliber 7.62m/m, air-cooled, capable of firing—700 to 750 shots per minute	150 specimens
2) Czech rifles.....	42 "
3) Cartridges for sub-machinegun K.50	14,000 "
4) Automatic rifles.....	11 "
5) 60m/m Mortar.....	1 "

III. Soviet Origin:

1) Mossin Nagant rifles, automatic, with folding bayonet, caliber 7.62m/m, model 1944	580 specimens
2) Automatic pistols	2 "
3) Cartridges for rifles	160,000 "
4) Sub-machineguns	6 "
5) Automatic rifles	7 "

IV. East German Origin:

1) Heavy machineguns MG 34: of caliber 7.92m/m, with a circular magazine of 50 cartridges and capable of firing 100 to 120 shots per minute. Pro- vided with a special sight, the arm has a long carriage permitting anti-aircraft firings.	3 "
2) Rifles G.W.E. 38 k., of caliber 7.92m/m, for anti-aircraft firings	5 "

Appendix II

TRANSLATION

Most Immediate

From	To
Mission in charge of relations with the ICSC—Saigon.	SECRETARIAT GENERAL of the ICSC in Vietnam—SAIGON.

Letter No. 0539/PDVN/CT/TD/2 dated 12.2.1965

The Mission in charge of relations with the ICSC presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the I.C. and has the honour to forward to the Commission the following new proofs concerning the illegal introductions of cadres and military personnel from North Vietnam into South Vietnam:

II. Importance of Infiltrations:

According to controlled but necessarily incomplete information, the strength of cadres and military personnel illegally introduced into South Vietnam during the period from 1959 to 1964 would have amounted to 39,000 men, being assessed as follows:

— 1959	300
— 1960	2,700
— 1961	11,000
— 1962	10,700
— 1963	7,200
— 1964	7,100 (figure still incomplete)
Total				39,000 men

To these figures the Mission deems it useful to add the following precise details:

- (1) The infiltration operations, sporadic as were seen, during the first years of the Geneva Agreement, were effected on a large scale from 1960 concurrently with the resumption of hostilities in Laos, reached their height in 1961 (11,000 men), year of the organization of the so-called "Front for Liberation of the South", to decrease in combat strength gradually as this organization took shape and required only the sending of specialized cadres.
- (2) The figures gathered, anyhow, have only an indicative value and are certainly below the truth. For the year 1964, the strength of combatant cadres tended to increase towards the last months and would have reached it alone, the figure of 5,500 men at minimum, against the 7,100 recorded so far.
- (3) According to the latest information, the infiltrated personnel would consist of 65% of officering military personnel from the rank of chief of group and upward, and 35% of political cadres or specialized cadres in different branches (artillery, telecommunication, special missions, espionage, engineering, mechanic workshops etc. . .).

4) The majority of the infiltrated contingents were drawn from the former units of the Viet Minh in South Vietnam regrouped in North Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva Agreement.

These elements have been chosen for their knowledge of the regions and have generally been sent back to South Vietnam to operate again in their former sectors.

Here are the former units of the Viet Minh which have contributed most to the sending of men to the South:

<i>Regrouped Units</i>	<i>Present Zone of Operation</i>
— Divisions 305 and 324	Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh and Phu Yen.
— Division 325	Quang Tri, Thua Thien.
— Regiment 120	area of the High Plateaux in Central Vietnam.
— Divisions 330 and 338	Southern regions of South Vietnam.

5) Besides these combatant units, numerous specially formed and duly trained groups have been sent to South Vietnam, to serve as cadres for the so-called "Forces for Liberation of the South".

These special groups are composed mainly of cadres specialized in espionage, military engineering, telecommunications, transport, military health, heavy artillery, etc.

The introduction of cadres specialized in heavy artillery has been particularly active and has been effected on a large scale since 1963. Their figure would have amounted to over 1,000 men, divided into several groups, such as the groups identified under the Nos. 39, 40, 64, 66, etc.

6) The cadres and combatant units from North Vietnam are generally introduced by small groups into South Vietnam. Once arrived at destination, the specialized cadres serve to staff the armed rebel elements recruited on the spot, while the combatant units are formed into regiments and incorporated with the so-called "Forces for Liberation of the South", change their name and fight behind this label under new identification numbers.

III. Previous Training

All the cadres and units called upon to infiltrate into South Vietnam, receive a previous political and military training the program of which is carefully elaborated by a special committee called "Central Committee for Reunification", installed in Hanoi and which works in close relation with the High Command of the Armed Forces of North Vietnam and the Ministries charged with the execution of the program.

Here are the conditions in which this training is effected:

1) The cadres are chosen, by preference, among the elements native of South Vietnam, having belonged to the former Viet-Cong units in South Vietnam and which have been regrouped in the North after the 1954 Geneva Agreement.

Since the year 1964, the presence of elements native of North Vietnam has been reported, notably on certain fronts in Central Vietnam.

(2) All the cadres destined for South Vietnam, even those already specialized, have to undergo without distinction a course for military training and political formation at the Special Camp of Xuan Mai (Ha Dong province). Besides the general basic notions, the duration and the detailed program of studies, as well as the strength of the participants, are determined according to the requirements of the situation.

(3) Apart from the principal of Xuan Mai, there are others more specialized for the formation of technical cadres, such as:

- the political centre of Hoa Binh;
- the technical centre of Son Tay for artillery and military engineering;
- the camp of Cao Bang for armoured cars;
- the camp of Tong (Son Tay) for telecommunications;
- the espionage centre of Hanoi;
- the centre of military health of Thai Nguyen;
- the centres of Minh Khai and Ben Quang (Vinh Linh) for the formation of guerrillas.

IV. Infiltration Routes

The introduction into South Vietnam of cadres and combatant units from North Vietnam, is mainly carried out through the following routes:

(1) *Along the Vietnam-Laos frontier:*

The communists of North Vietnam make an extensive use of this route, chiefly since April 1962. Here is the itinerary:

- (a) journey by military trucks from the Xuan Mai camp (Ha Dong) to designation of Vinh, Ha Tinh, Dong Hoi, My Duc village, pass 1001, in the Quang Binh province.
- (b) Rest, abandonment of uniforms and insignias of the regular army of North Vietnam, distribution of arms and new equipments.
- (c) resumption of journey on foot, crossing of Ben Hai river (17th parallel) and of the road No. 9, along the frontiers, in the Southern direction towards Bac An (Thua Thien province), principal transit station, before coming to the other provinces.

(2) *Via Lower Laos:*

North Vietnam has found in Lower Laos an "ideal corridor" to introduce men and armaments into South Vietnam. Here is the outline of this itinerary:

- (a) Departure in groups and by military trucks:
 - from Xuan Mai (Ha Dong) to Vinh, by the national road No. 1;
 - from Vinh to Tchepone (Laos) by the road No. 8, passing by Nape, Mahaxoy, Muong Xen, or by the road No. 12, passing by Huong Khe, Muong Xen, Nam Mi.
- (b) resumption of journey on foot, from Tchepone towards the South, to destination of Tamprill across Muong-Nong, Tousea.
- (c) *Infiltration into South Vietnam by 2 ways:*
 - either by coming to Central Vietnam or the High Plateaux;
 - or by coming to South Vietnam via Ban Don to reach the zone D (Phuoc Thanh province).

(3) *By sea way:*

One may believe that North Vietnam mainly uses this way to introduce equipment materials, chemical and pharmaceutical products and heavy armaments, as well as spies and special agents.

The introduction of heavy armaments has notably been reported in the Western maritime zone of South Vietnam, where modern arms of communist manufacture have been seized, such as the cannons of 75 m/m and 57 m/m caliber, the machine guns .50 and .30, the anti-aircraft machine guns, etc.

Three flagrant cases of infiltration by sea way have been revealed, following the capture of boats and spies on board them:

- at Ly Son (Quang Ngai), on 31 January 1960.
- at An Don (Quang Nam), on 5 June 1961.
- at Thuan An (Thua Thien), on 8 April 1963.

(4) *Across the Ben Hai river and the demilitarized zone:*

This way is the most direct one and is effected entirely on the Vietnamese territory. It includes the crossing of the Ben Hai river (by wading, by light boats or rubber boats), and the passage across the demilitarized zone South, mostly in the West and Westernmost mountain area near the Laotian border. From the demilitarized zone, the groups infiltrate themselves by stages into different provinces of South Vietnam, under the guidance of liaison agents, passing through a dense network of clandestine transit and welcome centres installed along the route. Thus it has been reported the existence in minimum of:

- 3 centres in the Quang Tri province
- 5 " Thua Thien province
- 6 " Quang Nam province
- 1 " Quang Ngai province
- 9 " Gia Lai province
- 3 " Darlac province

According to the documents seized at the end of December 1964, the infiltration operations have been effected on a large scale, across the demilitarized zone.

V. Armament and Equipment

(1) Each cadre introduced into South Vietnam is provided with individual arms, besides the heavy armaments allotted on a collective basis to each group.

During the first years of the subversion, these arms consisted of arms of French or American make taken from the stocks already in the possession of the Army of North Vietnam, at the time of the cessation of hostilities in 1954. They were later replaced by more modern arms of communist make, provided as military aid to North Vietnam by various communist countries, and of which the principal types are as follows:

- *Individual arms:*
 - Russian rifle Mossin Nagant
 - Czech submachine gun K50

—Collective arms:

- 57m/m SKZ cannon of communist Chinese make.
- Communist Chinese submachinegun, inspired from the Russian Model Kalashnikov.
- 7.62 m/m automatic rifle of communist Chinese make (Russian Model Degtyarev RPD).
- 7.92m/m Brno automatic rifle of Communist Chinese make.
- GEM 38 K. rifle of 7.92m/m caliber, East German make.
- MG-34 heavy machinegun of 7.92m/m caliber, East German make for anti-aircraft firings.
- Bazookas and bomb-launchers of Communist Chinese make.

By letters No. 4759 of 18th December 1964 and No. 0383 of 27th January 1965, the Mission has already supplied the Commission with a complete list of the arms in question with their characteristics as well as their photographs.

(2) Before penetrating into South Vietnam, the men are required to turn over all the objects, documents, insignias or uniforms which might reveal their belonging to the regular units or other organizations of North Vietnam.

They are distributed, besides the arms, new identity papers and an individual equipment composed in principle of:

- 1 mosquito-net
- 1 Hammock
- 1 Suit of grey khaki
- 1 uniform
- 1 black suit
- 3 under-wears
- 1 pull-over
- 1 cap
- 1 nylon rain-coat
- 1 water bottle
- 1 pair of sandals
- 1 knife
- Munitions and grenades
- Medicines of primary need
- 1 kilo of dry provisions
- 1 kilo of salt
- rations of rice varying with the duration of stages
- 1,200 piastres of South Vietnam

VI. The above information result from reliable statements made by the prisoners of war and the rallied elements, or from authentic documents captured during operations.

Though still incomplete, they are sufficiently edifying to give a precise idea on the importance of the contingents of cadres and military personnel introduced up to now, by North Vietnam, into South Vietnam, as well as on the process carefully worked out for their infiltration into the interior of the territory of the Republic of Vietnam.

They moreover, constitute irrefutable proofs showing the direct and active participation of the Hanoi communist authorities in the campaign of aggression presently directed against the Republic of Vietnam, in grave violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam.

VII. In the name of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Mission raises an energetical protest against such activities and declares that the Hanoi communist regime should bear the entire responsibility for this aggressive policy and the dangerous consequences which result therefrom for the peace in this part of the world.

It requests the Commission kindly to consider all necessary measures to compel the authorities of North Vietnam to respect the Geneva Agreement and to put an end to these war activities.

While the communist aggression in South Vietnam tends to reach disquieting proportions and constitutes a subject of world concern, the Mission is convinced that a decision of the IC condemning the Hanoi communist regime will not fail to contribute usefully to enlighten the international opinion on the true cause of the present tension and on the legitimacy of the measures taken by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam both for its own defense, as for the cause of peace and freedom of the world.

VIII. The Mission takes this opportunity to renew to the Secretariat General of the IC the assurance of its high consideration.

Sd/Col NGUYEN VAN AN

*Chief of the Mission in charge of
relations with the IC*

(SEAL)

Appendix III

TRANSLATION

Most Immediate

From	To
Mission in charge of relations with the ICSC—SAIGON.	SECRETARIAT GENERAL of the ICSC in Vietnam—SAIGON.

Letter No. 0512/PDVN/CT/TD.2 dated 9.2.1965

The Mission in charge of relations with the ICSC presents its compliments to the Secretariat General of the I.C. and has the honour to inform it of the following:

II. On the 2nd of June 1962, in a Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, the IC has formally recognized that "armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the zone in the North to the zone in the South with the object of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the zone in the South, in violation of articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam".

These infiltrations of arms, war material and military personnel have begun immediately the very day following the signing of the Geneva Agreement by North Vietnam, and were carried out uninterruptedly from bases illegally installed by the Hanoi authorities after the 1954 cease-fire.

According to the latest estimates, the strength of the personnel introduced into South Vietnam during the years of 1959 to 1964, would amount to 39,000 men including 11,000 men for the year 1961 alone.

Thanks to this personnel and to the arms and war material thus introduced into South Vietnam, the Hanoi authorities have launched, from the end of 1960, a real campaign of aggression against the army, administration and population of South Vietnam, campaign which, far from decreasing, has been pursued day after day with more persistence, with the ever-increasing support of the Peking Government and of other countries of the communist bloc.

The intensification of the aggressive activities of North Vietnam has recently been manifested by large-scale attacks launched against various military installations in South Vietnam, such as those directed against the Bien-Hoa air-field on 1st November 1964, and the military bases of Pleiku and Tuy Hoa on the night between 5th and 6th February 1965.

III. The Republic of Vietnam cannot allow the Hanoi communist regime to be thus able to continue organizing, with impunity, attacks against the territory, population and military installations of South Vietnam, and to prolong, thereby, the state of war in South Vietnam for expansion purposes to the benefit of communist imperialism.

Therefore, in order to cope with these acts of marked aggression, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam which, hitherto, has restricted itself

June 10, 1965

to defensive measures, has found itself compelled to take appropriate military action against the North Vietnamese strategic bases which, as known to everyone, have been utilized actively for the training and infiltration of Viet-Cong elements into South Vietnam.

The Mission considers it necessary to communicate herebelow to the Commission the text of the communique dated 7th February 1965 of the office of the Prime Minister of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam in this regard:

"The Acting Prime Minister of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam with the agreement of the National Security Council and the Ambassador of the United States, with the approval of the American Government, announce this afternoon (7.2.1965) that a military action has been undertaken today against certain strategic installations in North Vietnam".

"These installations have served as base for the direction and support of the aggressions against South Vietnam such as the attacks which took place early this morning against the installations and military personnel in the areas of Pleiku and Tuy Hoa."

IV. In taking such actions which simply aim at stopping the aggression of which it is a victim, the Republic of Vietnam has only used the right of legitimate defense recognized by the Charter of the United Nations⁽³⁾, and fulfilled its duties of protecting the life and property of its inhabitants.

The retaliatory operations were, however, strictly limited to the military areas which supplied men and arms for the attacks against South Vietnam.

V. The Mission takes this opportunity to renew to the Secretariat General of the I.C. the assurance of its high consideration.

Sd/Colonel NGUYEN VAN AN

Chief of the Mission in charge of relations with the ICSC.

(SEAL)

(3) "Treaty Series No. 67 (1946)", Cmd. 7015.

INDIAN STATEMENT ON THE CANADIAN STATEMENT

In order to clarify the factual position, the Indian Delegation draws attention to quotations in the Canadian Statement of so-called "conclusions" of the Legal Committee. The reference to the Special Report of 1962 made in the third sentence of para 3 of the Canadian Statement concerned only specific cases. The other quotations which immediately follow in the same paragraph purporting to be "conclusions" of the Legal Committee have neither been presented to, nor have the sanction of, the Commission or any of its Committees.

M. A. RAHMAN

Representative of India on the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam.

SAIGON,

February 3rd, 1965.

The Polish Delegation disagrees with the opinion expressed in the Statement of the Canadian Delegation, which distorts the causes of the events and attempts to justify the military actions undertaken by the United States and the Republic of Vietnam against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It is obvious that one cannot raise to the same level allegations on which the Canadian Statement is based and officially confirmed facts as quoted in the present Special Report.

Furthermore, the Canadian Statement refers to the conclusions of the Special Report of 1962, which was rejected by the Polish Delegation; it refers also to some other material which has no sanction of the Commission.

R. B. STAWICKI

Acting Representative of the Polish People's Republic on the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam.

SAIGON,

February 13th, 1965.

APPENDIX C

Unofficial Translation

2. DECLARATION OF MR. TRAN VAN DO, DELEGATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF 1954.

The delegation of the State of Vietnam presented a proposal whose aim was to obtain an armistice which did not even temporarily divide Vietnam, by means of disarming the belligerents after their withdrawal to assembly areas, which were to be as circumscribed as possible, and through the establishment of a temporary UN authority over the whole country, until the return of peace and order would permit the Vietnamese people to decide its destiny through free elections. The Vietnamese delegation protests the summary rejection of this proposal which alone respects the aspirations of the Vietnamese people. It earnestly requests that the demilitarization and neutralization of at least the bishoprics of the Delta of North Vietnam be accepted by the conference. It solemnly protests the hasty conclusion of the armistice agreement by the French and Vietminh High Commands alone, because the French High-Command commanded the Vietnamese troops only by a delegation of the authority of the Vietnamese Chief of State, and above all because several clauses of the agreement are of a nature which would basically and seriously jeopardize the political future of the Vietnamese people.

It solemnly protests the fact that this armistice agreement abandons to the Vietminh some territories still occupied by Vietnamese troops, and which are at the same time essential to the defence of Vietnam against a greater Communist expansion, and the fact that in practice the end result of this armistice is to remove from the State of Vietnam its inalienable right to provide for its own defence by any other means than the stationing of a foreign army on its soil.

It solemnly protests the fact that the French High-Command has arrogated, without the preliminary agreement of the Delegation of the State of Vietnam, the right to fix the date of the future elections, even though this is a question of an obviously political nature.

As a result, the Government of the State of Vietnam requests that it be written into the record that it solemnly protests the manner in which the armistice was concluded and the conditions of this armistice which takes no cognizance of the deepest aspirations of the Vietnamese people, and that it reserves for itself complete liberty of action in order to safeguard the sacred right of the Vietnamese to territorial integrity, to national independence, and to freedom.

APPENDIX D

VIETNAM SITUATION

A Statement by the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Rt Hon. K. J. Holyoake, on 13 May 1965.

"The serious situation in Vietnam has brought home to all New Zealanders just how vitally we are concerned with the events and issues in South-East Asia, the Prime Minister (Right Honourable Keith Holyoake) said today in a major policy statement.

New Zealand's security cannot help but be affected by the outcome of the fighting in Malaysia and Vietnam—by Indonesia's ambitions and 'crush Malaysia' threats, and by the ruthless undeclared war which communist North Vietnam, aided and abetted by communist China, is waging against South Vietnam.

I am keenly aware of how deeply disturbed everyone is, and must be, about this situation and the danger of it deteriorating still further.

In recent days many people have expressed their disquiet to me through petitions, by telegram, and by letter.

I have spoken with citizens from all walks of life who felt deeply enough about these matters to approach me or to demonstrate their concern.

Naturally the issue which is of deepest concern for all of us is whether we should give military assistance to South Vietnam in its bitter struggle for independence and freedom against flagrant communist aggression.

As you know we already have in South Vietnam a civilian surgical team and an army engineer unit in a non-combatant role.

The government has made no decision at this stage how we might best give further help to the people of South Vietnam in their tragic plight.

But let me declare here—clearly and unequivocally—that the New Zealand government fully supports and approves the action taken by the United States of America at the request of the government of South Vietnam and more recently the support announced by the Australian government.

The Vietnam issue and the whole South-East Asian situation confronts New Zealand with a decision of the utmost importance and consequence. It is one to which the government has been giving the most anxious and earnest consideration for many months.

The purpose of this statement is to set out as clearly as possible the background and the issues against which the government must make its decision. The facts are these:

The government's first and greatest concern is for the safety and security of the people of New Zealand. This involves us in defence treaties and obligations we must honour.

Since the war successive New Zealand governments have recognised that New Zealand's first line of defence is in South-East Asia. Let me remind

you that we already have nearly 1,400 men serving there. Our army, air force and navy are deployed in a combat role in Malaysia, where New Zealand is standing alongside our Commonwealth allies against the threat of Indonesian confrontation.

The Vietnam war is *not* a civil war nor a 'popular uprising', as some people are ready to assert. This is a cruel, vicious war. People are living in terror of communist Viet Cong torture, mutilation, arson, kidnapping and murder. This ruthless campaign is being directed and supplied from communist North Vietnam, and openly supported by communist China.

Should this concern us? The truth is that the threat to New Zealand's security at this moment is every bit as real in Vietnam as it is in Malaysia—probably more so.

The truth is that the United States of America has been carrying the free world's defence burden in Vietnam.

The government fully supports and is determined to work towards negotiations and the objective of a peaceful settlement, and to ensure the territorial integrity of these countries. But until the Viet Cong and North Vietnam discontinue their aggression and give evidence of readiness to accept a peaceful settlement, the freedom of South Vietnam must be safeguarded.

And let's get this fact crystal clear. The South Vietnamese people are fighting for their own freedom. They have an army of 240,000 men and rather more than that in police and local defence units—over half a million men, they are supported by approximately 40,000 American troops. America is *not* fighting this war for the South Vietnamese, but *with them and at the request of their government*.

There is criticism of America's increased military effort in South Vietnam. Let's not forget that Britain is standing alongside Malaysia for similar reasons with forces totalling about 50,000 men—more than the Americans have in Vietnam.

My last point is this—and don't let anyone have any doubts about it—if South Vietnam falls to the communists it will then be the turn of Thailand and Malaysia and every other smaller country in the region.

In this eventuality the threat to New Zealand would be that much closer to home. If we are not prepared to play our part now, can we in good conscience expect our allies to help later on?

These are the facts of the situation.

It is vital that all New Zealanders should understand the reasons for the present state of conflict and unrest in South-East Asia, and know where we stand.

I would remind you that Malaya was saved by British military aid in a bitter ten-year jungle war against communist guerrillas. Our New Zealand troops supported Malaya then, just as we're supporting Malaysia today.

You'll recall that Korea was and is divided, like Vietnam. In 1950, 16 nations of the free world successfully resisted open communist aggression. New Zealand troops served in Korea.

Since Korea, the communists have turned to subversion and insurgency to achieve their aims—and don't let anyone be deluded about the aggressive, expansionist aims of international communism.

Like South Korea, South Vietnam is under communist attack. This time it is not open aggression but subversion, infiltration and terrorism. The increasing infiltration of men and supplies from North Vietnam is a well documented fact.

It's not difficult to imagine what can happen, and what has happened, to the structure of government and to the morale of officials and the people under this fearful sort of Viet Cong terrorist pressure.

Think what it would mean in New Zealand if there were armed communists in formations up to 1,000 strong, roaming the countryside, terrorising the people and using every means to destroy the authority of the government.

It would take a very brave man to take his stand on the side of law and order: and in the countryside such bravery would be suicidal.

Many South Vietnamese people have taken such a stand. Thousands of them have paid with their lives.

In the past year alone the Viet Cong have assassinated 1,800 government officials and village leaders, and kidnapped 10,000 more as hostages.

Of course, the communists have been aided by government instability in South Vietnam. Because the South Vietnamese have not yet achieved the sort of stability that we regard here as normal is no justification for abandoning these people to the communists.

In the name of freedom and humanity the South Vietnamese people must be supported.

They *are* being supported by America and 33 other nations—but the great burden is being carried by America. America has given South Vietnam economic and military assistance amounting to over three and a half billion dollars. Economic aid in 1964 alone totalled 234 million dollars (over £80 million).

The United States has acted with firmness and restraint in this extremely difficult situation. Yet it is said that recent American action is provocative—that it risks 'escalation' of the war.

So many people completely ignore the fact that it is the North Vietnamese who have been interfering in the affairs of South Vietnam, not the South interfering in the North. They ignore the fact that the communists have been steadily escalating the scale of their activities for years.

The critical point at issue is this: will communist North Vietnam be allowed to impose its domination over South Vietnam by force?

If it does, no other country in South-East Asia will be able to feel safe.

President Johnson has emphasized many times that the United States wants an end to this war. He has offered to enter into discussions unconditionally, and with great generosity has proposed a vast development scheme for the area—including North Vietnam. He has spoken of a sum of 1,000 million dollars being made available. This could give a better life to all the people of the region.

The communists have called President Johnson's offer a fraud. If so, why don't they put it to the test and show it up for what they say it is?

They have refused every opening for negotiation.

Some people who have written to me have suggested that the conflict in Vietnam ought to be solved by United Nations mediation. In theory such a proposal would seem to be a most worthwhile one and I wish with all my heart that it was possible.

It is certainly a principal purpose of the United Nations to settle disputes by peaceful means. If it were practicable I would urge and use every possible means to have the United Nations settle this dispute.

However, we must consider the facts. At present the United Nations is beset by the gravest and most complicated internal problems—problems which unless solved could well jeopardise the very existence of the organisation.

They have repulsed attempts by the British Labour Government and 17 non-aligned nations to assist in finding a solution.

The communists clearly don't want a settlement which would permit South Vietnam to live in peace and independence. They're determined on conquest and on imposing a communist dictatorship upon South Vietnam.

Most of the representations made to me in recent weeks have had as their objective the attainment of a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. I have welcomed this display of concern, which of course the government fully shares, and which the government has advocated in every practicable way.

There are some people, not many fortunately, who are less concerned about the fate of the people of South Vietnam than with getting the Americans out of that country, on what happens then, they are strangely silent.

One cannot help but wonder whose interest they are attempting to serve. Is it New Zealand's?

Or is it perhaps the interest of some other country?

I think that we all know the answers to these questions.

I repeat again that communist terrorism must be halted in South Vietnam. Experience shows that retreat solves nothing. In the 1930's the world learnt again and again—in Manchuria, Ethiopia, Spain and Czechoslovakia—that negotiation, without the will to resist aggression, means capitulation.

If a wider conflict in South-East Asia is to be avoided, the lesson of history is clearly that we must stand firm in support of small nations like South Vietnam and Malaysia.

New Zealand's vital interests are at stake in this war. The fate of South Vietnam will help to determine the future of Malaysia, Thailand and the other small nations of the area. New Zealand's own security is involved.

The people of South Vietnam must be supported in their struggle against communist aggression. This government will continue to seek and to support every possible approach to a peaceful settlement which will give them security and independence."

APPENDIX E

Statement by the Minister of External Affairs, the Hon. Paul Hasluck, M.P.,
House of Representatives, Canberra, Australia, 23rd March, 1965.

Foreign Affairs

In this statement on foreign affairs I shall confine my remarks to a few of the more urgent topics. This is not intended, however, to limit the range of debate. With your indulgence, Mr. Speaker, when I move that the House take note of my statement, I will suggest that you might permit honourable members to discuss the full breadth of Australian foreign policy.

To assist them to do so, my Department has prepared information papers to be placed on the table of the Parliamentary Library. Additional copies of the papers are available for the personal use of members.

This is my first speech to the House as Minister for External Affairs and I might reasonably be expected to disclose something of my own approach. I shall try to do so but, in doing so, I would stress that I am not introducing any change in the foreign policy of the Government. The foreign policy is that of the government not of a person.

Foremost in my mind as I look at the world is the fact that today force is being used and, in such a world, in which the possession of power is the main determinant of what happens, anyone engaged in foreign affairs must recognise and study the facts of power and also recognise the reality of power politics. We might like it otherwise but we cannot ignore the fact.

The possibility of a nuclear holocaust still haunts the world. While we can see the risk we can also evaluate the situation by saying that the very horror of a nuclear war is one factor that has tended hitherto to reduce the risk of its coming. In certain situations the possession of nuclear power has been a deterrent to action that might lead to another world war.

At times during the past two years it has looked as though mankind might be creeping towards sanity on nuclear arms. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and proposals for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons—both of which have the full support of the Australian Government—have received a setback, however, firstly by the French insistence on developing and testing a nuclear weapon of their own and, secondly to a much graver extent, by the explosion of a nuclear device by the Chinese communists. Some time may elapse before Communist China becomes a front-rank nuclear power, but the cause for concern is that China has repeatedly spoken and acted in a way that reveals an aggressive intention to try to dominate the life of other nations, a readiness to achieve her purposes by any means at her command, and an unwillingness to contemplate peaceful relationships with other great powers except on her own terms. In the hands of such a nation, nuclear weapons become more dangerous and the prospect of nuclear control of disarmament less hopeful.

There are two other points to be made about nuclear power. Nuclear power in the hands of a few nations acting with responsibility can be a deterrent. The proliferation of nuclear power, by placing more fingers on

more triggers and by giving a new impulse to the demand for nuclear weapons either for the sake of national prestige or for national security, will greatly increase the risk that something will go wrong. To check these impulses towards proliferation we are likely to need, as well as an agreement against dissemination, a reasonable assurance that other nations, particularly the middle-sized powers, will not need to possess or develop nuclear weapons of their own in order to feel that they can defend themselves. This in turn throws us all back to the real core of the problem of world peace—the policies of the great powers and their relationships with each other and the degree of our confidence that the two great nuclear powers—(the United States and the Soviet Union)—will act with restraint.

In my more hopeful moments, I am inclined to believe that the diplomatic labours of the past fifteen years have shown some results in the easing of tension between the group of countries centred on the Soviet Union and those centred on the Western Alliance. One also hopes that the social and economic changes that have taken place within the Soviet Union and the countries of eastern Europe have themselves created influences making for peace. Although the basic nature of the Soviet Union as a Communist power has not changed, and although the facts of power rivalry remain, yet we can look back on the fact that these two great groups of power have managed to live at peace with each other in spite of many occasions of great tension, for a period of twenty years and that, at the end of twenty years, they would appear to be further from a deliberate choice of war with each other than at any time during the twenty years. If one were to think only of the risks of world war as the result of either action by the Soviet Union or action by the United States of America, one could nurture some hope of peace and even believe that it might still be possible for these two great powers to join together, perhaps not with a common ideal but with a common realism, to help keep the peace of the world.

Nuclear power, in the hands of a few nations, may yet remain a powerful factor in preventing the outbreak of big wars or in stopping small wars from growing into big wars. It is patently not a factor in preventing the outbreak of small wars and it has not served as a deterrent against small wars and the fomenting of subversion. The immediate effect of the new power of Communist China has been felt not in any war that China itself is waging as an identifiable combatant—although in Tibet and the Indian frontier China was the actual aggressor—but in numerous trouble spots in several continents.

It would be foolish to imagine that these smaller wars and trouble spots can be regarded as lying apart from and having nothing to do with the greater dangers and the major conflicts in world power. No incipient trouble can show its first signs without becoming part of great power politics. In many cases closer examination reveals that troubles which may seem local and trivial at first sight have been promoted or expanded as the result of influences controlled by great powers. Whether or not any such incident in its beginning was purely local, it would be unrealistic to assume that any great power, either in its role as a peace-keeper or being careful to maintain its own power, could ignore it. It sounds fine and moralistic to say that if only the great powers would keep out all would be well. But such moralising obscures the reality.

Let us test this by the case of South Vietnam. Chou En-lai has described the National Liberation Front as "the glorious standard bearer and illustrious leader of the South Vietnamese people in their struggle for national liberation". This description of the war in South Vietnam as "a struggle for national liberation" has to be read in the context of Chinese communist doctrine. In the exchange of open letters between Moscow and Peking, China's view in support of warfare and armed struggle is clearly expressed. I quote from several texts: "Until the imperialist system and the exploiting classes come to an end, wars of one kind or another will always occur"; "War is the continuation of politics by other means"; "Marxists-Leninists never conceal their views. We whole-heartedly support every peoples' revolutionary war".

South Vietnam is part of a pattern. In Laos, notwithstanding the fact that there is an international agreement for the neutrality of Laos, Communist China describes the territory held by the Communist-controlled Pathet Lao as "the liberated area". The clear inference is that the remainder has still to be liberated. Peking has recently served notice that Thailand is in danger of becoming the object of what might be called conquest by subversion. Chinese radio and news agencies are now publishing the programme of an organisation describing itself as the "Thailand Patriotic Front" which, from Peking, calls for the overthrow of what it calls the "fascist" Thai Government. Radio Hanoi is also broadcasting the same material.

What is happening in South Vietnam is not a local rebellion caused by internal discontent but the application of the methods and doctrines of Communist guerrilla warfare first evolved in China and then successfully used in North Vietnam. The Peking and Hanoi regimes have both come to power through guerrilla warfare and both share the Asian communist doctrine evolved by the Chinese. The practical application in neighbouring areas is clear. Neither Peking nor Hanoi has yet had to commit large-scale conventional forces in South Vietnam for external aggression. A dissident communist-controlled movement was created for guerrilla warfare against the established social order and government. Lines of communication and support from outside were organised. Given the natural elements of instability in many of the newly established countries of the region, and their social, ethnic and communal problems, there are understandable opportunities for such tactics.

It is nearly three years since the International Control Commission in Vietnam condemned the violation by North Vietnam of the 1954 Geneva Agreements by the despatch of arms and men from the North and the incitement and encouragement of hostilities in the South. The rate of infiltration from North to South increased until in 1964 it is estimated that 10,000 Viet Cong terrorists trained and armed by the North, were sent to the South. I draw the attention of members to the document recently distributed to the United Nations by the United States describing the extent of this new form of international aggression. Copies are available in the Parliamentary Library. We have considerable information of the same character from Australian sources.

At any one time the Viet Cong maintains a hard core of guerrillas in military formation of some 30 to 40 thousand and they are supported by an irregular force of another 80 thousand. This total force of something over 100 thousand has established itself through methods of coercion and terrorism

in large parts of the South Vietnamese countryside. In some areas it has been able to introduce its own system of administrative control. This it has done, not by the attraction of some programme of economic and social reform but by the exercise of power through terror. The Viet Cong maintain their control as a determined minority relying on fear, despair, war-weariness and the political disintegration of their opponents.

Are these the circumstances in which the Asian communist powers having taken such steps to advance their policies, all other powers who are opposed to such policies, should look the other way and do nothing?

What the United States has chosen to do in South Vietnam appears to the Australian Government as the recognition and acceptance of the great responsibilities which their own greatness has laid on them.

We are told from time to time that, while external aid can help, it is for the people of South Vietnam themselves to establish a political regime which will withstand internal subversion. We must remember, however, that the South Vietnamese are not dealing simply with a situation of local unrest, but with a large-scale campaign of assassination and terrorism directed from outside. It would be a dangerous thing to argue that, because subversive elements inspired from outside have achieved some success in creating instability within a country, these elements thereby earn the right to become the government of that country. In South Vietnam one may ask what future security, freedom and religious tolerance there would be for the millions of people who have committed themselves to resistance against communism.

It is also unrealistic to claim that if only the influence of the great powers were removed there would be a sudden and blissful peace in South Vietnam. To whom would withdrawal leave the land? Not to the local population. There is a campaign in Australia at the present time among a section of our population that might be summed up in the words sometimes chalked on walls abroad: "Yankee, go home". Let those who are approached to support this campaign ask themselves what the phrase means. It means simply that the North Vietnamese and the Chinese are the only foreigners to be allowed in South Vietnam and therefore this is a campaign which, in its results, would favour Asian communism. This was seldom heard of when Asian communism was making gains; it has grown in strength when Asian communism is being checked.

In the circumstances that now exist, the United States could not withdraw from South Vietnam without abandoning the responsibilities that belong to power or the principles they are trying to uphold. The United States could not withdraw without necessarily considering the world-wide impact of such a withdrawal on the broader strategies of world politics.

If the United States did withdraw, the same conflict would be renewed somewhere else. Within a brief period the struggle now taking place in South Vietnam would be shifted to Thailand. If there was abandonment of Thailand, it would shift to Malaysia—to Indonesia, to Burma, to India and further. Nothing would be ended and no stability would be achieved by yielding in South Vietnam.

It is not a valid policy to call for negotiation unless there is a clear idea what is to be the outcome of negotiation. If negotiation is simply to mean an end of resistance to aggression and the success of aggression then a plainer word for it would be defeat for those resisting Asian communism.

Fortunately we have the declaration of President Johnson who on 17th February set out the United States position on Vietnam in the following words:

Our purpose, our objective there is clear. That purpose and that objective is to join in the defence and protection of the freedom of a brave people who are under an attack that is controlled and that is directed from outside their country. We have no ambition there for ourselves. We seek no dominion. We seek no conquest. We seek no wider war. But we must all understand that we will persist in the defence of freedom, and our continuing actions will be those which are justified and those that are made necessary by the continuing aggression of others. These actions will be measured and fitting and adequate. Our stamina and the stamina of the American people is equal to the task.

Australia's own analysis of the situation has brought us to the belief that the United States action is necessary for the defeat of aggression against Asian peoples and is also an essential step towards the building in Asia of the conditions of peace and progress. We also believe that in their resistance to China they are preventing an alternative in the world balance of power which would be in favour of the communists and which would increase the risk of world war. Consequently, Australia firmly supports that stand by the United States and the decisions reached that targets in North Vietnam should be attacked. Should North Vietnam not be exposed to military risk, we would be permitting North Vietnam to remain a privileged sanctuary from which a military campaign of subversion and aggression against the South can be maintained and exploited indefinitely and with immunity.

It is asserted by communists that the United States and her allies by acting thus are creating the risk of a wider war. But the alternative would be to allow the systematic mounting of campaigns of guerilla warfare and terrorism to undermine non-communist governments one after another in South East Asia. In other words, the communist powers would be free to conduct a wider war on an advancing front of subversive and guerrilla activity.

At the moment, contacts are being made and the positions of the various powers involved are being explored in order to determine whether there are real prospects for negotiation. We should be clear about the position as it now stands. Hanoi and the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam will negotiate on certain conditions. Those conditions include the prior withdrawal of United States forces from South Vietnam. Their policy, supported by China, is to remove the United States from the area. A study of Hanoi and the National Liberation Front documentation also makes it clear that what they are seeking is the replacement of the present government in Saigon, not even by a coalition or neutralist government, but by a government which is communist led and controlled. Such a government would be the instrument of the Hanoi regime, the National Liberation Front itself having been created by the North Vietnam Communist Party.

There clearly would have to be a considerable change in this position before there could be formal negotiations at a conference table. For the moment the Government believes that the best course lies in the exploration and assessment of the positions of the parties in order to establish whether

a basis of political understanding can be reached. We would of course be favourable to negotiation in the right circumstances and we would hope as fervently as anyone that a time and lasting peace might be established.

In the examination of the situation in South Vietnam I trust that I have shown clearly to honourable members the approach of the Government to the basic fact of a world power struggle and the immediacy of the danger in Asia. That is a danger not only to one country of Asia but to many countries of Asia and to countries outside the region.

A second immediately important topic on which I should declare myself is the relationship of Australia to Asia. What happens in Asia can have such immediate effects on what happens to Australia that perhaps we sometimes see events in Asia through too narrow a loophole.

One point that I stressed repeatedly in conversations during my recent tour to several capitals of Europe and North America was that the power situation in Asia cannot be separated from the major problems of the power situation in the whole world. What is happening in Asia today cannot be regarded as a series of isolated incidents which can be settled as local affairs in the expectation, firstly, that after settlement they will remain unaffected by the power struggle and secondly that when they are settled they need not occupy the attention of other powers any longer. The struggle for peace today is a global struggle. The resistance to aggression is a world-wide resistance. The emergence of China and the policies of China affect the whole of world politics. What is happening in Asia today will perhaps prove more fateful for mankind than anything that has happened since the last World War. The corollary of course is that any contribution to peace in Asia is a contribution to the peace of the world.

We Australians are perhaps inclined at times to think of South-East Asia as a frontier where a potential enemy can be held. Let us also constantly remind ourselves that we have a wider and more far-reaching interest in the region than that. We have positive and constructive aims and not merely a defensive interest in Asia.

We want to see an Asia in which the free nations of that continent, whether newly independent or long-established, will be able to develop their own way of life in a state of security from aggression. We want to see an Asia in which there will be social and economic opportunity and where, as a result of the fuller use of the natural resources of the region, the standards of living of its people will steadily rise and their opportunities and capacity to build a new life will grow. We want to see an Asia with which we ourselves can live in friendship and peace and with whom we can work for mutual benefit, respecting the qualities of each other.

To achieve these hopes the countries of Asia must be free of the domination of any single great power; there must be freedom of exchange and commercial intercourse between them and the rest of the world; and there must be an increased and a more helpful association between the countries of Asia and the peoples and nations of other continents. The participation of countries outside Asia in its affairs is essential firstly to give to the smaller countries of Asia security against the aggression that is rising within Asia itself, and secondly in order to bring the financial, technological and social and economic assistance that is needed for the development of Asian resources and the creating of opportunity for its people to improve their own lot.

Situated near Asia, Australia lives with a number of neighbouring States which, for historical and economic reasons, have political and social systems vastly different from our own. We do not criticise or attempt to change systems freely chosen by other peoples. What we are concerned with is to achieve an international climate in which threats against and pressures against other States and peoples are removed, whether these threats arise from aggressive nationalism or aggressive communism or perhaps a mixture of the two.

Within that climate, and behind the shelter provided by regional security arrangements, the countries of South and South East Asia wish to pursue their objectives of social and economic progress. This is the purpose of the Colombo Plan and other programmes of international aid to which the Australian Government contributes. The aim is not simply security for its own sake but development for the good of peoples.

Our involvement in the situation created by Indonesian "confrontation" of Malaysia is giving Australia at the present moment one of the most difficult tests of our resolution and our diplomacy. On the one hand we wish to live in harmonious relationships with Indonesia, we accept the fact that Indonesia has been established and we would like to see the growth and the integration of Indonesia and we have hoped to be able to co-operate as a neighbour in measures for its social and economic progress. In this country of great natural resources we saw an opportunity for its own people to build their own life. There is basic goodwill towards Indonesia.

Unfortunately, Indonesia has embarked on policies which we are bound to oppose. To our regret, over the past six months Indonesian military "confrontation" of Malaysia has assumed new and more serious forms. Along the border between Malaysia and Indonesian Borneo there has been a substantial build-up of the Indonesian armed forces. Moreover, Malaya and Singapore itself have been subjected to a long series of attempted infiltration, sabotage and subversion.

That the situation has been held as well as it has is the result of the deterrent effect of the defensive measures taken to build up Malaysian, British and other Commonwealth forces in Borneo and of the striking success of the security forces in Malaysia in coping with infiltrators and saboteurs. Malaysia has shown a remarkable degree of self restraint and maturity in dealing with these provocations.

Indonesia's declared and active hostility to Malaysia imposes an additional strain on an area already subject to the threats of communist subversion and intervention. It is not only forcing Malaysia to increase its defence expenditure at the expense of its development but it is adding to the burdens of the impoverished and neglected Indonesian economy. This situation could be eased very rapidly provided only that Indonesia accepted the existence of Malaysia and ceased to conduct military operations against it.

We have noted that, in withdrawing from the United Nations, the Indonesian Government declared that it still upheld the principles of international co-operation as enshrined in the United Nations Charter. We, for our part, consider that all States which have become members of the United Nations have made a solemn declaration accepting the obligations imposed by the Charter and that a State, even though it no longer regards itself as a member of the organization, nevertheless remains bound to observe the principles upon which the Charter is based.

We have said on many occasions, and I repeat it again this evening, that it remains a primary objective of Australian policy to seek with Indonesia a relationship based on understanding and respect. Hence, while leaving Indonesia in no doubt of Australia's determination to assist Malaysia to defend herself against armed attack and subversion, we continue to demonstrate our willingness to search for the basis of an enduring peaceful relationship with Indonesia. In this spirit, the Government is continuing a limited programme of aid to Indonesia, details of which are available to honourable members in statements tabled in the Library. This aid has been and will be kept under close review and the decision to proceed with it has been made after the most careful consideration of all the relevant factors.

A new element in the situation created by Indonesia's "confrontation" of Malaysia, has been created by some evidence of increasing contacts between the Indonesians and the Chinese communists. It is as yet difficult to determine the significance of these contacts, but they are a further reminder that, in all our thinking about Asia, we have to consider quite starkly the growing power of Communist China.

Some people are disposed to argue that we should facilitate the representation of Communist China in the United Nations. Certainly our long term objective must be the achievement of stable political relationships amongst all countries of the world. So long however as the Peking regime continues to threaten the Chinese Nationalist Government and the people of Formosa, to promote the export of revolution abroad and to construct nuclear weapons to back these policies contrary to the overwhelming voice of world opinion, one can hardly expect this regime to help solve any of the major problems facing the United Nations.

This brings me to my third topic—the future of the United Nations. An information paper covering some aspects of the present problems confronting the United Nations will be found amongst the material available in the Library. Behind the recent inability of the General Assembly of the United Nations to proceed with its business was a difference of opinion regarding the peace-keeping functions of the United Nations and the role to be played by each of the two great blocs of power in maintaining the peace. It will not be finally solved except as part of the general problem of relationships between the great powers.

As honourable members are aware, the General Assembly was unable to proceed with its business and has adjourned after appointing a special committee to examine questions of United Nations finance and the peace-keeping functions of the organisation and after expressing the hope that the great powers themselves would get together and reach an understanding on the same issues. I should like to make some observations about this situation. The failure of the General Assembly to proceed with its business does not necessarily mean a breakdown of the United Nations. The United Nations has many organs which are still functioning. For our part Australia gives unqualified support to the United Nations and will use our best endeavours in co-operation with other members to find a way out of the difficulties of the General Assembly.

At the same time two things need to be said quite plainly about the experience in the General Assembly this year. One is that the General Assembly is not able to function at present as it was intended to function

as the great forum of the world in which the conscience of the world might find expression and help to establish a body of principle by which the exercise of power might be restrained. Some of the reasons for that are not far to seek. Many of the members of the General Assembly—and I particularize no single member—have not lived up to their opportunities and their obligations under the Charter. They themselves have decided matters without regard to established principles of international conduct and without trying to take as a consistent guide a body of principle which will apply to great and small.

The other observation is that at the present time the General Assembly, and indeed the Security Council, cannot be relied upon as a significant and effective means of keeping the peace of the world. Would any small country in danger of invasion or acts of aggression against its sovereignty and its territory be warranted in having full confidence that the United Nations would protect it? We have to see as a matter of reality this absence of any international means of bringing security to the smaller nations or even to the middle-sized nations. It is the background to the situation in which such peace as we have is kept by one or other of the great powers and it is also the continuing challenge to all nations to work more purposefully at the problems of peace-keeping.

As a practical illustration of what I have been saying, may I remark that in South and South East Asia, it is American armed strength which is the reality behind which the countries in that area have retained their liberty to choose their own courses. To this same end, the Australian Government also warmly welcomes the recent practical manifestations of Britain's continuing determination to fulfil her obligations to Malaysia and Asia.

Having spoken of power situations, I would talk of a fourth aspect of my own view on world affairs. Power is not enough. In a world of power, peace is only maintained on a precarious balance and it is plain that recourse to power as a means of security is in essence a readiness to have recourse to war. There will never be full security for anyone unless and until the exercise of power is made subject to agreed principles of international conduct and, in a world of national states, that means that the possessors of power restrict by their own pledges their own use of power.

I should like to develop this theme with particular application to Australian policies. As a small nation in a time of power contest we have to choose. For us, neutralism is not a practical choice. We Australians must choose our side because in the immediate future we are determined to ensure the defence and the survival of our country and we want to preserve our right and our capacity to apply our own faith and ideals regarding human society in Australia. We must also choose our side because ultimately Australia will survive and grow and become a better country in all senses of the term only in a world in which the exercise of power has been subordinated to principle. It is deep in our faith for mankind and vital to our own existence that there should be a world in which sovereign independence is recognised; where territorial integrity is respected; where force and the threat of force are not used to compel nations to act against their own interest or against their own free choice; where settlement is by negotiation and the small as well as the great are protected in negotiation because it is conducted according to these principles and, if negotiation fails, there will still be recourse to

orderly and peaceful processes of settlement; a world where the pledged word is kept through the sanctity of treaties; where international law is built up both in its substance and its authority by the consistency of the conduct of nations, by the sanctity of treaties and by invariable recourse to these international institutions to whom the application of these laws and rules of conduct has been entrusted; where aggression is identified by actions contrary to these standards of conduct.

In choosing sides we serve these ideas. Let us ask ourselves bluntly, when we are choosing sides and deciding whom we will support, which of the great powers, on the past record and their known doctrines, will take this line. We stand firmly with Britain and the United States of America, not only because in the short term we believe them to be military allies with resolution and capacity but, more than that, because we believe that they are nations who honour these principles and try to serve them.

It is not enough to say that we believe in these principles—broadly the principles of the United Nations. We also have to give solid and constant backing to those powers who will work to put these principles into effect. What we are supporting is not only a military alliance but, more importantly, certain principles and standards of conduct in international affairs. That must be the final touchstone of our policy in respect of our allies, and it must guide our own contributions to discussions on the policies which will continue to command our support. We have to make judgments from time to time on what is right as well as on what will keep us safe. It seems likely that the world will become more and more unsafe for us in the coming years. In such case it will help us to see our course more clearly if we try to see not only the risks but the opportunities—not only the threats we may have to meet but also the constant need to advance our own belief in the right standards of international conduct.

Personally I believe that today Australia faces the dual challenge of its own survival and the maintenance of those standards of civilised conduct and those basic values of civilisation which have been so laboriously established by past ages of mankind and which in international dealings today are so often in the discard. I also believe that the measures we are taking for our survival and for the support of those values are inseparably linked. Both considerations have helped us to choose our side in the current contest and have made us determined in support of it.

Let us all see that we have not only chosen our side but have also dedicated ourselves to a cause. Surely at the heart of any realistic foreign policy for Australia must be the aim of trying to promote the unity and the resolution of all those forces that will work in the same direction. This must be not merely a policy of resisting those who threaten us but, more positively, one of helping friends—a policy not only of saying that our ideas are better than those of our opponents but one of proving that our ideas will work.

This has a particular application to Asia. Among our near neighbours in Asia are many nations, both great and small, in a less fortunate position than we are but who are trying, just as we are, to advance the welfare of their own peoples in freedom from external threats. Their will to resist has been under assaults that we have never known. Their conditions of life are not yet such that they can have as high a confidence about the future as we have. Fear and physical want, the lack of means or opportunity to develop

fully their national resources, political uncertainty and communal divisions have beset them. Surely in all we do we must see the need to strengthen their will, to assist them to realise their plans and hopes, and to join with them in maintaining those principles which are basic to their life as to our own.

Surely we are to test any other policies that may be advocated by asking whether they also serve that purpose. Or do those other policies only hoist signals to these peoples that they cannot count on understanding, let alone help or sympathy, from us, but had better give in and let the communist imperialists have their way?

As a last word I return to the nature of the interest that links us and other non-Asian countries to Asia. As an Australian I do not want to look on our neighbours in Asia as buffer states. I see them rather as part of a structure of hope in which Australia itself, like each of them, is only one of many pillars. The structure weakens if any one of us should fall. The hope must belong not to one but to all. Hence Australian policy in respect of South Vietnam, SEATO, Colombo Plan and Malaysia will continue firmly on the lines already so clearly laid down by the Prime Minister and other spokesmen for the Government.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Third Session—Twenty-sixth Parliament

1965

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: MR. JOHN R. MATHESON.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 2

THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 1965

MAIN ESTIMATES (1965-66) OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

WITNESS:

The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs and
Acting Prime Minister

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1965

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. John R. Matheson

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and Messrs.

Bélanger,
Brewin,
Brown,
Deachman,
Douglas,
Dubé,
Forest,
Gelber,

Haidasz,
Klein,
Konantz (Mrs.),
Lachance,
MacEwan,
Mandziuk,
Martineau,

McIntosh,
Nugent,
Patterson,
Pugh,
Regan,
Walker,
Winkler—24.

M. Slack,
Committee Officer.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

THURSDAY, June 17, 1965

Ordered,—That the Standing Committee on External Affairs be granted leave to sit while the House is sitting.

Attest

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House.

REPORT TO THE HOUSE

TUESDAY, June 15, 1965

The Standing Committee on External Affairs has the honour to present its

FIRST REPORT

Your Committee recommends that it be granted leave to sit while the House is sitting.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN R. MATHESON,
Chairman.

(Note,—This Report was concurred in by the House on Thursday, June 17, 1965.)

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, June 17, 1965

(3)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 3.50 p.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Matheson, presiding.

Members present: Mrs. Konantz and Messrs. Bélanger, Brewin, Brown, Deachman, Douglas, Forest, Gelber, Haidasz, Klein, Lachance, MacEwan, Mandziuk, Matheson, Nesbitt, Nugent, Walker (17).

In attendance: The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Acting Prime Minister.

The Committee resumed consideration of Item 1 of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs.

Mr. Gelber moved, seconded by Mr. Deachman, that the statement by the Minister of External Affairs of Australia and the statement by the Prime Minister of New Zealand, tabled on June 10, be printed as appendices to today's record. *Carried on division.* (Note,—The Committee later this sitting agreed to print these statements as Appendices "D" and "E" in previous issue, see Issue No. 1.)

The Minister made a statement on the problems of disarmament, and tabled two resolutions of the Disarmament Commission which were ordered printed as appendices to the record of this sitting. (See Appendices "F" and "G".)

At 4.20 p.m., the Committee recessed for five minutes and the Minister retired.

The Committee resumed and the Minister continued with his statement.

At 4.35 p.m., the Minister retired again, to attend to urgent business.

During the absence of the Minister, Mr. Brewin proposed, seconded by Mr. Walker, that the House be requested to again refer to this Committee the matters of hate literature and genocide and that the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of last session be also referred to this Committee. After discussion, it was agreed to defer consideration of this motion.

The Minister returned and completed his statement on disarmament and was examined thereon.

By leave, Mr. Brewin withdrew his original motion.

Mr. Brewin then put on record the following notice of motion for consideration at the next sitting: "that this Committee seek from the House an order that this Committee's present terms of reference be extended to enable it to further study the problems of hate literature and genocide referred by the House at the last session to this Committee; to make recommendations thereon, and that the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the External Affairs Committee, 1964-65, on these matters, be referred to this Committee".

The examination of the Minister still continuing, at 5.55 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

M. Slack,
Committee Officer.

EVIDENCE

THURSDAY, June 17, 1965

● (3:43 p.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: Mrs. Konantz and gentlemen, I see a quorum. Mr. Gelber?

Mr. GELBER: I understand the statement by the Minister of External Affairs of Australia and the statement by the Prime Minister of New Zealand are to be included in the record as of this date. I refer to the statement made by the Minister of External Affairs for Australia of March 23, 1965, and to the statement made by the Prime Minister of New Zealand dated May 13, 1965. I so move.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I second the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: Is it agreed?

Mr. NUGENT: Where were these statements made?

The CHAIRMAN: These documents were tabled to be included in the record as part of the evidence of Mr. Martin at the last sittings of the committee. They were to be put in the record but they were not in fact. So this motion by Mr. Gelber is being made in order that they be included in the record today.

Mr. NUGENT: Personally I do not like the practice. I think the only statements in the record should be statements made by people who can be cross-examined; and if there are statements which are made elsewhere, then the only proper way to handle them is to have them tabled or attached as appendices. I think the record should consist only of statements made before the committee. I do not think these other statements should be part of the record.

Mr. DEACHMAN: When we were here last week I believe the hon. Member was not among those present.

The CHAIRMAN: That is correct.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I understood that these two documents had been put on the record. I discussed it with other members of the committee afterwards, concerning what was to be in the record, and it was our understanding at that time that these were in the record. I think what we are doing here is looking at differences of opinion as to what ought to be in the record. I thought we were in unanimous agreement.

The CHAIRMAN: It was my understanding at the last meeting that they were to be included as appendices to our record. I only discovered today that these two documents were not filed. Is it agreed?

Mr. NUGENT: I would like to comment on Mr. Deachman's remarks. I agree that I was not here last week. The reason was that somehow I did not get a notice of the meeting. But I think he cannot be right. Mr. Gelber's

motion would not be necessary if Mr. Deachman were right. If these documents were filed only, and if that was done last week, then no further actions would be required.

The CHAIRMAN: Is it agreed that they be appended? All those in favour?

Those opposed?

Motion agreed to.

We have with us the Secretary of State for External Affairs who will continue with his presentation today. Mr. Martin is dealing with another aspect of foreign policy.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, do I understand that the Secretary of State for External Affairs will go on with some of the other subjects that he mentioned?

Hon. Paul MARTIN (*Secretary of State for External Affairs*): That is right.

Mr. BREWIN: And you are hoping at a later date to refer to the statement on Viet Nam. Is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN: We are still under Item I. Nothing has been closed. Is that agreed? Mr. Martin?

Mr. NESBITT: Was it not clear? It was my impression last week that it had been agreed at the last meeting that Mr. Martin would discuss Viet Nam. We spent some considerable time asking questions about it. Today we were to discuss disarmament, and the area of peacekeeping by the United Nations; and at the next meeting the minister would deal with any other questions not covered, and that each subject would come up at the final meeting in order to give us all a chance to deal with them.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is right.

The CHAIRMAN: I think that was the concensus of the meeting. Now, Mr. Martin.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Mr. Chairman, as I indicated last week when we met at the first meeting, I said that I would like to amplify my statement on the situation in Viet Nam and then perhaps to follow it with a statement on disarmament; and then I would deal with the situation in the United Nations, in this order.

So today I wish to discuss some aspects of the problems of disarmament not only in United Nations' terms, but also in terms of our own Canadian position, as well as in terms of the attitude taken by other countries with whom we are having discussions.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission of 114 nations finished its deliberations yesterday. There were two resolutions put forward by a group of non-aligned nations. The first resolution called for the convening of a world disarmament conference of all countries. This would include the Government of Mainland China.

This resolution was supported by Canada. And there was another resolution supported by a substantial group of non-aligned countries, which gave general directions with respect to the objectives of the various disarmament bodies. I propose to table these two resolutions both of which were supported by Canada.

There was a story in the papers last Friday that Canada had opposed the resolution calling for a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited. This was an error but it was reported in some Canadian papers. There was a correction made, I believe, by the Canadian Press.

In any event Canada was not among those countries which had opposed the calling of a world disarmament conference.

The resolution of the disarmament commission calls upon all members of the General Assembly to become parties to the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and to abide by its spirit and provisions.

It also recommends that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should:

- (a) reconvene as early as possible to resume as a matter of urgency its efforts to develop a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and to consider all proposals for measures to relax international tension and halt and reverse the arms race, including those submitted to the Disarmament Commission at its present session;
- (b) consider as a matter of priority the question of extending the scope of the partial test-ban treaty to cover underground tests;
- (c) also accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a program of certain related measures;
- (d) keep in mind the principle of converting to programs of economic and social development of the developing countries a substantial part of the resources gradually released by the reduction of military expenditures; and then, finally the request is made that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should report to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly during its twentieth session on the progress made in respect of the above recommendations.

● (3:53 p.m.)

I should point out that the Soviet Union abstained on the resolution to which I have just referred, namely the resolution that provided for the direction that should be pursued in future disarmament deliberations. I hope that the position taken by the Soviet Union will not mean that it will be difficult to persuade the Soviet Union of the desirability of an early resumption of the discussions on disarmament in the eighteen-Nation committee which has been meeting in Geneva, and whose sessions came to an end last fall.

The CHAIRMAN: Excuse me, Mr. Martin. Is it agreed, Mrs. Konantz and gentlemen, that the two resolutions which have been filed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs be appended to today's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sorry, Mr. Martin; would you carry on.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I mentioned in the House the other day in answer to a question, that Canada had drafted a non-dissemination agreement. This was in reply to a question on whether or not we had been consulted by the British Government with regard to an announcement that that government had circulated for private discussions among a number of states a draft treaty on dissemination, I said that was the case and that we ourselves had drafted a treaty, which we have been discussing with a number of countries. Of course, it is impossible at this stage to make public this treaty because it is in a stage of exploratory consultation with certain powers.

I might say when the Prime Minister of India was here the other day we gave him a draft of this non-dissemination agreement for the consideration of his government. We have had consultations with the Government of India on this subject over a period of time. I myself had some discussions about this with Swaran Singh, the Foreign Minister of India, last December in New York. Because of the vital interest of India in this problem we are happy to have them as one of the countries with which we wish to have this preliminary stage of discussion and exploratory examination. This non-dissemination agreement currently is being discussed informally through diplomatic channels, first of all with our other three partners in what is called the Western Four, Britain, the United States and Italy, and then with an increasing number of other interested countries.

[The Canadian Government has held the view for some time that progress in solving the problem of disarmament or in solving the problem of how to halt the spread of nuclear weapons would be facilitated if those directly involved in the disarmament negotiations were to advance an example of the sort of non-dissemination treaty they would be ready to negotiate. I must say that the formulation of initiatives on the western side has been impeded somewhat by the Soviet contention about the incompatibility of a non-dissemination agreement and possible further modifications in the nuclear arrangements of the Atlantic Alliance. Of course, it was not that anyone in the West considered the Soviet allegations had any foundation in fact; rather, there seemed little to be gained if all that happened whenever Western countries mentioned non-dissemination was that we were confronted with a repetition from the Soviet Union of charges about the Federal Republic of Germany seeking to gain access to nuclear weapons. However, meanwhile, the non-nuclear powers, for their part, have begun to make known their increasing reluctance on the grounds of national security and equity to contemplate unconditionally renouncing the possibility of some day having an independent military nuclear capability.]

I think that one of the most important questions facing the international community at the present time is the danger to the peace of the world that would result from an increase in the membership of what is called the nuclear club. It is only fair to say that this concern has been shared by at least three of the nuclear powers, and certainly by the two main nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. I would not overlook the recent demonstrations of the fruit of the Communist Chinese military nuclear programs as a factor influencing the thought of a number of nations in this regard. One must consider the position of certain countries of Asia, for

instance, which are confronted with the fact that China, the Chinese People's Republic, has detonated two nuclear bombs. The psychological effect of this, of course, must be very great in Asia, where the first two nuclear bombs were dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The Canadian Government welcomed the statement made by the Prime Minister of India on at least three occasions in Ottawa when he was here during his notable visit reaffirming that the policy of the Government of India was not to make any nuclear weapons; that it was engaged in nuclear activity for peaceful purposes only. This is, of course, also the basic position of the Canadian Government.

As late as last November it had been my hope that the non-nuclear states might have been prepared to regard the situation which now confronts them and us a little differently. It has become clear that the present nuclear powers have no intention of allowing their nuclear weapons programmes to contribute to the creation of further independent nuclear capabilities, of additional loci of military nuclear power which at best would serve only to complicate the strategic picture and at worst would render the deterrent equilibrium unstable. Since the Cuba crisis brought home to all the world the extreme danger involved in any attempt by a great power to alter the strategic balance in a radical manner, I think a distinctly new phase in relations between the West and the Soviet Union began.

● (4:03 p.m.)

I would hope, notwithstanding the dangers and the centres of conflict which exist that it might be possible to agree that the relations between the Soviet Union and the West continue to justify the view that, at least since Cuba, a detente of an easing in relations has taken place. I think it is most important for the peace of the world that this should be the case.

I think we all felt that the signing of a partial test ban treaty, the achievement of other limited agreements concerning the non-orbiting of nuclear weapons of mass destruction, and the reduction in the planned rate of expansion of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, were factors which made for progress in this improved relationship between East and West, notwithstanding the fact that there has been no settlement of the major political problems that divide East and West—such as those resulting from a divided Berlin and a divided Germany.

These measures of restraint were undertaken in so far as their practical application was concerned by the states with a military nuclear capability rather than by the generality of states. This is something which I think we have to underline. The initiative for the partial nuclear test ban treaty was taken by the nuclear powers. It was adhered to by over 100 states, including our own, which have thus agreed not to engage in nuclear tests in three environments. These circumstances suggest to us that the non-nuclear states for their part might now be prepared to make some concerted movement, in the direction of the generally desired aim of limiting the spread of independent nuclear capabilities, to give proof of their awareness of their responsibilities.

I had in mind that the countries with a nuclear capacity but not engaged in the weapons programme—and this would include Canada—might give a meaning to and strengthen the formula provided for in the Irish resolution of 1961 by pledging themselves not to initiate such a programme. You will

remember that the Irish resolution was passed in 1961. It was introduced by the government of Ireland on the 20th of December 1960 and supported by Canada. The operative part of the resolution calls upon all states, and particularly upon the states presently possessing nuclear weapons, to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear states would undertake to refrain from relinquishing nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture, to states not possessing such weapons, the proposed agreement would also contain provisions under which states not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons.

We had in mind that the nations within this category—that is the nations with nuclear capacity but not engaged in a weapons programme—could agree among themselves not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of nuclear weapons. In turn, such action might have encouraged the military nuclear powers to overcome their hesitation in committing to paper, in a full non-dissemination treaty, that tacit understanding which has governed their relations for the last while that they will not hand over the undivided control of nuclear weapons to states which do not possess them already.

Mr. NESBITT: What is the Minister quoting when he says “the undivided control”.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I was not quoting; this was my own statement.

The situation, as I see it now, has changed somewhat, at least in so far as some countries and some regions of the world are concerned. The reluctance of non-nuclear states does add a complicating factor to the formulation of an effective non-dissemination proposal, but not I think one that is inhibitive. It does serve to remind us all that it really is the non-nuclear countries which are giving something up for the future if they enter into a non-dissemination agreement and that accordingly they will, and indeed must, have an important role in the negotiation of a treaty to that end. It is their adherence which, from a practical point of view, would be the most significant aspect of a non-dissemination treaty. In short the substance of the matter is such that it is not the nuclear powers alone who will need to play a major part in the formulation of a treaty or in the choice of various measures which a treaty might contain.

It is only realistic to expect, if we are going to ask such non-nuclear states as India and other countries in other regions of the world to forgo the making of nuclear weapons and to confine their nuclear capacity to peaceful purposes, that we should take into account their security problems when they are confronted in their regions with countries which have a nuclear weapons capacity.

● (4:13 p.m.)

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I wonder if I could ask for five minutes?

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we will adjourn for five minutes.

Recess.

After recess.

The CHAIRMAN: Will the meeting come to order, please.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am sorry that I asked for this adjournment but it was a matter of some importance that I had to deal with. The draft of a non-dissemination treaty, which we are now discussing through diplomatic channels with a limited number of countries, of course, has been drawn up as a stimulant to friendly discussion. We are now receiving reactions and there is general interest. In addition to meeting what we might regard as the requirements of those nations with whom we have allied interests, our draft has been conceived as going some way toward meeting the needs of the non-aligned and neutral nations within whose ranks the spread of nuclear weapons is the more likely to take place in the next decade.

Now, our draft treaty is a very preliminary one. There are great problems involved in trying to work out some of the processes that are required if this kind of a treaty is to receive the acceptance of countries both non-nuclear and nuclear. Our draft is also being discussed with the disarmament experts of those governments which have allied interests with us. However, I would like to say that there are essentially six elements in the approach that we are suggesting.

(1). A non-dissemination agreement proper based on the Irish resolution, to which I referred earlier, which constitutes the only norm of non-dissemination that has up to now been generally accepted. The agreement on non-dissemination must be based on that resolution.

(2). The extension of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to the entirety of the non-military atomic programs of all signatories, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute being the only multilaterally agreed instrument which provides a means of verifying that nuclear materials and equipment are not being diverted to military purposes.

(3). A collective security guarantee in accordance with which the nuclear powers would come to the assistance of unaligned and neutral non-nuclear states in the event that they are subject to nuclear attack.

(4). A complaint instrument or mechanism which, together with safeguards as provided for as I have already indicated in (2), would provide a means of verifying compliance with the commitments made under a non-dissemination agreement based on the Irish resolution, especially with regard to the ban on relinquishing control of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states.

(5). Provisions for implementation or continuation of the treaty only in the event of a sufficient degree of universality of adherence.

Finally, sanctions would be required to dissuade states from ceasing to comply with their undertakings. A limited duration for the treaty would be called for the purpose being notably to encourage the nuclear states to make tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament within that period lest the non-nuclear states change their minds.

The committee will understand that these are general principles; they are capable of revision. They are put forward with supporting material in the draft treaty, which it is not possible at this stage to discuss publicly. These are some of the features that we have been thinking about. I am sure our draft is not fully acceptable to some countries, just as we are satisfied

from what we have seen thus far that some of the points embodied in the draft proposals of other countries do not, in our judgment, meet the objectives that all of us have in mind.

We are in effect advocating a co-ordination of measures. We do not regard our system as constituting an inseparable whole, nor do we consider that the various measures concerned must necessarily at first come into effect in their optimum or finally developed form.

Now, I would like to repeat that there are considerable difficulties which will have to be overcome in the development and realization of the various elements which I have listed. Obviously the process of consultation that is under way will be valuable as indicating to us which of those measures might be successfully developed.

Since the end of the second world war, the United Nations, in the Disarmament Commission of that body and in a sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission, has laboured to try and come forward with some agreement with the nations concerned in the matter of both conventional and nuclear disarmament. The first discussion in the United Nations in the realm of disarmament had to do with the Baruch proposal which would have placed the atomic energy capability of the United States in the hands of an international agency. Canada was a participant in these discussions through General A. G. L. McNaughton. This proposal was not accepted, of course, by the Soviet Union. The introduction of the proposal preceded the successful detonation of a nuclear weapon by the Soviet Union. There have been proposals put forward on both sides with regard to programs for the elimination of the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons. It is a fact that not much progress has been made in that field of disarmament. This does not mean that there has not been patient negotiation and long negotiation on all sides but it is a fact that the political climate of the world has been such that there has not been much success. The basic difference between the position taken by the Soviet Union on the one hand and the nations of the West on the other and I think for the most part most other nations, has been on the question of control.

● (4:33 p.m.)

Discussions of disarmament at an earlier period, before the Second World War, did not involve to anything like the extent of the last two decades and insistence on disarmament with control, or the position that has been taken by Canada under successive governments—and I think it is generally supported by all political groups in the country so far as I can judge—has been that each disarmament measure must be accompanied by control measures that will guarantee compliance with the agreement undertaken.

The Soviet Union has taken the position that the question of control is important but first must come the agreement for disarmament, and that once this is done there will be no problem in arranging the control. But it has never been possible apart from a single statement that I know of, issued by Mr. Khrushchev about a year before his retirement, to detect or to have clearly defined what systems of control the Soviet Union has in mind. In any event notwithstanding this basic difference, there has been no fundamental progress made in this area. There are some who argue that it cannot be

expected that there will be agreement in the absence of a settlement of the major political problems that divide East and West or that divide East, West and the other parts of the world.

The partial test ban treaty represents a great achievement on the part of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and the other countries that adhered to it. Regrettably, two other nuclear powers have not subscribed to it—France and the Chinese People's Republic.

Our policy continues to be to urge all countries, non-nuclear and nuclear, to adhere to this partial test-ban treaty. It would seem to us that the time has come when there should be agreement, not only with respect to tests in the three environments but, as well, regarding tests underground. Certainly the technical facilities for the detection of underground tests have now been perfected to the point where it seems to us this ought to be an objective to be pursued.

I think that is the general statement I wish to make, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Martin. Mr. Nesbitt.

Mr. NESBITT: There is just one point I would like to ask the Minister to clarify for the Committee; it concerns the Irish resolution in the United Nations about dissemination of nuclear weapons or, in other words, new members in the nuclear club.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I must apologize, Mr. Chairman. I have to leave the Committee for a few moments to receive a long distance telephone call from London.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, while the Secretary of State for External Affairs is absent from the Committee perhaps it would be appropriate for me to raise a matter which I have already raised with some members of the Committee.

At the last session, the Committee had referred to it two bills, one put forward by Mr. Klein and one by Mr. Orlikow, which, broadly, dealt with the subject of hate literature. Those who were members of the Committee will recall that we had quite a lot of evidence adduced before us. Six or seven witnesses gave evidence, and the Department of External Affairs furnished us with two excellent memoranda, one on the international aspect and the other on the legislation that has been passed in other countries concerning this subject. Then the session came to an end and the Committee died, and the reference of this subject matter to the Committee also died.

It would seem to me most unfortunate if the work that was done by the Committee and the excellent evidence and material collected should fade away without any result. I wonder if it would be appropriate to move that this Committee should seek from the House an order referring this matter again to the Committee, and referring to it the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence from the last session.

With this material, I think very little new would be required in the way of evidence, but that would be a matter for the steering committee. I know we have some new members on this Committee, but by and large we have the same members as the last Committee, and they have heard the evidence. That evidence is available in print. If that were done, we could get on and perhaps deal with the subject, which is one that concerns us all.

If it were in order to do so now, I would move that through you we request the House to refer this matter again to this Committee and to refer the minutes and proceedings to this Committee.

There is just one point I would like to add to what I have said. The suggestion might be made that under the new set-up a more appropriate committee to deal with this matter than the External Affairs Committee would be the Human Rights Committee. However, I do not think that argument has weight, for two reasons. One is that the so-called Human Rights Committee has the Immigration Act, Indian Affairs and a whole host of matters to come before it. Secondly, in substance, the work has already been done. The External Affairs Committee may have been originally a somewhat inappropriate committee, but having done the work and having the material available, and because it does have some international implications, after consideration I thought this might be in order.

Mr. WALKER: Does this motion need a seconder, Mr. Chairman?

I support this fully and I second Mr. Brewin's motion.

Mr. NESBITT: I would like to speak to the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to hear the views of the members. It would be useful to the Chair if members were to address themselves to the question of the propriety of the motion.

Mr. BREWIN: Do you say we should not—

The CHAIRMAN: There is an awful lot in this motion as moved and seconded. It commends itself to me, but—

Mr. BREWIN: What do you mean by "propriety"? What is the suggested impropriety? It may be wrong, but what is the impropriety?

The CHAIRMAN: We appreciate that we are instruments of the House of Commons. Our terms of reference are those that are set out by the House. At the moment I can see no reason why we could not report back to the House and ask for permission to carry on with this matter that was under the consideration of the earlier committee. I see no reason why this is not possible.

Mr. KLEIN: Under the terms of reference that were originally given in the first instance?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. Nesbitt, you have a lot of experience in External Affairs.

Mr. NESBITT: When this matter was first referred to us, I believe some members of the committee of the day inquired why this matter was referred to the External Affairs Committee in the first place, because it seemed perhaps an inappropriate committee to which to refer the matter. One of the explanations given, as I recall, Mr. Chairman, was that the principal reason was that there was no other appropriate committee and, secondly—and perhaps more cogent—that this Committee could find out through the Department of External Affairs what legislation was passed in other countries and the effects of such legislation. That seemed to be an eminently good reason, as I think we have all agreed.

We have heard witnesses and we have obtained information. I agree with Mr. Brewin that we would not by any manner of means like to see this very valuable information lost. I do not know what goes on in the minds of the

Government, but it seems that one of the reasons for setting up the Human Rights Committee was to deal with just this sort of thing. I can see no reason why the evidence we have heard and the other material we obtained could not be given to that Committee. We have new members on this newly constituted External Affairs Committee now, people who did not have the advantage that some of the rest of us had of hearing this evidence, so the new members of the Committee would have the same disadvantage as would members of the Human Rights Committee, to which I think this matter would more properly be referred.

Then Mr. Brewin brought up the very interesting point that perhaps the Human Rights Committee will have to deal with the Immigration Act—which will certainly take a lot of time, I agree—and the Indian Act. Nevertheless this Committee has the estimates of the department before it at the present time. From the way things have been going—this is no reflection on you, Mr. Chairman, or the Minister or any of us—and in view of the likelihood of recess, I do not think it will matter if the House refers to us again this matter of human rights. This will not expedite matters because we have the estimates of the department to consider, and apparently this will certainly take considerable time. I cannot see that anything will be gained. I wonder why a Human Rights Committee should be set up to deal with this kind of thing. I do not think the information we have obtained would be lost because I have no doubt that Committee would request our records.

As I have already mentioned, a number of members on this special Committee are different from those who have heard evidence on the previous occasion. I have no objection to this and I have great interest in this particular matter. I am sure that members of this Committee are aware that I introduced the private member's bills on this subject, on which I consulted Mr. Brewin and Mr. Klein. I would just question whether this is the correct committee. I will not put up violent opposition to this but I thought this matter might first be considered by the members.

Mr. NUGENT: I think this matter should be brought up in the house, Mr. Chairman. I do not think it is proper for this Committee to go back to the house and to say that the Committee operating under the same name in the previous session did some work and we do not want to see it lost. I think the matter can be referred to this Committee which can then refer to the evidence that was received so that our work will not have been completely wasted. I think it is improper for this Committee to accept the motion made by Mr. Brewin telling the house what they should refer to us.

The CHAIRMAN: One of the problems that presents itself to my mind at the moment is the propriety of this Committee reporting back to the House on a subject which is now before the House on the order paper and before this matter has come up in this session. I wonder if it would meet the pleasure of the meeting if this matter regarding the propriety of the motion were to be discussed in the steering committee with some legal assistance, and brought back to the Committee. I think there is a great deal to the proposition that we should finish off, if possible, what was so nearly completed in the last session, but I do not think we have all the information necessary to make a very wise assessment today. Would it be agreeable if this matter were simply taken under advisement?

Mr. BREWIN: I do not want to interrupt the presentation of the Minister. I will perhaps drop the motion now, but I think this motion should be dealt with. We do not need any legal advice on it. For goodness' sake, let us not ask a lot of lawyers about it because more complications will then arise.

Mr. WALKER: I believe we should allow the Minister to carry on with his statement but I would like to see this present discussion carried on rather than to have it deferred. We could carry on with this matter at some future meeting of this committee when the Minister is not available.

The CHAIRMAN: Is that agreeable? We will adjourn discussion on this matter for the moment.

It has been pointed out to me that we were able to stop production of issue No. 1 to enable these two statements that were tabled to actually become part of issue No. 1 rather than issue No. 2 as was suggested today. Is that agreed?

Mr. NUGENT: What does that mean, that report No. 1 will be delayed again? I certainly think it is most important that we have evidence given to this Committee by the Minister as soon as possible. I do not think it is so essential that that report be appended to the first issue.

The CHAIRMAN: This does not mean a delay. It was such a long report in the first instance that it took up all the time that was available. We have just been advised that if it is the pleasure of the Committee that this be included with the No. 1 issue, it can be done. Is that agreed?

Mr. DOUGLAS: Can we not proceed with the printing until this is set up? This is bound to cause delay. We have not yet received a transcript of the meeting which took place a week ago.

The CHAIRMAN: I understand it will not cause delay if we advise them by telephone.

Mr. NUGENT: The Chairman said there would be no delay.

Mr. DOUGLAS: Can the Chairman give us some reasonably certain date when we will get the printed copy?

The CHAIRMAN: It will be a very large issue, Mr. Douglas, as you know. The production has been slow essentially because of translation problems, but I understand that it is now completed.

Mr. DOUGLAS: Can you tell me whether the document which you have and which you now propose to add to issue No. 1 has to be translated, or is it already translated and ready to be put into type?

The CHAIRMAN: I think it is simply a matter of printing this under issue No. 1 or No. 2. Is it agreed? I understand it is agreed.

Mr. Nesbitt, will you proceed with your question?

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, I was asking the Minister a question which was interrupted by the Minister's call. The question I had in mind concerns the Irish resolution of 1960 regarding the dissemination of nuclear weapons or, in other words, the possibility of new members joining the nuclear club. At that time it was my recollection that the terms of the Irish resolution were quite clear. At one point in the Minister's remarks he referred to dissemination or undivided control of nuclear weapons. I wish to ask the Minister whether there is anything in the Irish resolution of 1960—to which we subscribe—that had any mention of undivided control of nuclear weapons.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No.

Mr. NESBITT: I would then ask the Minister this question: Does the Soviet Union or any of the countries associated with it think that Canada has now become a member of the nuclear club in view of the fact that there are nuclear weapons in the hands of Canada under, shall we say, divided control?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not want to speak for the Soviet Union.

Mr. NESBITT: I was wondering if the Minister had heard anything at the United Nations.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): This idea had been suggested to me once by Mr. Gromyko in relation to the arrangement we have made for the storage of nuclear weapons in North America for Canadian forces, but I do not believe he was serious.

Mr. NESBITT: Perhaps the Minister has found a greater sense of humour in Mr. Gromyko.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Mr. Gromyko has a great sense of humour. This is one of his happy faculties and one of the things that I am counting on to enable progress to be made. When we say a nation belongs to the nuclear club we mean they have a military nuclear capacity which lies entirely within its control. We are not in that category. We do not have full control of these weapons. We could not use them entirely on our own decision even if we wanted to. They cannot on the other hand be used, in any event, without our consent. When we say a member of the nuclear club we mean a nation which has in its hands full control of nuclear weapons.

Mr. NESBITT: Was there any reference in the Irish resolution to divided control?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I said no.

Mr. NESBITT: There is just one more thing. This is part of the same question. I realize we are only allowed one question at a time.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In fairness to the Soviet Union I should add one thing, that they do make the suggestion that, for instance, the proposed multilateral nuclear force would be an extension of the nuclear club. I presume they would say the same of the proposal made by Mr. Wilson, the present Prime Minister of Britain, but I would give the same reply to that suggestion as I gave with regard to the other.

Mr. NESBITT: Have any other countries at the United Nations or elsewhere, through their ambassador here in Ottawa, made a suggestion to the present Government that Canada is in fact a member of the nuclear club?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have heard no one say that to me in Ottawa.

Mr. NESBITT: Perhaps not in Ottawa, Mr. Minister, but perhaps at the United Nations.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I suppose that this has been done but I do not recall anything specific. I do not think anyone could seriously make that claim because we do not.

● (4:48 p.m.)

In 1945 the Prime Minister of Canada met with the Prime Minister of Britain and the President of the United States in Washington, Mr. Attlee, and

Mr. Truman. We made it clear then that our nuclear capacity would be devoted to peaceful purposes. That has been the policy of successive Canadian governments, and it continues to be our policy.

Mr. NESBITT: I agree with it, and I would certainly agree with the minister. But I refer more specifically to the items such as the Bomarc for instance, and other pieces of military hardware.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We do not have independent control over these weapons. Independent national control is an essential ingredient.

Mr. NESBITT: Do you feel, or does the Minister feel, that the Irish resolution contemplated this? What is the divided control which we all subscribe to?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think we should look at the resolution. It reads as follows:

1. Calls upon all states, and in particular upon these states at present possessing nuclear weapons, to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear states would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to states not possessing such weapons and provisions under which states not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons

Mr. NESBITT: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Brewin.

Mr. BREWIN: On this question now being discussed and about control, if we have this joint control of tactical or strategic nuclear weapons, and they are in the physical possession of some other country, for example, West Germany, would it not create a situation at the moment of tension, when control would be handed over to the other nation? Therefore is there not some substance to the apprehension and fear of the U.S.S.R. that if we should hand over control of nuclear weapons to another country, we are not stopping the dissemination of nuclear power?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not think that the contention of the Soviet Union would be warranted, because to have control of nuclear weapons entirely on its own responsibility. ~~This is the situation in the Soviet~~ We do not have that. We cannot use any nuclear weapon unless there is also action on the part of the United States. The United States can use its nuclear weapons entirely on its own responsibility. This is the situation in the Soviet Union; this is the situation in Britain; this is the situation in France; and this is the situation in China. Those are the only areas in which independent national control of nuclear weapons can be regarded as being applicable.

Mr. BREWIN: Is it your view, Mr. Martin, that there is no basis of apprehension?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is my view.

Mr. BREWIN: None at all; and therefore not only the U.S.S.R. but other countries in Europe have no reason to be fearful of any proliferation, even

if the United States retains the key or control, a control which can be handed over at the moment?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would want to examine carefully this new question because it adds another element to your questions which up to now have had to do with the proposition, as to what constituted the qualifications for membership in the nuclear club. I say we do not qualify because we do not have independent national control.

Mr. BREWIN: I do not want to pursue this too far. I was not impressed by the wording about being in a nuclear club. That is a phrase today to which you can give whatever content you wish. It seems to me useless and a waste of time to discuss whether we are in the nuclear club.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think it is a very vital thing for the peace of the world.

Mr. BREWIN: I think it is vitally important whether we are moving towards effective agreement for non-dissemination. I am fearful of enlarging the danger of more people having nuclear weapons in their hands. I am trying to see if I can find out whether or not there is any basis for the alarm that is expressed by many people including the U.S.S.R. If you disseminate, even under control, as under the M.L.F., physical possession of nuclear weapons, that is, the control of nuclear weapons to a number of countries, even if that control is something which is subject of course for the time being to American control, notwithstanding that American control, does proliferation not represent a real danger and a real degree of apprehension to other people?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think I understand.

Mr. BREWIN: I think you said that the Soviet Union was concerned about some of the proposals in the non-dissemination treaties such as the M.L.F. and the A.N.F. or whatever it is called. I am trying to ascertain whether or not there is a little more substance in this point of view on the other side.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): This amplification I think puts a different emphasis on the problem. There is no doubt that this contention is made by the Soviet Union, and, as you said, I acknowledged this in my initial statement. They have argued that the M.L.F. or the A.N.F. of Mr. Wilson does involve an element of proliferation. I simply say that I do not believe this is the case.

Mr. Wilson, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, made a very strong statement on January 14, in his speech on this point, which I think we ought to try to table. In it he emphasized that he could not agree with the contention that is made by the Soviet Union that this was a form of proliferation.

There are undoubtedly many sincere people, Mr. Brewin, who do believe this to be the case, but I can only say that I do not agree, myself, with the basis for their apprehension. That that apprehension does exist in some quarters is undoubtedly true.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I want to ask the witness about his understanding of the foreign policy. His statement is that Canada has fears about

the further dissemination of nuclear weapons, and that it must be regarded as one of those dangerous factors we have to contend with. Is that correct?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is generally true.

Mr. NUGENT: And that ever since this subject was first discussed, it has been Canada's policy for some years that we have been in the forefront of those who try to discourage further dissemination of nuclear power.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is right.

Mr. NUGENT: But in the last few years we had come to the position where Canada not only had no nuclear weapons on its own soil, but had no part in their being used. What is the position today, when Canada does have on its own soil nuclear weapons for use by Canadian forces inside Canada? Is that not now our position?

● (4:58 p.m.)

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Canada has not independent national control but the weapons cannot be used in Canada without Canada's participation.

Mr. NUGENT: But these weapons are in Canada today and are available to Canada's armed forces, if I understood the Minister of National Defence correctly.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Under the conditions I have just described and pursuant to an agreement made with the United States Government for the storage of nuclear weapons in Canada in compliance with commitments previously made.

Mr. NUGENT: Now, obviously these weapons are made available in Canada for the use of Canada's armed forces for defence purposes under the conditions you have described. Has that not departed a long way from Canada's former position? While we cannot qualify, you say, for that full step of complete and absolute control of weapons which we own, we have departed from the position where we did not have them available on our soil; we had no bases for them and did not have them available for our forces; whereas they are now on Canadian soil and available to our forces. Is this not dissemination?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not believe it is and I do not believe anyone has seriously argued that it is.

Mr. NUGENT: The witness says it is not but that is because he is certain of the exact degree of control and the arrangement by which Canada and the United States share control of these weapons. Is that not right?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Would you please repeat your question.

Mr. NUGENT: Your confidence in this stems from the fact that you have knowledge of the method of control and the agreement for control between Canada and the United States of these atomic arms.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do know what is in those agreements because I helped to negotiate them, but independent of this knowledge there is not any doubt that we do not have independent control of these weapons.

Mr. NUGENT: You say we do not have any control?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, we do not have control of these weapons in the sense in which one understands ownership of a nuclear weapon as the result of a national capacity.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, now, that is exactly the point that puzzles me because I am not at all clear.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It is obvious that if there was a war—and we hope this does not eventuate—we would have no independent power to use these weapons. The only way they could be used would be by joint action on the part of the two countries. In the case of the United States, it can use its weapons without any reference to Canada or anyone else.

Mr. NUGENT: Are the terms of the agreement of control between Canada and the United States—that is, the exact arrangement—known to the public generally?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Would you repeat that question?

Mr. NUGENT: Are the terms of the agreement and the method of joint control known to the general public?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, and I am sure you would not expect they would be. 119006

Mr. NUGENT: No, but this certainly is part and parcel of the situation in respect of other people that Canada will be asking to join in programs against dissemination. They will be asked to face a situation that in Canada there now are nuclear weapons available for use of our armed forces which we say are under joint control, which we say we cannot use without United States consent; and which we also say that you do not know the terms but you will just have to take our word for it.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No. But, the Canadian people know these weapons are subject to joint participation and cannot be used otherwise. The Canadian people know that because they have been told by their government; and this has been confirmed by United States sources. The Canadian people and, I am sure, the Canadian Parliament, do not expect that the details of these agreements would be made public. It is not our policy to divulge for the benefit of those who may have an interest that is adverse to our national interest details which would be of help to them.

Mr. NUGENT: I am not suggesting any such thing.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I know you are not, Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT: I am concerned with the picture we present to other countries in the world. Canada has asked these other nations who do not have nuclear arms not to acquire them, but the picture we present to them with regard to not having helped further disseminate nuclear weapons depends on the knowledge that we make available to them, that we do not have independent control. They have to accept our word. How can they have that amount of confidence that there has not been further dissemination if this does not amount to further dissemination? 113 1001
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Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I can say that the nations with whom we have had talks in this area, as well as others with whose pronouncements we are familiar, recognize that Canada is engaged in this field only for peaceful purposes and that she could have made a bomb of her own many years ago. 11

Mr. NUGENT: Well, does any nation say that they acquire weapons for any thing but peaceful purposes? Does not any other nation, when acquiring weapons, say exactly the same thing?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I was referring to a military nuclear capacity. Every nation knows we could have made a nuclear weapon before any other country other than the United States and the Soviet Union but we have not. This is recognized all over the world and our position is respected. No one has made a charge that, because we have entered into an agreement with the United States for the storage of nuclear weapons, we have abandoned this policy.

Mr. NUGENT: I am wondering why Mr. Martin emphasized the word "storage" when the obvious purpose of these weapons surely is the arming of our Canadian forces; they are available to them and they are part of our defence. That is their purpose. Why does the witness emphasize the word "storage" when they are part of our arms?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I emphasized it because I wish to be exact in my characterization; that is exactly what it is. It is an agreement for the storage of nuclear weapons for the armed forces in Canada.

Mr. NUGENT: Is it not storage in the same sense that any weapons are being stored as long as they are not being used, the same as ordinary bombs, machine gun bullets, and so on are in storage.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Still, they are in storage and the immediate guardianship is not Canadian. Canada would, under certain—I am sorry but I cannot go into that.

Mr. NUGENT: I realize we should not pursue that any further but I would like to pursue this line of questioning. In connection with other countries, in the Minister's opinion would there be a further dissemination if, for instance, the Soviet Union made a similar agreement with East Germany which Canada and the United States have made, and to the same extent, and they said we have this agreement and they cannot use them without our say so. Would the Minister consider this further dissemination and would the Canadian Government attempt to bring pressure to bear in the hope such an eventuality would not come about?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would say on the facts you postulate that would be joint control.

Mr. NUGENT: Would this be contrary to the policy of the Canadian Government at the present time?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): If the arrangement was the same as the arrangement we have made for the storage of nuclear weapons in Canada I would not logically complain.

Mr. NUGENT: Then Canada as such is not against any further extension of acquisition of nuclear weapons by other nations and having them available in storage for defence in their own country?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We are against any additional independent nuclear capability; that is our policy.

Mr. NUGENT: You used the word "capability"; does that mean we are not against any further extension of joint nuclear weapons control?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have answered your question; we are opposed to any additional independent national nuclear capability. In my judgment, as well as others, that is the objective in the non-dissemination treaties that are being discussed.

Mr. NUGENT: What is the attitude of the government toward further joint agreements of control?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is a question. If the Soviet Union entered into an arrangement similar to ours it would have to receive the same kind of characterization.

● (5:08 p.m.)

Mr. KLEIN: If Canada and the United States at some stage were to agree on the use of the bomb in Canada, would it be the United States or Canada which would fire the bomb.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is another matter. There are agreements which deal with how these things are done but I cannot discuss these things publicly.

Mr. GELBER: Mr. Chairman, the partial nuclear test-ban treaty has been in effect for some years—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Two years.

Mr. GELBER: —and as you pointed out there have been further scientific advances in the area of detection. One of the difficulties I recall with the Soviet Union was on the question of inspection. I am wondering whether these problems are as important today as they were then in view of these scientific advances.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): With regard to underground testing?

Mr. GELBER: Yes.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I, myself, do not think they are. We would like to see the partial test ban applied to underground tests. I think there now is a growing recognition that the number of inspections which at that time—two years ago—were thought to be required would no longer be needed.

Mr. GELBER: Are you hopeful that the agreement can be extended further in terms of the task it undertakes to do?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We certainly have been urging this.

Mr. GELBER: A number of years ago the Kellog-Briand Pact was considered a very important manifestation of international desire for peace.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In 1928.

Mr. GELBER: Yes. I am wondering whether the signatories of the international test ban treaty would consider a declaration of no first use of nuclear arms in view of the growing invulnerability of the second strike forces; do you think that type of prohibition would be of interest to Canada and would there likely be acceptance by the members of the partial test-ban treaty?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We have given some thought to this. However, I would like to consider my answer carefully.

Mr. GELBER: I will put it on the order paper.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): When you referred to the Kellog-Briand Pact, you then jumped to another point.

Mr. GELBER: I was thinking that the Kellog-Briand Pact was a very important demonstration of the desire for international amity and that a similar declaration of non first use of nuclear weapons would have a very important influence in terms of promoting the detente.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The Kellog-Briand Pact, as I remember very well, in 1928, was a declaration initiated by the United States and France renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. There are many people who believe, in spite of the good intentions of the authors—both of them being the foreign ministers of their respective countries—that this declaration of intention created a false atmosphere—created a false security—which contributed somewhat to the build-up of arms in Nazi Germany and elsewhere. I am not saying this actually is the case, but I do know this is the view of many people. I would not say this would be the consequence of the proposal you are making. I would like to think a little more about it.

Mr. MANDZIUK: Mr. Chairman, I was very interested in the first remarks of the hon. Minister when he mentioned the World Peace Conference calling all nations to a Disarmament Conference, Peace Conference, or whatever it is. Will that be within the framework of the United Nations and if so how will China and Indonesia which stepped out of the United Nations fit in? Is this going to be a conference outside of the United Nations.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): This is not necessarily under or outside. They have called for the holding of a World Disarmament Conference of all nations.

Mr. MANDZIUK: Who has called; where does the movement originate?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The U.N. Disarmament Commission has called for the holding of the World Disarmament Conference. If it would mean, for instance, that China or Indonesia would not want to sit in a body called by the United Nations, I am sure it would be agreed that that formalistic obstacle should be removed because the essential part of the resolution was that all the nations would be included. That would include China, which is not a member of the United Nations and not recognized by many members of the United Nations. The Canadian position would be that every nation should be included, including China.

Mr. MANDZIUK: I am interested in the Minister's remark about removing this reluctance that China and Indonesia would have. What had you in mind?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Indonesia has resigned from the United Nations. China is not a member of the United Nations. They well might take the position, if this were to be under the auspices of the United Nations or even within its precincts, that they could not attend. This is a factor which will have to be borne in mind. I greatly suspect it will not be a United Nations conference; it will be a conference inspired by the United Nations, but under outside auspices. We have no indication that China will attend a conference. When they were invited to adhere to a partial test-ban treaty they said they would not because they had not been invited *ab initio*—from the beginning. This well might be their position this time. I think this would be regrettable because it might not be possible to achieve the kind of agreement we hope for unless you have the participation of all the countries in the world, and particularly one of the size and importance of the Chinese People's Republic.

Mr. MANDZIUK: My next question is a short hypothetical one and the last question I intend to ask. If this Disarmament Conference of all nations were held outside the framework or sphere of influence of the United Nations, is there not a danger that some new organization may be born that would replace or supersede the United Nations Organization as we have it at the present time.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not think so. The United Nations charter provides for the utilization of other media to pursue and achieve the same purposes.

The eighteen-power meeting, which only seventeen attend, on disarmament is not a United Nations body. It was called together by the foreign ministers of the two major powers. It does not in any way interfere with the United Nations. No, I do not believe it would, Mr. Mandziuk.

Mr. MANDZIUK: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Haidasz?

Mr. HADASZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Martin, in your interesting statement this afternoon you have referred to two factors of interest in the international scene. The first one is the International Atomic Energy Agency. Would it be possible this afternoon, Mr. Martin, for you to elaborate further on this agency, mentioning perhaps the membership of this agency, particularly whether France and China are members and West Germany, and whether, in its regulations, there are effective measures to check the end use of uranium and how these regulations are enforced?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The International Atomic Energy Agency came into being in 1957, I think it was. It was first negotiated at the U.N. in 1954 because I was the Canadian representative. Before that there had been some negotiations amongst certain powers in Washington which led eventually to the statute that was finally decided on, as Mr. Barton reminds me now, in 1957 or 1956. It was in 1956. Mr. Barton is pointing out that he was a year out—I am correcting the most knowledgeable man in the field of the United Nations. France is a member; Nationalist China is a member. The International Atomic Energy Agency is growing in strength. I believe there is a greater disposition now on the part of the Soviet Union to recognize the applicability of some of its norms. There is a greater recognition on the part of other countries of the importance of strengthening these standards and their applicability. It is not the only organization through which the principle of safeguards is applied. Safeguards are provided for in a number of ways.

There are, first of all, the various bilateral safeguards arrangements. We recently, for instance, sold a reactor to India, the second one, and the safeguards that are applicable in that particular situation are on a bilateral basis. That is to say, Canada is given the right of access and inspection. Any violation—which I do not for one minute ever think will happen in the case of India—would have to be met by action on the part of Canada. Under what is known as Euratom, there are likewise arrangements providing for very strict safeguards bearing comparison to those of the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, I envisage the International Atomic Energy Agency developing a strengthened body, not only of standards, but of actual safeguards as time goes on if we are going to have the kind of guarantee and security which I believe is essential in a nuclear world. This applies to uranium. It applies to all kinds of things; facilities like reactors and so on.

Mr. HAIDASZ: In your answer you have not mentioned whether there are regulations which spell out the end use of uranium.

● (5:18 p.m.)

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not know exactly what you mean when you put it this way.

Mr. HAIDASZ: France, I do not think, had a nuclear capability before 1957.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No.

Mr. HAIDASZ: France is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency. If there are any regulations in the—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I said in the case of the International Atomic Energy Agency it has set standards or norms. In Euratom there are safeguards that are compatible with the standards set by the International Atomic Energy Agency. In so far as their application is concerned, I think perhaps they may be regarded as fully comparable.

Mr. HAIDASZ: In what year did Euratom come into being?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): About seven years ago, about 1958.

Mr. HAIDASZ: The point of my question is: how was France allowed to develop this nuclear capability if it is a member of both Euratom and the Atomic Energy Agency?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have answered you with regard to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Euratom is a regional arrangement supplemented by unilateral agreements and the standards or the safeguards that are required under these arrangements apply only to peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Mr. MACEWAN: I wonder if I might ask the Minister a short question? I wonder, Mr. Martin, if you can advise whether the Canadian Government to this date has made any efforts to negotiate out of the use of nuclear weapons which we have just started in Canada?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I can only call you attention to the statement in the white paper.

Mr. MACEWAN: I do not recall exactly what it says.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not have the white paper here before me.

Mr. MACEWAN: Could you say yes or no to that question?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Would you mind letting that question stand for a few minutes? I will come back to it.

Mr. KONANTZ: Mr. Chairman, I might be asking a very stupid question. Canada has assisted in building atomic reactors, I know, for instance, in India and I know that these reactors are for peaceful purposes. However, could such stations be converted in such a way in emergencies where they might be used in atomic war?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Mrs. Konantz, you have mentioned the reactor in India. We have a bilateral arrangement with India. It is not multilateral. It provides for safeguards which involve not only verification and control but the right of access and inspection.

Mr. KONANTZ: All we can do, I suppose, is to rely on our friends to live up to it.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We also have an obligation. However, we believe that it would be better to have these safeguards on a multilateral basis. We are now negotiating with Pakistan, for instance, for the sale of a reactor. We have proposed, in this instance, the application of international safeguards, and Pakistan has readily agreed to arrangements in that regard. 91

● (5:33 p.m.)

Mr. MANDZIUK: May I ask a question which is supplementary to Mr. MacEwan's question?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not think I can say any more on your question, Mr. MacEwan, than I have already said.

Mr. NUGENT: You have not said anything yet. 11

Mr. MACEWAN: Was that the white paper that was issued to the Defence Committee?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. MANDZIUK: As a supplementary to Mr. MacEwan's question, may I ask if the United States have any other arrangement or agreement such as that which they have with Canada, say with England or West Germany? Or can Britain use nuclear arms on her own, without consulting the United States, although they were provided by the United States?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): There is, I believe an agreement with the United Kingdom.

Mr. MANDZIUK: Is there joint control there?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. MANDZIUK: In the United Kingdom?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. MANDZIUK: What about West Germany? Without consultation with the West German government, the United States are free to resort to the use of nuclear weapons?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No.

Mr. MANDZIUK: They are not?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No.

Mr. MACEWAN: May I ask a question following that?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I made the statement "no". I do not want to go any further. We do not know the details of the United States arrangements.

Mr. MANDZIUK: I am not asking for details.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We do not know them.

Mr. MACEWAN: I take it you have nothing to add to what was said in the white paper.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I have nothing to say in addition to that and to what I have said in the House from time to time.

Mr. NUGENT: Then that is zero plus zero!

Mr. LACHANCE: May I ask a supplementary question to the one asked by our colleague?

There must be a very big step between the functioning of an atomic reactor and the building of an atomic bomb. 11

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would not qualify technically to answer such a question. I really could not help you on this. I am sure there is, but I do not even know how one makes a wheelbarrow!

Mr. LACHANCE: Mrs. Konantz asked if it could be related to the use of a reactor.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would prefer that you asked this type of question of Dr. Laurence and those people; they are technical people.

Mr. NESBITT: May I ask a very brief question in view of Mr. MacEwan's question concerning the negotiating out of nuclear weapons?

I agree that this would perhaps come more appropriately under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Defence than of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and perhaps at some future occasion when the Secretary of State has finished appearing before the Committee we might give consideration to inviting the Minister of National Defence to come. Perhaps he could give greater clarification on the matter.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think that is correct. My role would be as to how we got into the field, and of course you know the answer that I would give—that we felt that a commitment had been made that it was essential for us to respect.

Mr. NUGENT: We do not know any such thing. We do not know that a commitment was made. That is a bunch of poppycock.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I know you expressed that view, in elegant language, in the House of Commons on one occasion.

The CHAIRMAN: It has been stated by Mr. Martin that some possible advantage would be served at some appropriate time were there to be a joint meeting of the Defence Committee and the Committee on External Affairs.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would like to repeat what I said in the House today in answer to a question by Mr. Lambert, Mr. Nugent's colleague. I said that the Canadian military contribution to NATO is under constant review in the light of political, strategic, and technological developments in order that Canada, as other member states, may determine the best way in which we can make a realistic contribution to NATO's ability to deter aggression. I gave as an example that last year Canada committed a battalion group to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Forces, which was established to enable SACEUR, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, to respond to the threat to the flanks of NATO.

Then I might well have pointed out that Section 5 of the white paper on defence deals with the question that Mr. MacEwan has raised and to which constant reference has been made. I also recommend for good and interesting reading—but always with a critical eye!—the very worthy publication of Mr. Brewin on Canadian defence policy; and I want now to acknowledge with gratitude the complimentary copy which I received.

Mr. BREWIN: I was just about to ask a critical question, but I am disarmed!

Mr. HADASZ: I refer to two interesting remarks of the Minister in his statement, the second of which was "improved relations between East and West". Would the Minister care to elaborate on that this afternoon?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes. I think in November of 1962 there began an improvement in East-West relations. This was noted when for the first time the nations of the world were faced with the possibility of nuclear war over Cuba. This improvement was symbolized, I think, by the partial test-ban treaty which had been urged on the Soviet Union and on the United States for some time. The atmosphere or the climate that developed was such as to make it possible for this initiative to take place. It represented a very important forward step. It was followed later by an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States to outlaw the orbiting in outer space of nuclear weapons.

● (5:38 p.m.)

There was then a certain deterioration in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic. The general improvement has not been accompanied, as I mentioned earlier, by agreement in those areas of major political difference between East and West but those of us who have had to engage in conversations and negotiations with the Soviet Union have recognized a very considerable improvement in the attitude of that country. And, as I say, this has been abetted by the differences between the Soviet Union and that other Communist power, the Chinese People's Republic. I do not want to gloat over those differences, but they have undoubtedly been a factor. There have been other reasons, I suppose, such as the development of consumer goods problems in the Soviet economy. These have been factors which, together, have brought about an improvement. I would hope, seriously hope, that the situation in Indo-China, and the implications of that situation for the Soviet Union, will not permanently or seriously impair what I think has been a progressive improvement in the relations between East and West, an improvement which I believe is essential for the preservation of peace in the world today. We cannot help but underline the two different concepts of coexistence as enunciated by the two leading communist powers of our world. However we notice an improvement in East-West relationships in the liberalization that has taken place in the postures of the satellite powers for example Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria. The freedom that these countries are permitted to have, if I may put it that way, in their trading relationships with the West, and the manifestation, for instance, of the willingness of the United States to trade now with the Eastern European Communist countries is, on the part of the United States, an indication of what I call a *détente*. These are manifestations—and one could give many more—of what is an undoubted development and one which, I hope, will not be arrested by the situation in Indo-China.

Mr. HADASZ: Does this mean, Mr. Martin, that Canada envisages more cultural relationships and diplomatic representation with the countries of the Communist bloc?

The CHAIRMAN: May I ask Mr. Haidasz to repeat that question?

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, at what time will we adjourn?

The CHAIRMAN: That is for the Committee to decide; we have no more dinner recesses.

Mr. HADASZ: I have just one last question. In view of the Minister's statement, can it be taken that Canada envisages further cultural exchanges and diplomatic relations with the countries in the Communist bloc?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I believe that it is essential to have these kinds of contacts if we are going to break down the barriers. At the same time this will

afford us an opportunity of impressing on the world the importance of recognizing the difficult position of many of the peoples of Eastern Europe under Communist domination.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn may I refer to my motion although I know we cannot discuss it now? I brought up this question of hate literature and I have been given some advice about the form of a motion which I would like to put on the record so that it can be dealt with at the next meeting of the Committee: It reads as follows:

That this Committee seeks from the House an order that this Committee's present terms of reference be extended to enable it to further study the problems of hate literature and genocide, referred by the House at the last session to this Committee, and to make recommendations thereon; and that the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the External Affairs Committee in 1964-65 on these matters, be referred to this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Are you withdrawing your previous motion?

Mr. BREWIN: I am withdrawing my previous motion. This is an improved variety of the same motion.

The CHAIRMAN: Does the seconder agree to the withdrawal of the first motion?

Mr. WALKER: Yes, and I will second this one. Can we not deal with it now?

Mr. NUGENT: No. I object to it on a point of order and I would like to discuss it.

Mr. BREWIN: I will not urge that it be dealt with now but I would ask that it be dealt with at the earliest possible opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you gentlemen, thank you Mr. Secretary of State. The meeting is adjourned.

APPENDIX "F"

UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

DC/222

3 June 1965

DRAFT RESOLUTION

Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Finland, Ghana, India, Japan, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, Togo, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

The Disarmament Commission,

Having considered the report dated 17 September 1964 of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee submitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the nineteenth session of the General Assembly,

Reaffirming the ultimate and continuing responsibility of the United Nations for disarmament,

Noting with regret that during 1964 despite the efforts made by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee no specific agreements were reached either on general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension, or halting and reversing the arms race,

Deploing that, notwithstanding General Assembly resolutions 1762 (XVII) and 1910 (XVIII), nuclear weapon tests have taken place and also that no agreement has been reached on the "discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", which is one of the stated objectives of the partial test-ban treaty,

Considering that the memorandum of 14 September 1964 submitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, represents a fair and sound basis for the conduct of negotiations towards removing the remaining differences for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty,

Convinced that failure to conclude a universal treaty or agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to the most serious consequences,

Deeply conscious of the urgency of making early progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and of reaching agreement on measures which would facilitate the attainment of that goal,

Bearing in mind the proposals made at its present session for measures to reduce international tension and halt and reverse the arms race, and also at the meeting of the Organization of African Unity and the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries,

Recalling the principle that a substantial part of the resources that will be released through disarmament should be devoted to the economic and social

development of the developing countries, thus contributing to the evolution of a safer and better world,

1. *Reaffirms* the call of the General Assembly upon all States to become parties to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and to abide by its spirit and provisions;

2. *Recommends* that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should:

(a) reconvene as early as possible to resume as a matter of urgency its efforts to develop a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and to consider all proposals for measures to relax international tension and halt and reverse the arms race, including those submitted to the Disarmament Commission at its present session;

(b) consider as a matter of priority the question of extending the scope of the partial test-ban treaty to cover underground tests;

(c) also accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures;

(d) keep in mind the principle of converting to programmes of economic and social development of the developing countries a substantial part of the resources gradually released by the reduction of military expenditures;

Requests the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to report to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly during its twentieth session on the progress made in respect of the above recommendations.

APPENDIX "G"

UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT

DC/221

3 June 1965

Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and

Zambia. DRAFT RESOLUTION.

The Disarmament Commission,

Recognizing the paramount importance of disarmament as one of the basic problems of the contemporary world and that its solution should be sought in a world-wide framework,

Convinced that a world disarmament conference would provide powerful support to the efforts which are being made to set in motion the process of disarmament and for securing the further and steady development of this process by formulating proposals and guidelines in the spirit of the Declaration adopted at the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, with a view to speeding up general and complete disarmament under effective international control and thus contributing to the relaxation of international tension;

1. *Affirms* the proposal adopted at the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in October 1964 for the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited;

2. *Recommends* that the General Assembly give urgent consideration to the above-mentioned proposal at its twentieth session.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES
OF
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Third Session—Twenty-sixth Parliament

1965

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: MR. JOHN R. MATHESON.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 3

MONDAY, JUNE 21, 1965

Main Estimates (1965-66) of the Department
of External Affairs

WITNESS:

The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs
and Acting Prime Minister.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1965

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. John R. Matheson

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and Messrs.

Bélanger,
Brewin,
Brown,
Deachman,
Douglas,
Dubé,
Forest,
Gelber,

Haidasz,
Klein,
Konantz (Mrs.),
Lachance,
MacEwan,
Mandziuk,
Martineau,

McIntosh,
Nugent,
Patterson,
Pugh,
Regan,
Walker,
*Winkler—24.

*Replaced by Mr. Churchill on Friday, June 18.

M. Slack,
Committee Officer.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

FRIDAY, June 18, 1965.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Churchill be substituted for that of Mr. Winkler on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Attest.

LEON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

MONDAY, June 21, 1965.

(4)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 4:50 p.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Matheson, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Brewin, Churchill, Douglas, Dubé, Gelber, Haidasz, Klein, Lachance, Mandziuk, Martineau, Matheson, McIntosh, Nugent, Pugh, Regan and Walker. (16)

In attendance: The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs and Acting Prime Minister.

The Committee resumed consideration of Item 1 of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs.

The Minister made a statement relating to the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations and the solvency of the United Nations, referred to Canada's views on these issues and was examined thereon.

During the Minister's presentation, members received copies of the report of the Secretary General and the President of the General Assembly to the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations of the U.N. General Assembly, dated May 31, 1965.

The Chairman requested the members to give consideration to the reduction of the quorum.

At 5:55 p.m., the examination of the Minister still continuing, the Committee adjourned until 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday, June 22nd.

M. Slack,
Committee Officer.

EVIDENCE

● (4:50 p.m.)

MONDAY, June 21, 1965

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I present Mr. Martin, the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Hon. PAUL MARTIN (*Secretary of State for External Affairs*): I promised today I would deal with the general situation in the United Nations. I already have made an announcement today about a Canadian voluntary contribution to help restore the solvency of the United Nations.

I mentioned in the House the other countries which were joining together in seeking to provide some financial assistance to the United Nations, I said that in addition to Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland and Norway, I anticipated that New Zealand and Finland would soon make contributions. I have learned since making this announcement in the House that Finland has agreed to put up \$500,000.

I should like to describe the circumstances which led to the decisions of these countries. It will be recalled that, before adjourning on February 18, the 19th Session of the General Assembly established a special committee on peacekeeping operations, a committee of 33 nations. This committee concluded its first round of meetings on June 15 and will reconvene in August. The committee was concerned primarily with the issue which caused the adjournment of the 19th Session; that is, the question of whether the loss of vote sanction contained in Article 19 of the Charter should be applied to those countries whose arrears in payments for past peacekeeping operations equal or exceed the amount of their assessed contributions for the preceding two years. These countries are chiefly the Communist countries and France. The biggest indebtedness to the United Nations in this category is owing by the Soviet Union.

I regret to say that the committee was unable to reach any agreement on this issue and that because this issue has dominated its proceedings, it was unable to explore in detail the wider issues of the authorization, control and financing of peacekeeping operations.

I wish that my officials would distribute now or later for the convenience of the members of the Committee the report of the Secretary General on the deliberations of the committee of 33. It is not very encouraging reading. It shows that little progress has been made in meeting a situation that could very well make it impossible for the General Assembly to meet next September on substantive questions. I believe that such a situation must not be allowed to arise.

The principal issues at stake deserve examination. First, there is the dispute about the applicability of Article 19 of the Charter to those countries in arrears. The Soviet Union has said it is prepared to make a voluntary contribution to help clear away the accumulated debt of the United Nations provided the question of Article 19 is not raised. The United States believes that the Soviet Union must pay its arrears before it will give any commitment

to set aside Article 19. This was the position of Canada, as well. However, I am firmly of the view that there are strong reasons now that at the next General Assembly we must take a more flexible position. However neither the government of the United States nor that of the Soviet Union has yet indicated a disposition to withdraw from the firm positions they have taken. It was for this reason that a group of countries, including Canada, have decided to make unconditional voluntary contributions in the hope that this action will ease the financial crisis and aid in the settlement of the wider issue involving Article 19. It is my hope that the kind of initiative that was taken in New York on Friday and Saturday, and confirmed by our ambassador with U Thant this afternoon, may create a better atmosphere. I hope it will result in a climate where we can speak more optimistically of a settlement of the Article 19 controversy when the committee of 33 meets sometime in August. I hope that the initiative taken by these countries will be supported by other countries who believe in the United Nations. I hope that as a result of this action the Soviet Union, the Communist European countries, France and other nations in arrears, will provide the necessary resources to enable the United Nations to meet its past obligations and that this, in turn, will set in motion a negotiation that might once and for all settle the constitutional problem involved in peacekeeping.

The other area of the dispute—the first being Article 19—relates to future arrangements for peacekeeping. Most Western countries and some of the non-aligned countries believe, as we do, that while the Security Council has the primary responsibility for authorizing peacekeeping actions, the General Assembly must maintain the right, formally spelled out in the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950, to recommend peacekeeping actions when the Security Council is prevented from reaching agreement.

It is a fact that in the Charter of the United Nations the primary responsibility for keeping the peace rests with the Security Council. This is apparent certainly in the enforcement sections of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The Soviet Union and France take the view that it is a serious violation of the Charter and of the spirit of the Charter in any way to withdraw any of the exclusive powers that the Security Council, in their judgment, has alone the power to exercise. The government of France takes a strong position in this regard. There are some countries, notably India, that have in recent days given indications of an inclination to modify their stands and to recognize that the only way out of our problem is to agree that the Security Council alone has responsibility for peacekeeping operations. The government of the United States and the government of Britain have not taken this position; they have said that the primary responsibility is one for the Security Council, but that there must reside in the General Assembly some residual authority in the absence of action by the Security Council to establish and deal with peacekeeping arrangements.

● (5:00 p.m.)

The Soviet Union takes the view that the Assembly does not have the right to recommend military action of any kind or, so far as I can see, the sending even of military observers to trouble spots. The government of France and some of the non-aligned countries do not go quite so far as this, but nevertheless agree with the Soviet Union that the Assembly cannot recommend any action involving the use of armed force.

In addition there is the disagreement of course about the financing of these peacekeeping operations. Both the Soviet Union and France argue that only the

Security Council can decide what is the desirable method of financing peacekeeping operations. Both admit, however, that the Security Council might decide in certain circumstances that compulsory assessment of all members is the appropriate method. At other times it might decide that voluntary contributions are appropriate or that the parties concerned should pay. For instance, in the peacekeeping action in the Yemen, to which Canada and Yugoslavia contributed, the cost of that operation was provided for by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. In the case of Cyprus the operation is paid for in respect of some countries out of the voluntary funds of the U.N. and in the case of Ireland and Canada out of contributions made directly by the two countries for the maintenance of their own forces.

Some countries, including ours, have supported the view that compulsory assessment of all the nations should be the norm for all peacekeeping operations and that the apportionment of this assessment amongst members should be decided by the General Assembly. We take the position that the only way to have a successful realization of the collective security principle is through this method of compulsory assessment or a common assessment so that all the members in the organization bear their fair share. This would be determined in relation to their financial capacity to pay in respect of those operations which are regarded by the Security Council as being appropriate to meet a situation where there is a threat to the peace or a violation of the peace.

As I said a moment ago in talking about the position we took last year in common with that of the United States, if we are going to get out of this dilemma and if we are going to expect the General Assembly to function, we have to look for some compromise. I am hopeful that one will be found. The contribution we have made today with other countries is intended to try to create the necessary climate toward this end.

Finally, there is no agreement about how forces for peacekeeping operations should be raised. The Soviet Union, France and some other governments would prefer that agreements be worked out between the Security Council and member governments to cover the types and sizes of national contingents to be held in readiness for peacekeeping duties, such as stipulated in Article 43 and the immediately following articles of the Charter.

The members of the committee will recall when the United Nations was set up it was envisaged in Article 43 that the Security Council would have at its disposal military representatives of the countries represented by the five powers and that this group in turn would serve as the genesis for permanent peacekeeping arrangements which would be continuously under the supervision of this military staff committee. The five powers have their military representatives there now who serve as a sort of a United Nations Chiefs of Staff body. However, they really have no work to do. This is largely because of the intransigent position taken by the Soviet Union with regard to the fulfilment of the Charter obligations. It was contemplated that such forces would operate under the direction of the Military Staff Committee. The Military Staff Committee would recommend to the Council who should command the United Nations force in each instance.

Now, these proposals have not been directly challenged by other members of the committee because they are clearly based on the United Nations Charter; but it is common knowledge that the Security Council was unable to agree

on the kinds and size of forces to be raised under Article 43 when it considered the matter in 1946 and 1947.

There has been no further attempt to reach agreement. Instead the United Nations has been able to raise the necessary forces on an ad hoc basis, with the Secretary General playing the part of the Military Staff Committee assisted by advisory committees or, as in the case of Cyprus, by the Security Council.

This ad hoc method has worked relatively well in about 15 cases. We feel, as do countries like the Scandinavian countries, Britain and the United States—some 30 countries in all, many of which came to our peacekeeping conference here last October—that it would be a pity to abandon this ad hoc approach in favour of undertaking negotiations which are bound to be long and complicated and uncertain of success. Furthermore, supervision of peacekeeping by the military staff committee would be a cumbersome business compared to present arrangements. Nevertheless, I want to say on behalf of Canada that we would have no objection to a new attempt being made to implement Article 43 if this were the general view of the committee. I have indicated this to the ambassador of the Soviet Union in a conversation I had with him not long ago, and I asked him to pass this on to his government.

I have referred to Canada's views on some of these issues. I would like briefly to summarize them. We have had the following objectives in mind:

First, to restore the United Nations to solvency and to be ready to contribute to any agreed scheme for voluntary payments for this purpose.

Second, to preserve as far as possible the principle of collective financial responsibility for operations authorized by the Security Council.

Third, to resist efforts to deny the residual responsibility of the General Assembly for recommending peacekeeping operations if the Security Council is unable to take action.

● (5:10 p.m.)

Fourth, to seek to maintain as broad a financial base as possible for the United Nations Emergency Force.

Fifth, to protect the present responsibilities of the Secretary-General for operational control of peacekeeping operations.

Sixth, finally, to accomplish these objectives on the basis of the broadest possible consensus of the members.

Now, I would be prepared to deal with any questions on this phase. I propose later to deal with the relationship between the peacekeeping functions of the United Nations and regional agencies; to consider, for instance, the situation of the forces of the Organization of American States in the Dominican Republic, and our concept of the character of a regional peacekeeping organization and its relation to the United Nations. However, perhaps I could stop at this point in order to deal with any questions that any member of the committee might want to put on this aspect of the problem.

Mr. MANDZIUK: Mr. Chairman, I wondered if the Minister, intentionally or through an oversight, did not refer to or make any comment on what cripples the work of the Security Council. Is it not the veto power that the five permanent members have?

Mr. MARTIN: I did not comment on it deliberately or unintentionally. I just did not feel that this aspect of the problem was essentially part of what I had to say today but I do not mind dealing with it.

There is no doubt that when the United Nations was formed it was generally admitted that its success depended on the capacity for collaboration of the five great powers. It was not only the Soviet Union but the United States which insisted on the right to exercise a veto in matters involving the jurisdiction of the Security Council.

However, it is a fact that the great powers, other than the Soviet Union, have shown the greatest restraint in the exercise of the veto. The veto undoubtedly has served as an obstacle in many situations involving the work of the Security Council.

We all remember the circumstances that made the establishment of the United Nations force in Korea possible. If it had not been for the fact that the Soviet Union had been absent, undoubtedly the establishment of that force by the Security Council would not have been possible. The Uniting for Peace Resolution has since served as a means for giving the General Assembly authority which was not expressly given to it in the Charter. You will not find in the Charter any specific mention made of the right or the authority of the Assembly to establish peace forces. This is the reasoning generally of a common law lawyer, proceeding by interpretation, by logical analysis. This is one of the reasons why the French are strongly of the view that no peace force can be established except by the Security Council.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Minister, I believe you said you are quite confident that a compromise could be reached; in fact, you left the impression with me that you had some idea in mind. I wonder if you would elaborate on that and also, in view of the Article itself, how can a compromise be reached with the major powers?

Mr. MARTIN: I believe what I meant to say was this: I hope, as a result of the voluntary contributions being made by a number of countries, that a climate will be created which will encourage the Soviet Union in particular to recognize the good intentions of countries which have contributed a great deal to UN peacekeeping and which are putting up this additional money in the hope that they might encourage substantial payment by other countries.

Now I must say, Mr. McIntosh, that the committee of the 33 has made hardly any progress. Perhaps I am not warranted in saying that there is going to be an agreement. However, I just cannot believe that the Soviet Union and France, knowing that the United Nations has been hamstrung now for two years,—unable to deal with substantive questions,—are prepared, in the face of some of the serious situations that prevail in Latin America and in Asia, to allow the United Nations to go on for a third year unable to deal with or discuss these questions.

Mr. McINTOSH: Can the Article be amended?

Mr. MARTIN: It can be amended but I am not suggesting that it should be amended. The meaning in Article 19 is clear. A country that is behind in its assessments under its terms loses the right to vote. A strict interpretation of Article 19 makes it clear, that defaulting countries will lose the right to vote. This was the position that we took last year and, because the United Nations did not want the withdrawal from the Assembly of any of the defaulting nations, including the Soviet Union, it was generally agreed that it would be unwise to have a confrontation. No country wanted to see the Soviet Union leave because the United Nations cannot function successfully unless the great powers do

participate. This was the view of Great Britain; this was the view of the United States and of Canada. It was for this reason that we proceeded with the consideration of some of the procedural questions by what was called a consensus procedure under which no vote was taken. However, finally, in the month of February, you will remember the delegation of Albania, a country ideologically closely attached to the Chinese People's Republic, insisted on business as usual, which meant that a vote would have to be taken.

A number of countries faced with this situation—and no one could prevent Albania from proceeding as usual—decided to take issue with the position taken by Albania. This would not be regarded as in any way violating the position they took with regard to the implications of Article 19. We made a statement, along with other delegations, along this line.

What I am saying now is that we must get on with the business of the U.N. This will not necessarily mean that we do not regard Article 19 as still having the integrity which we attached to it at the last Assembly. However, we do not propose to make an issue of it at this time so that we can, as a result of a compromise, get on with the business of the United Nations. I am hopeful that if we take this position we might be able to encourage the defaulting countries to make substantial payment. If this is done, then the climate will be set to negotiate a long term solution with regard to the procedures for carrying on these peacekeeping operations. That is our objective and I do not know whether we can succeed.

● (5:20 p.m.)

Mr. McINTOSH: No vote can be taken until this Article is left out?

Mr. MARTIN: No. I would say we will not insist on the application of Article 19. A vote has already been taken in the case of the intervention by Albania. We have made our reservations known. We will simply say to the defaulting countries, "Make substantial payments. We do not have to make any payments; we have made additional payments. Let us then proceed *de novo* for the future." This is a compromise. It could be described as a retreat, if you will. However, I believe now, after careful consideration—and I think most countries in the United Nations now take this position—that this is a desirable and necessary thing for us to do.

Mr. MANDZIUK: May I ask the Minister whether the voluntary contributions that he hopes the countries will make, such as the one Canada has offered, will go to the general fund of the Assembly or to pay for the indebtedness for the Congo and other peacekeeping operations?

Mr. MARTIN: That is right.

Mr. MANDZIUK: They would form two separate accounts, I imagine.

Mr. MARTIN: The contributions are intended to take care of the indebtedness arising out of the Congo operation, particularly, and operations that have to do with peacekeeping, in connection with which the Soviet Union and the French, among other countries, have said they have no obligation to pay.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Brewin.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Martin to clarify the situation for me in this respect. As I understand it, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations is not likely to solve the basic constitutional issues for quite a little while. It is hard to say exactly how long.

Mr. MARTIN: That is my judgment.

Mr. BREWIN: Then what you are saying is that during the interim period, when the Special Committee is coming up with the final solution, the application of Article 19 would be waived but without prejudice to the different positions taken by different countries?

Mr. MARTIN: Without prejudice to future application to Article 19, yes. We have already made that reservation.

I would go so far as to say that, having exercised the vote on the Albanian initiative, the principle has been settled; but it was settled with a number of countries, including Canada, making the reservation that we voted in this particular way for this purpose without establishing a precedent and only because we wanted to meet the disturbing intervention made by Albania.

Mr. BREWIN: Do I understand that the United States, for example, will be willing in September, when the issue comes up all over again and when it comes to a vote, temporarily to waive the application of Article 19?

Mr. MARTIN: I do not know. The United States has not indicated the position it proposes to take. We have had some conversations with them, but their position has not been finally stated.

My own view—and I have told this to the United States—is that we, the United Nations, cannot afford to have a repetition of the situation we had last December and last January. We have come to this conclusion with great regret because the United States has been a very loyal member of the United Nations, one of its mainstays, along with other countries. I have canvassed the situation, and I am sure that the position we have taken is now the overwhelming sentiment in the organization. I do not know what the final position of the United States will be: I was going to say that I sincerely hope it will recognize what I think is now inevitable; I believe it will; but I have no right to say that.

Mr. BREWIN: Is it not a fact that a good many rather distinguished United States Senators—Senators Dirksen and Mansfield, for example—have clearly indicated their view that their country, the United States, should take a more flexible attitude with regard to the application of Article 19?

Mr. MARTIN: That is right. Senator Dirksen made a speech the other day, which I read last Friday, on this very point.

I have come to this view not without some reluctance. You were on our delegation, Mr. Brewin, and you remember how strongly I felt about this. We had many discussions in our common room at night. You and others, I felt very keenly about this, I do now. But I think we have to take into account the situation in the world at the present time. My own view is that the peace of the world largely depends now on the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. There is a great division of opinion between China and the Soviet Union. There is a great desire to see peace talks begun about the situation in Viet Nam. We have our own views of what are the influences that could be brought to bear on Hanoi.

Having in mind the great dangers involved in the situation in Indo-China, I think it would be useful for us to try to develop a posture that will bring the positions of the West and the Soviet Union closer together. I do not believe it is possible, of course, to marry our respective ideological positions; that is

not what I am suggesting. I think these two nuclear powers recognize the dangers, and that if we can find some accommodation in the problems that face the United Nations, this might prove to be a very important factor in meeting some of the problems that face the world at the present time and that currently are facing the Prime Ministers at the Commonwealth meetings.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Pugh.

Mr. PUGH: Mr. Martin, you mentioned Article 43 and the possibility of a general agreement. In the event that a general agreement were finally reached, would one power be able to exercise a veto in the Security Council under Article 43?

Mr. MARTIN: Oh, yes, the Soviet Union would insist, as would the other great powers, on the veto. I do not believe it is constitutionally correct for any of the great powers to exercise a veto in respect of procedural questions; but certainly with regard to substantive matters there is no doubt that they have the right to exercise the veto. They will insist, all of them, on the right to exercise it in given situations. However, the Soviet Union has used it frequently and has abused its right in this respect.

Ideally, the right of the great powers to exercise the veto is undesirable: undoubtedly, all nations should be alike. But we have to recognize the practicalities of the world in which we live. These five powers represent the military might or the great proportion of the military might of the world. Without their co-operation and their participation a United Nations would not be possible. In the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944, prior to the agreement of the signatories to the Charter in San Francisco in 1945, it was clear that the great powers would insist on the right of veto. Subsequently, this insistence was not only made clear by the Soviet Union but by the United States and by the others.

I hope that with the evolution of time, and the process of internationalization which I think is inevitable in the kind of interdependent world we live in, we might see the gradual withdrawal of this special privilege that has been accorded to the great powers; but at the present time it is not practical to envisage any erosion of the veto power.

● (5:30 p.m.)

Mr. PUGH: If there were general agreement under Article No. 43 and we were faced with a situation such as we had in Cyprus when the Turks and the Greeks were ready to move in, we would find ourselves in exactly the same position, someone would have to set up a peacekeeping force. My mind goes back to the debate we had in the House regarding the setting up of a peacekeeping force for Cyprus. At that time, time was of the essence. Would we not be faced with exactly the same situation even though there was general agreement under Article No. 43?

Mr. MARTIN: Undoubtedly, but if the Soviet Union had not been so intransigent with regard to Article No. 43, I think we could have, on paper at least, built up more rapidly the kind of peace force that was envisaged, for instance, by General Eisenhower in 1958, and by others around that time. However, you are quite right that this would not have altered the fact that any one of the great powers could still, by use of the veto, have made impossible the establishment of a particular peace force. For instance, in the case of Cyprus no veto was exercised. In March of 1964, the Soviet Union did not vote for the establishment of the Cyprus force; it abstained. In the case of the establishment of the observation force in the Yemen in 1963, a formal meeting of the Council was not held at all.

What was done was that the Secretary General, fearing the exercise of the veto, simply passed around a report which indicated that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic were prepared to pay for the cost of this operation and that, if no objection was registered to the presentation of this report, he was going to assume, through what they called the consensus procedure, that there would be no objection.

And so they had to resort to these various devices to establish these operations. I am afraid that until such time as the Soviet Union will give in on the position it takes with regard to the exclusive powers of the Security Council we may have to resort to these ad hoc arrangements for future peace-keeping operations. However, this is better than nothing, and if we can get the situation back on the rails and avoid being placed in the financial position in which we have been placed in Cyprus, so much the better. It is certainly not satisfactory now that the countries which are contributing to the peace force should be among those who had traditionally been taking on this responsibility, practically the same countries each time. It is not fair nor is it helping to build a collective world peace organization to have the same countries obliged each time to put up their own money and to maintain their own forces in the name of the United Nations. That is what Ireland and Canada are doing in Cyprus. Finland, Sweden and Denmark are contributing men but, because of their financial situation, they consider that they must ask for repayment out of a voluntary fund that is being contributed to by a number of countries, notably Great Britain and the United States. This is admittedly an unsatisfactory arrangement and I do not believe it is the kind of arrangement that can go on indefinitely, but there would have been no other way of establishing an international force.

Mr. PUGH: If a peacekeeping force were set up, as you mentioned, right at the beginning under the Security Council, what would be its size and type if we were again faced with a situation such as we had in Cyprus? I am interested in the composition of the force. Suppose, ideally, this force were set up, would we then have to have the agreement, for instance, of Cyprus in the case that I mentioned, regarding the composition of this force; that is, what troops would come on the soil of Cyprus and what would be acceptable to the Cypriots? Do you envisage the Security Council stating "This is the peacekeeping force going on your soil" regardless of its composition?

Mr. MARTIN: If I understand your question, I do not believe we can at this stage establish a peace force against the wish of the country concerned. The Security Council establishes the force. It decides upon the method of financing the force. That is one thing. However, it cannot send that force to a country—to Cyprus in this instance—against the wishes of that country. Some day I hope that the world will evolve in its process of internationalization whereby, just as we have succeeded in buying off the vengeance in domestic national communities, we will be able to buy off the vengeance, to apply Mr. Justice Holmes' phrase, in the international sphere, and that we will have evolved to such a point that no country would dare refuse to permit the U.N. police power to come in and deal with situations in an area that is threatened. However, at this stage we cannot consider imposing a police force on a country. That is one of the disabilities of the U.N. in the case of the Cyprus peace force.

First of all, it was limited in size. The government of Cyprus would not permit a force larger than one with a maximum of 7,000 men. It would not allow contributions from certain countries. It refused to accept certain countries in Europe as participants. Also the United Nations had to negotiate the terms of the operation of the force. You will remember the difficulties which we had over the powers of the force. These were great difficulties and they were regrettable but it was the best that could be obtained in all of the circumstances. I think all of us were wise in accepting these limitations even though they involved difficult negotiations, and sometimes humiliating ones, for the United Nations force. However, I am satisfied, from what I know and from what I have seen, that the United Nations force in Cyprus has perhaps been the most successful of all of the U.N. peacekeeping operations, with the exception of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Gaza.

Mr. PUGH: May I ask one more question? It is in regard to the cost to Canada.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Pugh, I wonder if you could ask that question towards the end because there are many questioners awaiting a chance to ask their questions.

Mr. PUGH: It concerns the cost to Canada and it is a short question. Mr. Martin, I was wondering what extra cost would be involved in sending such a force to Cyprus in addition to the cost of maintaining those troops in Canada?

Mr. MARTIN: I have those figures right here. From March 1964 to June 26, 1965, the net out-of-pocket cost to Canada was \$5,166,000. From June 27, 1965 to December 1965—the force has just been renewed—the net out-of-pocket cost to Canada will be \$1,836,000. Assuming the force is called upon to stay in Cyprus until December 26, 1965, the total net out-of-pocket cost to Canada from the beginning will be roughly \$7 million. Of course this does not include what it would cost anyhow; this is the additional cost. The total cost of the force—I do not have that total cost; but that has been ours.

● (5:40 p.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Walker.

Mr. WALKER: I just wanted to ask the Minister if he thought it was a fair statement to make. I get lost in what I consider to be not the real reasons for the inability of the United Nations to function. But is it fair to say that, generally, many of the members of the United Nations now are more determined to hold on to their national sovereignty and their ambitions than they are determined for peace? Is that not the crux of the question?

Mr. MARTIN: Well, Article 2, subsection 7 of the Charter says in substance that the organization is made up of sovereign states, and that no interference in the domestic jurisdiction of a country shall be permitted. The article reads as follows in these terms:

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle

shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

It is important to note that nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. So that it is an organization of independent powers, but I think that generally speaking there is a recognition on the part of most member states that the United Nations can only succeed if there is a recognition that there is to be some diminution in sovereignty of the countries, and I think this is generally so. But the difficulty is that we all look at things differently. What we in the West have done—and particularly in the British Commonwealth and in the Scandinavian countries—is to attach importance to peacekeeping that is not shared by many other countries.

I refer to new countries of Africa,—and I would not want them to misinterpret my words—they do not attach the same importance to this that we do. Their great concern is about bread and butter. They are concerned with what the United Nations is going to do to assist them to raise their standard of living.

We in the department are now engaged in a very careful examination of our own position from their point of view, trying to find ways and means of making our contribution, if necessary, more generous, and in trying to understand their problems in the hope that by taking a global position we might encourage them to see the importance of avoiding situations which threaten the peace, by enlisting their interest, and by causing them to bring pressure, for instance, on the Soviet Union. The countries in Africa have great influence today on the Soviet Union, and I think that if they saw the problem as we see it, and if we are able to see their problems, to recognize they might have a great influence in bringing the Soviet Union the need to reach some agreement for instance on the problem of Article 19.

Mr. WALKER: From the Canadian point of view there should be increasing emphasis on the worthiness of economic grants in aid equalling in importance the military.

Mr. MARTIN: I believe this is something we have to do and something we are in the process of doing.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Douglas.

Mr. DOUGLAS: I would like to ask the Minister if he has any reason to hope that the defaulting nations might make some contribution towards this \$100 million which is required to meet the accounts that have been made up for the peacekeeping operations?

Mr. MARTIN: Last fall the Soviet Union—and I talked to Mr. Gromyko myself about this—gave, I think, grounds for thinking that they might make a payment. The question is what would a substantial payment for the Soviet Union be. There was talk that they might pay \$5 million, or that they might pay \$15 million. I think that anything less than \$15 million by the Soviet Union would not have been regarded as a substantial payment, and I would have hoped that they would have made payment of at least \$22 million.

Mr. DOUGLAS: Is that the amount that would have been assessed had they paid the amount in the regular way?

Mr. MARTIN: No.

Mr. DOUGLAS: What would it have been?

Mr. MARTIN: It would have been more than that. They are indebted to something in the neighbourhood of \$60 million.

Mr. DOUGLAS: And what about France?

Mr. MARTIN: That would be \$15 million. The Soviet Union was prepared to meet payment of an amount in the neighbourhood of \$22 million only on the condition that the United States would not raise the issue of Article 19. And that is why I think that if there was not a strict adherence to the legal position they might make an accommodation.

I should add this for completion, when I was in France not very long ago I discussed this matter with the French foreign minister. This was just after he had had five days of talks with Mr. Gromyko. The French take basically the same position as the Soviet Union. However they were very optimistic about the outcome of this situation. But their approach procedurally is different from ours. They believe that if we could agree on future permanent arrangement, the question of past indebtedness would fall into place. I hope that this optimism is warranted. But I have grave doubts that it is warranted, myself. I cannot believe that it will be possible to convince the majority of members of the United Nations, including Canada, that the General Assembly should be denied any authority whatsoever in the matter of peacekeeping arrangements.

I do not think it will be possible to get the majority of the members to agree that only the Security Council can deal with these things.

Mr. DOUGLAS: I have two very short questions. First, if this voluntary contribution does not reach the sum of the \$100 million required, what is the next step? And second, assuming that \$100 million is raised by voluntary contribution, is this payable against defaulting nations indebtedness so that Article 19 no longer operates?

Mr. MARTIN: The Russians would not agree under any circumstances that any moneys that they pay are to be related to any past indebtedness in respect of peacekeeping operations.

The money could be paid by them and it could be dealt with by the Secretary General in a manner which would permit him to say that in general accounting procedures this would be assured. It seems regrettable that we have to resort to this device, but that is the situation.

I am sorry, Mr. Douglas, but what was your first question?

● (5:50 p.m.)

Mr. DOUGLAS: If the voluntary contributions do not meet the \$100 million indebtedness what is the next step?

Mr. MARTIN: Well, first of all, the total indebtedness is over \$100 million. I said over \$100 million but it is \$108 million.

Mr. DOUGLAS: The amount you read out this afternoon would hardly make a dint in that.

Mr. MARTIN: Oh, no, though there will be additions. The principle of these contributions is double the nation's assessment. We put up \$4 million. If we were going to support the principle of assessment for this voluntary purpose, our total would be \$6.3 million. I would not hesitate to recommend that total if the occasion is warranted. Britain has put up \$10 million. Its possible assessment would be \$14.4 million. But, even these additional amounts will

still be far short of the \$108 million. But, at least it will have been an effort and I would not regard it as a wasted effort. I am sure there will be other countries coming in. If countries like Iceland, Finland and New Zealand are able to pay there will be yet other countries which will recognize the importance of making contributions. I would be very surprised if the United States would not make a substantial payment; I do not know. I would hope, and if I do not spell this out the committee will believe I have good reasons, that this initiative will cause the Soviet Union to recognize how important it is that the United Nations be able to discuss the serious situation that threatens the world at this time; we are all anxious to see an improvement in the situation in Viet Nam, will welcome anything that will bring about a closer understanding between us and the Soviet Union in this matter.

Mr. DOUGLAS: The committee will agree with the Minister that there is nothing to be lost and much to be gained by trying.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, before we proceed I would like to know what time you anticipate adjourning?

Mr. MARTIN: It looks now as though I will not be going to New York tonight; but, the Secretary General would like to speak to me and I would like to do that before 6 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN: Will you be available tonight, Mr. Martin?

Mr. MARTIN: Well, I do not know what I will be doing yet. In any event, I would prefer not to attend tonight. We could meet tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN: Would it be the pleasure of the Committee to meet at 9.30 tomorrow morning?

Mr. NUGENT: No, Mr. Chairman, I would prefer a meeting in the afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN: Would it be agreeable if notices are issued for 3.30 p.m., which means at the conclusion of Orders of the Day tomorrow.

Mr. WALKER: Would you make it 4 o'clock?

The CHAIRMAN: We will send out the notices for 4 o'clock.

Gentlemen, I would like to point out one problem to all members of the committee, and I am not being critical about this.

Previously we had a Standing Committee on External Affairs with 35 members and a quorum of 10. You will recall that no matter what subject we were discussing it was always a problem, because of commitments of a good number of members, some of them being out of the country and so on, to actually man that committee to full strength. We had a quorum of 10 in respect of a membership of 35. Under the new rules it is a very great burden to get a quorum of 13 out of 24 members. Under the new membership we are 11 members short and we have to have three more before we can start a meeting.

Mr. NUGENT: I wonder who put in that rule change?

The CHAIRMAN: There has been an excellent attendance today. We had two thirds of our members present for this important deliberation this afternoon.

Mr. PUGH: Three quarters of them Conservatives.

Mr. WALKER: Do your arithmetic right.

The CHAIRMAN: The question that I am asking members to consider is whether or not this is wise and if we should not consider the possibility of a smaller quorum, perhaps a quorum of 10.

Mr. NUGENT: You would have to get special permission from the House to have that rule changed.

The CHAIRMAN: I would ask that members give this matter serious consideration and we will discuss it later.

We will adjourn until 4 p.m. tomorrow.

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OF
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Third Session—Twenty-sixth Parliament

1965

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: MR. JOHN R. MATHESON.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 4

TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 1965

Main Estimates (1965-66) of the Department
of External Affairs

WITNESS:

The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs
and Acting Prime Minister.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1965

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. John R. Matheson

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and Messrs.

Bélanger,
Brewin,
Brown,
Churchill,
Deachman,
Douglas,
Dubé,
Forest,

Gelber,
Haidasz,
Klein,
Konantz (Mrs.),
Lachance,
MacEwan,
Mandziuk,

Martineau,
McIntosh,
Nugent,
Patterson,
Pugh,
Regan,
Walker—24.

M. Slack,
Committee Officer.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, June 22, 1965
(5)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 4.10 p.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Matheson, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Brewin, Churchill, Deachman, Dubé, Forest, Gelber, Lachance, MacEwan, Martineau, Matheson, McIntosh, Nesbitt, Patterson, Pugh, Regan, Walker (16).

In attendance: The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs and Acting Prime Minister.

The Committee resumed consideration of Item 1 of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs.

Pursuant to notice given at sitting of June 17, Mr. Brewin moved, seconded by Mr. Walker, that this Committee seek from the House an order that this Committee's present terms of reference be extended to enable it to further study the problems of hate literature and genocide referred by the House at the last session to this Committee; to make recommendations thereon, and that the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the External Affairs Committee, 1964-65, on these matters, be referred to this Committee.

After discussion, the Committee agreed to amend the motion by deleting the words, "further study" and substituting therefor the words, "submit a report based on the previous evidence relating to".

It was agreed that further consideration of the motion, as amended, be deferred until Tuesday, June 29, to enable new members of the Committee to read the proceedings of the previous session relating to this subject-matter.

The Minister then made a statement on the relationship between United Nations peace-keeping and the performance of this function by regional organizations, and referred to the situation in the Dominican Republic and also Viet Nam.

At 5.45 p.m., the division bells having rung and the examination of the Minister still continuing, the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

M. Slack,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

TUESDAY, June 22, 1965

• (4:10 p.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I see a quorum.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, before we hear the Minister I wonder whether it would be possible to deal with a motion, notice of which I gave at the meeting previous to our last meeting. The motion was that we make a report to the House requesting the enlargement of our terms of reference to include the subject matter of hate literature which was dealt with at considerable length by this committee at a previous session.

The CHAIRMAN: May I read to the committee what has been handed to me as the exact motion:

That this Committee seeks from the House an order that this Committee's present terms of reference be extended to enable it to further study the problems of hate literature and genocide, referred by the House at the last session to this Committee, and to make recommendations thereon; and that the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the External Affairs Committee in 1964-65 on these matters, be referred to this Committee.

Mr. BREWIN: May I add that it was suggested by Mr. Nesbitt that this subject matter was one which would more appropriately go to the committee on Human Rights. However, as I look at the members of this committee, I find that only two or three members of that committee were members of this committee which heard the evidence, discussed the evidence and almost reached the stage of making a report; whereas on this committee there are quite a number of the members who already are seized of this matter. This matter once having been before the External Affairs Committee and the committee already having the necessary material before it, it would seem that this is the committee to deal with the matter.

Mr. WALKER: I second the motion. This subject matter was referred to this committee by the House and we are requesting very little more time to arrive at some decision. I would second the motion and hope that we can settle it now.

The CHAIRMAN: Is the meeting ready for the question?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, there are some persons on this committee who were not here last year. Surely we are entitled to an examination of the evidence which was presented before the committee. As a matter of fact when the subject came up in the House on a Private Member's Bill I thought it was quite wrong to refer hate literature to the External Affairs Committee. It should have gone to a committee which deals with the Department of Justice, because if action is to be taken on hate literature it has to be taken through the Department of Justice.

I think it is wrong to have this motion put to us as it is now without further consideration. At the moment I do not approve of this being rushed in so hastily nor that this committee become responsible for continued discussion of this subject matter.

Mr. WALKER: It was the House which referred it to this committee in the first instance; that has been done. The reason at that time, as I understand it, was the relationship of this subject matter to Canada's being one of the signing nations to the United Nations Declaration.

Mr. DOUGLAS: The Declaration of Human Rights.

Mr. WALKER: This seemed to be the closest committee to that. Rightly or wrongly the subject matter has been gone into very thoroughly by this committee and I would hate to see that work wasted.

If I might, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say to Mr. Churchill that I for one am not pressing for a decision concerning the report that this committee may make, but I see nothing to be gained by delaying the question of whether the committee should go on with the subject matter which was looked into very deeply.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, at the last meeting I made my position on the matter quite clear. I think Mr. Brewin and Mr. Walker have one good point; that is, that probably better than half the members of this committee were members of the previous committee on External Affairs when this matter was discussed.

I remember at the time a number of us objected to having this subject matter sent to the committee on External Affairs, because we felt it was not the correct forum for the discussion of this matter. However, it was sent to the External Affairs Committee. One very valuable suggestion was made, I believe by Mr. Brewin, that the Department of External Affairs provide the committee with information concerning hate literature in other countries and its effect, and therefore the previous committee had some very valuable information.

In view of the fact that a number of the member of this committee were members of the previous committee on External Affairs, and in view of the fact that some of us have heard a number of witnesses, there certainly is some merit in this committee preparing some kind of a report. However, I would like to inquire of Mr. Brewin and Mr. Walker whether it is their intention that this committee continue to hear evidence, and perhaps evidence unrelated to external affairs, when there is in fact a Human Rights Committee set up? Or is it Mr. Brewin's and Mr. Walker's intention to merely make a recommendation on the evidence heard by the previous committee, and that that be the end of it, and any further discussion be referred to the Human Rights Committee or some other appropriate committee.

Mr. BREWIN: I thought sufficient evidence was taken previously to make a useful and valuable report. Personally I did not contemplate that we would go into an extended inquiry.

Mr. WALKER: I agree.

Mr. BREWIN: All the evidence taken before covered a broad field and it was transcribed so that it very readily could be made available to the members of the committee who were not present at that time. While the Chairman may

know of persons who may wish to make further representations, I had thought that there was sufficient material for us to make a useful report on what we have done to date.

My object in moving the motion was that what has been done should not be wasted. We should try to get an objective, valuable and constructive report as soon as possible from the material which is readily available. However, this should not exclude the possibility—if somebody wished to appear—of the matter being considered by the Steering Committee and if it so desired one or two additional witnesses might be heard; but it seems to me that from the six witnesses who gave evidence we have had a very good review and in addition we had the material from the other countries and we had a discussion of our international obligations.

Mr. REGAN: I shall speak very briefly in support of Mr. Brewin's motion, Mr. Chairman. I think since a number of the members of this committee were members of the previous committee, and if printed copies of the evidence of the previous committee are available to the new members, surely we have some sort of duty to the taxpayers to ensure that the study made of this matter during the previous session should not go to waste entirely. I think the evidence and the report that were made were very helpful. I think Mr. Brewin's motion is a very good one for that reason.

Mr. NESBITT: Would it not be possible to refer this evidence to the Human Rights Committee?

Mr. WALKER: For what reason?

Mr. NESBITT: It still seems to me that the question of hate literature, which is a very important subject and one in which I have a very active interest as I think hon. members know, should be referred to the proper slot.

Mr. PUGH: Mr. Chairman, why was a report not brought down on the information which had been presented?

● (4:20 p.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: I think the explanation for that, Mr. Pugh, is that it was doubtful at that period whether or not the committee would continue hearing evidence. There were probably a score of organizations that would have been pleased to make representation. At it happened, those people who came here were in each instance invited to attend by the committee. The evidence tended to be general in character. On one occasion we had first the senior representatives of the Department of External Affairs and we were guided to some extent by the Department with respect to people that were called by us.

I can quite visualize the logic of following this first series of witnesses with maybe many more. However, it was felt that what was done in the first instance as to gather general information and particularly as it related to the Department of External Affairs. The session came to an end before there was any opportunity of coming to a general conclusion, therefore the committee died.

Mr. PUGH: Yes. You decided, I suggest, to take the backlog of work and then come to a conclusion sufficiently to form a report. Possibly many meetings would have to be held and all the persons would be given a chance to say whether they wished to appear before a different committee.

The CHAIRMAN: In the steering committee there was some doubt whether any useful purpose would be served in continuing to hear evidence because the material that was made available to us through the hearings of Mr. Justice Dalton Wells who went into a fairly thorough investigation, at the request of the Postmaster General on the use of mails, furnished indirectly to the committee a most valuable body of evidence. I think I am expressing the views of the steering committee when I say they would have been quite happy if the hearings had been terminated by the Department of External Affairs at that point with some kind of general recommendation.

Mr. NESBITT: This is another question for clarification. As far as I am concerned, Mr. Chairman, I do not intend—if it is the wish of the committee—to press it to the point of causing a row. However, at the time did the Government not appoint two other committees of some sort to hear evidence when the former External Affairs Committee was also having hearings on the subject?

The CHAIRMAN: I do not think that there were some other groups. It is true that there was a special hearing of Mr. Justice Wells concerning John Ross Taylor and David Stanley. I think those were the two people.

Then, of course, there was a small committee of experts, I believe chaired by Dean Maxwell Cohen, the Dean of Law at McGill University, who was giving some confidential advice to the Minister of Justice. He had a committee under whom there were very eminent legal people who were concerned later on with civil liberties and the question of possible codification and alterations of the Criminal Code. I am not quite clear as to the terms of reference but certainly the feeling of our former Committee of External Affairs was that we were moving along independently. There was a feeling that we had exhausted our useful study of that subject.

Mr. PATTERSON: If the committee feels all the evidence that was necessary has been obtained and it is in a position now to draw up its report and recommendations, then I think it would be fine. However, if, on the other hand, it is anticipated there will be further representations, then I believe that the whole matter ought to be referred to the Committee on Human Rights. Therefore, the question now is whether we are prepared to draft a report on the basis of the evidence we have heard.

Mr. PUGH: Mr. Chairman, that was the point of my question. In other words, a little reading would not do some of us any harm. However, when you answered first you spoke of general and generality; you mentioned the words "general" and "generality" several times. Now I gather from your answer that there should have been more witnesses called. Possibly there are a number of people in Canada or other organizations who would like to appear before this committee, in which case it would extend the sittings of this committee measurably.

The CHAIRMAN: Certainly, speaking for myself, my view is that probably we have gone as far as we usefully can and there is no great virtue in calling in interested parties. One of the interesting things about the evidence that has been called by the previous committee is that in no instance have we had representations from an injured group. I think it is correct that this has been a discussion in principle and the people that have appeared have come

to us more or less in the capacity of experts, either legally, sociologically, psychiatrically and externally. I think on the basis of that we can come to some quite useful general conclusion.

Mr. WALKER: I think so.

Mr. CHURCHILL: What is the nature of the motion that is now before us? There is nothing in front of us.

The CHAIRMAN: That this committee seek from the House an order that this committee's present terms of reference be extended to enable it to further study the problems of hate literature and genocide referred by the House at the last session to this committee, to make recommendations thereon and that the relevant minutes and proceedings and evidence of the External Affairs Committee 1964-65 on these matters be referred to this committee.

Mr. BREWIN: On a point of order, I would be perfectly ready to see the motion amended to cut out that part about further study and add "to submit a report based on the previous evidence". I do not think we need any more evidence.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I think you should permit the members of this committee who were not members last year to have a chance to study and read the evidence that has been submitted to you before we make a decision on this.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: As has been mentioned, it may be that we would decide that the accumulated evidence should be referred to a different committee.

Mr. McINTOSH: Is this not a different committee altogether? How can we make a report on submissions given at the last session to the committee? I mean relations have been changed, your composition of the committee has been changed; the members have been changed. If last year's committee did not make a report that is their responsibility, not ours.

Mr. WALKER: I do not agree with that at all, Mr. McIntosh. The subject matter was referred to the External Affairs Committee last year by the House of Commons. The External Affairs Committee had their hearing and went fully into the subject matter. We were ready, right up to the time of the next meeting, to sit down and bring in some type of a report.

● (4:30 p.m.)

Mr. McINTOSH: What was the composition of last year's committee?

Mr. WALKER: What do you mean by the composition?

Mr. McINTOSH: How many members were on the committee last year and how many are on it now?

The CHAIRMAN: The Standing Committee formerly, as you will recall, was composed of 35 members of the House. That number has been reduced to 24. In the contraction of the committee to 24 members, it just happens that a very large percentage—

Mr. LACHANCE: At least 20 per cent, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Twenty of the 24 members of the present committee are members of the former committee.

Mr. McINTOSH: My interpretation of the rules is that this is a new committee and that it is just coincidental that there are on this committee 20 members from the previous committee.

The CHAIRMAN: This is so.

Mr. McINTOSH: Then how can we, a new committee, report on submissions of last year's committee?

Mr. WALKER: Because the great majority of the members of last year's committee are on this committee.

Mr. NESBITT: May I make just one point for clarification? Did not the last Committee on External Affairs make a final report?

Mr. WALKER: No, this is it.

Mr. NESBITT: Perhaps we could check that, Mr. Chairman. There was handed in a report of sorts.

Mr. BREWIN: There was a purely interim report; that is all.

Mr. NESBITT: Let us see what it was.

Mr. WALKER: Is there too much wrong—and I suggest this to those who perhaps do not feel this way—with asking the House to refer this matter to us so that the committee itself can discuss whether we want to send it to another committee.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That would be different.

Mr. WALKER: Let us get it here with the consent of the House so that we can discuss it.

Mr. NESBITT: There is a report.

Mr. WALKER: An interim report.

The CHAIRMAN: The report to the House, dated March 24, 1965, concludes as follows:

Your committee recommends that it be given an opportunity for further consideration of the advisability of Canada adopting similar legislation, and therefore, as the committee finds that it will not be able to complete its study of the subject matter of these bills at the current session of this Parliament, it recommends that the same subjects be referred to it early in the next session in order that the committee may continue its study of this very important matter.

Mr. WALKER: That report was tabled but not concurred in.

The CHAIRMAN: Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Nos. 34 to 39 inclusive, were appended.

Mr. BREWIN: That is just what I am asking for now.

Mr. CHURCHILL: All I am asking is that you give the new members on this committee a chance to see what was the evidence before the last committee.

The CHAIRMAN: As Mr. Churchill says, it would be unthinkable that this matter should be hurried through without all the transcripts—and there are only six—being furnished to every member of this committee and without giving them sufficient time to read the material.

Mr. PATTERSON: I think the point Mr. Churchill was raising was that before the decision was made on this motion before us, the new members should have an opportunity of perusing the material and ascertaining their attitude toward it.

The CHAIRMAN: Was that the point?

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is all I am asking.

Mr. PATTERSON: I would suggest that the matter be tabled until the next meeting or some future time so the material can be in the hands of the members of the committee.

Mr. McINTOSH: As a new member may I ask if this topic has been referred to this committee by the House.

Mr. BREWIN: No, that is what we are asking for.

Mr. GELBER: That is what we are talking about.

The CHAIRMAN: Estimates have been before the House already, and we were given notice two meetings ago by Mr. Brewin to the effect that it was his intention to bring this motion forward so that we, in our report, could ask leave to complete this matter within our terms of reference and to enlarge our terms of reference to this extent.

Mr. BREWIN: I think Mr. Churchill's request is not an unreasonable one and, with the consent of the seconder, I would ask that the motion be not now put. I would also ask that the clerk, or whoever has the material available, supply it to the new members of the committee so we can deal with it at an early date.

I want this matter dealt with. I think we can make a useful and valuable report on a subject that requires action.

Mr. LACHANCE: I second the motion.

Mr. BREWIN: We have young Nazis in my constituency who are sending out this material. I want to get action on it, but I am ready to withdraw the motion for the time being.

Mr. LACHANCE: I second it.

The CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the comments of Mr. Brewin, may I ask if it is agreed that the motion should be amended? I will ask the clerk to read the motion.

The CLERK: The motion reads:

That this Committee seek from the House an order that this Committee's present terms of reference be extended to enable it to submit a report based on the previous evidence relating to the problems of hate literature and genocide referred by the House at the last session to this Committee; to make recommendations thereon, and that the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the External Affairs Committee, 1964-65, on these matters, be referred to this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Is that in accordance with your wish, Mr. Brewin?

Mr. BREWIN: Yes.

Mr. LACHANCE: I second it.

Mr. WALKER: It has been seconded. Is this fair? We do not want to keep putting off the decision on which committee should handle the matter. If you wish to put it aside today, can we not make it a condition that we will come to a decision at the next meeting? Does this give you time, gentlemen?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I am just as much interested in this as anyone. I do not mind reading this material.

Mr. PUGH: When do we get it?

Mr. WALKER: I presume the clerk can give it to you tonight.

Mr. PATTERSON: Instead of saying that it will be dealt with at the next meeting, could you not set a period?

Mr. NESBITT: We never know when the next meeting is going to be called.

The CHAIRMAN: Can we say Thursday afternoon?

Mr. MARTINEAU: We do not sit on Thursday; it is St. Jean Baptiste day.

The CHAIRMAN: Tomorrow afternoon?

Mr. MACEWAN: No.

Mr. LACHANCE: Would Tuesday of next week be convenient?

The CHAIRMAN: May we have a meeting on Tuesday, June 29, at nine o'clock?

Mr. MACEWAN: If you serve us breakfast, Mr. Chairman, we will come at nine!

Mr. LACHANCE: Nine-thirty, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MACEWAN: You will have lots of company at nine o'clock, Mr. Chairman!

The CHAIRMAN: The Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Mr. MARTIN: Mr. Chairman, unless there are some other questions on what we were discussing yesterday I would like now to deal, as I indicated I would, with some of the problems as we see them involved in the relationship between the peacemaking functions of the United Nations and the regional agencies. What I had in mind particularly was the situation in the Dominican Republic, and the use that is being made of the Organization of American States' Peace Force. I would also like to make a comment on the proposal of the President of India in connection with a possible peacekeeping operation made up of Afro-Asian countries in respect of the situation in Viet Nam.

When I made my statement in the House of Commons on May 28 I referred to the decision of the Organization of American States to create an inter-American force to be sent to the Dominican Republic. I would like to remind the committee of what the Secretary-General of United Nations had to say in this connection on May 27. He spoke as follows:

It is far from my intention to question the jurisdiction or the competence of regional organizations in performing certain functions, in accordance with the constitutions laid down by those organizations. But, from the point of view of the functioning of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter, I think recent developments should stimulate some thought by all of us regarding the character of the regional organizations, the nature of their functions and obligations in relation to the responsibilities of the United Nations under the Charter.

● (4:40 p.m.)

I think that this statement of the Secretary General was an important one because, while we look now with some concern at unilateral action, we have to be careful that any action taken in the peacekeeping field by a regional

organization is not an instrument that is being used by a particular nation for purposes of meeting the problems that would be envisaged by it in what might be regarded as a unilateral action.

I would therefore like to try to explain our views regarding the relationship between United Nations peacekeeping and the performance of this function by regional organizations. But what I want to say assumes that there has arisen a situation, in the Dominican Republic or anywhere, which justifies international action in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

Article 52 (1) of the United Nations Charter provides that:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purpose, and Principles of the United Nations.

As far as I am aware the only peacekeeping operations that have taken place outside the United Nations have been the result of the accord of the Geneva powers in 1954 when they decided to set up one body in North and South Viet Nam, one body in Cambodia and one in Laos, all bearing the title International Control and Supervisory Commissions, of which Canada, India and Poland are members. Now, these are not para-military or military bodies although they have military personnel attached to them in varying numbers. The functions of these three bodies are different of course from the functions of the force in Cyprus or the force in the Gaza Strip, but they are supervisory, peacekeeping bodies of a different character. They are peacekeeping bodies set up outside the United Nations. They were set up because some of the powers at the Geneva Conference were not members of the United Nations and would not have been willing to sit under the auspices of the United Nations. It was not contrary to the United Nations that they should have made the decision that they did, but obviously the problem presented in the case of these Indo China Commissions is not the problem presented in the case of the peace force operating under the Organization of American States.

As I said, the Charter, through Article 52 (1) is explicit. There is nothing in the Charter that would preclude the setting up by the O.A.S. of a peace force. What is important is that such arrangements must be consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 53 of the Charter should also, I think, be referred to. It says:

The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for presenting further aggression by such a state.

In subsection 2 of Article 53 it is provided:

The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

The following two paragraphs of Article 52 encourage member states to settle their disputes peacefully by regional action first and require the Security Council to foster this principle. But as I have just indicated, the Charter also provides for appropriate Security Council action in respect of arrangements or in connection with agencies that are established for enforcement purposes, always, of course, under the authority of the Security Council.

"Enforcement action" under Chapter 7 of the Charter has never, I think, been satisfactorily defined. What we believe is that it refers to the use of armed force to deal with acts of aggression as envisaged in Chapter 7 of the Charter. There is of course no explicit reference in the Charter to peacekeeping as it has come to be known in the form of United Nations action in the Gaza Strip or in Cyprus or in some of the other peacekeeping operations. These forces—and this is one of the disputes that we have with the position taken by the Soviet Union—have not, strictly speaking, been concerned with enforcement action. Their function has been more preventive than forcible. They have been raised voluntarily and operate on the basis of the consent of the nations concerned.

There are two questions that are involved here: first, is there any reason to object to regional agencies performing the preventive peacekeeping role as it has been developed in the United Nations? All of the peacekeeping operations, apart from those in Indo-China, have been under the United Nations and have been performed by a United Nations body. I see nothing in the Charter to which any objection to such rule could properly be registered, providing always of course that it is consistent with the purposes and the principles of the United Nations. Not only do I see no objection, I think that the reverse is true. The precedents, of which there are few, point to the competence of the regional agency to investigate or ameliorate disputes. The Organization of American States has generally maintained its authority to deal with inter-American disputes and has tried to settle such disputes before referring them to the United Nations. Few Latin-American disputes have come before the Security Council, and no United Nations peacekeeping body has been set up in respect of inter-American disputes.

● (4:50 p.m.)

But I think it can be said that the Security Council has in practice always asserted, at any rate, the right, indeed the authority, to take what might be regarded as action involving concurrent jurisdiction.

The Security Council of the United Nations cannot be, and has not ever been, excluded from making recommendations about inter-American disputes, or with regard to the circumstances that are likely to create international tension.

So it would seem to us that the wisest view would be that the United Nations and regional agencies have a complementary role to play in peacekeeping developments; and it may be that one of the ways by which we will

be able to establish a greater support for peacekeeping activities is by recognizing the potential role of regional bodies, particularly in those areas of the world where there is a suspicion against the participation of certain member states.

It will be recalled that in the Suez operation there was a reluctance made manifest to the participation of certain forces from Canada, and the contribution made by Canada to the Congo operation was essentially functional, in that we sent signallers and not what might be regarded as para-combat units.

The Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, in 1954 said: "a policy giving full scope to the proper role of regional agencies can and should at the same time fully preserve the right of a member nation to a hearing under the Charter".

The implication of this is that the use of any "regional agency" should not be so unrelated to the Security Council of the United Nations as to deny any country in that region from making an appeal to the United Nations itself.

Second, there is the inter-American action in the Dominican Republic, one that I think must be dependent upon the declared or implied authorization of the Security Council.

Now, in that situation clearly the use of force was and is involved, but so too was the use of force involved in the Congo; and the United Nations operation was not considered to be enforcement action within the meaning of Chapter VII, as is contended by the Soviet Union.

In the present case, in the Dominican Republic, the action would appear to involve the interposition of force between factions within a state and is therefore similar to the role of the United Nations force in the Congo, as a result of action taken by Katanga province, and likewise the situation in Cyprus where the force is interposed between two communities that are made up of citizens of the same state.

Now this problem is not free from some difficulties. But I think it is fair to say for purposes of our discussion that the O.A.S. is not involved in the Dominican Republic in enforcement action. These are legalistic considerations, I know, but they have a very important basis if we are to assert the authority of the United Nations in respect of any action that is taken enforcementwise or preventively, and to avoid the dangers that run from unilateral action, the kind of action which we wish to see minimized if we are going to strengthen the ultimate authority of the United Nations.

I would like to make the following points as a result of what I have said:

- (1) Both the United Nations and regional agencies or organizations have a role to play in dealing with disputes or threats to the peace.
- (2) The United Nations must be concerned with all situations affecting peace and security and cannot be denied the right to decide whether it will or should intervene.
- (3) Enforcement action should not be taken without the approval of the Security Council.

That is a statement of what I believe should be the ideal situation, but there is disagreement over the meaning of the term, that is, enforcement action, and there may be occasions when some action would be preferable to

the paralysis of action brought about by a veto in the Council, and this is the situation, I think, in the Dominican Republic.

- (4) Even if a peacekeeping action authorized and taken by a regional agency does not constitute enforcement action nevertheless we would take the view that it is important for regional organizations engaged in any action involving the maintenance of international security to conduct the operation in close association with the United Nations which retains over-all responsibility for preserving international peace and security.

Now, in the case of the Dominican Republic, when the O.A.S. sought to give the international umbrella to the peacekeeping operation in the face of the inability of the United Nations itself to act, there was no decision by the Security Council. There was indeed an expression of opposition to the operation in the Security Council by the Soviet Union.

Note was taken of the O.A.S. action. I do not think however that one could say that the notation that was given implicitly amounted to the consensus procedure that more and more is being adopted in organs of the United Nations such as was done, as I mentioned yesterday, in the case of the establishment of a peace observation mission in the Yemen.

The President of India suggested some time ago that it might be useful, while the conflict was still on and before there was final settlement, that there should be established a peace body or a peace force as it is sometimes called, of persons made up of Afro-Asians, although I do not think he defined that it should be under the auspices of the United Nations.

The government of India later, however, in discussing this particular proposal, did make the suggestion that some consideration should be given to the utilization for this purpose of the United Nations' umbrella.

● (5:00 p.m.)

It will be recalled earlier that the Prime Minister of Canada had suggested that after the settlement there should be established—preferably under the auspices of the United Nations, but because of the practical situation at least under the auspices of the international community—some kind of force to provide for a continuing recognition of an obligation that would have been incurred by the nations attending the conference on Viet Nam, but with the purpose of seeing to it that whatever settlement was made at that conference would be observed by all sides. So that the concept of the President of India, later associated with the government of India, in principle, was not different from that proposed by the Prime Minister except the period when the proposal would come into being was different. In the case of India, it would come into being while there was still discussion as to the terms of settlement; in the case of the proposal of the Prime Minister, this would come in as one of the ways of guaranteeing the implementation of the settlement itself. Therefore, we have had put before us, particularly in the Dominican Republic, somewhat of a new situation, and the only point I want to make is that the Canadian government feels strongly that in respect of any regional peacekeeping operation an endeavour must be made to see to it that it derives its authority or its approval from the proper organ in the United Nations so as to avoid the dangers of abuse of action by any one state or any group of

states in respect of situations which we believe can take place only under the authority of the United Nations.

Now, in the case of the Dominican Republic, there may have been practical considerations involved; certainly, if a proposal had been made in the Security Council at this stage for the establishment of a regional force with the sanction of the Security Council there would have been placed in the deliberations a veto by one of the great powers. I suppose as an effort was being made to maintain the peace it was more important in this stage of progressive development of international organization that there be peace rather than consideration as to what was legalistically desirable. But, we must not overlook the consequences of the development that has taken place. The first time this happened was in the Congo, I think, and now we have it in the situation in the Dominican Republic, where there was no threat to the peace by a state operating against the Dominican Republic; that was a situation where factions within the same state were engaged in conflict with one another in a manner that threatened the peace. But, I am sure, there would be a lot of purists who would argue that the United Nations itself would not have had any authority to intervene unless one regards the precedent in the Congo—not what happened at the beginning in the Congo but what happened as a result of the revolt by one province in the Congo operation. I think I state that situation correctly.

This matter was raised in our House of Commons, not critically, by the leader of the Opposition at that time, the present Prime Minister, who asked the then Secretary of State for External Affairs whether the government had given consideration to the intervention of the United Nations in respect of the Katanga revolt, when it first began, after the United Nations itself had been properly launched in the Congo operation.

Mr. Chairman, that is all I have to say about this problem.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Martin. Have you a question, Mr. Brewin.

Mr. BREWIN: I, personally, would like to call a spade a spade and to see if the Secretary of State for External Affairs would agree with me on that proposition.

Did I understand the Minister to say that the American intervention in the Dominican Republic was an intervention in a factional dispute between two different elements in that country?

Mr. MARTIN: No, I do not think I said that. What I said was—

Mr. BREWIN: But is not that the effect then?

Mr. MARTIN: No; I would prefer to deal with it in a different way. What I said was that the situation in the Congo did involve a factional dispute; it was not an attack made on the Dominican Republic by another state. It was stated that the intervention made by the United States, in the first instance, was to protect the nationals of the United States and the nationals of other countries. Indeed, Canada was the beneficiary of the evacuation process provided by the forces of the United States. But, subject to that qualification, that is the situation as I see it now. After the evacuation had taken place there was presented to the government of the United States the problem of this bloodshed, this conflict, which did threaten the peace, and to give an international flavour to the action the Organization of American States came in and gave support to the national agency of one country, the national military agency.

Mr. BREWIN: But is it not a very dangerous thing that there should be military intervention in regard to what is essentially an internal dispute, a revolutionary situation existing within a country? If this is to be justified by any amount of word-marking is it not contrary to all basic principles of international law and the principles of the Charter? Is it not a dangerous situation which we cannot condone or waive aside with polite words?

Mr. MARTIN: I have indicated in my statement in the House that we believe unilateral action in these situations is not the ideal arrangement. This was the position we took in 1956 in respect of another situation, and it was also a position that was taken by the government of the United States in the same situation. I believe it would have been better if there had been regional stand-by arrangements in existence and if these could have been invoked at the beginning of the troubles in the Dominican Republic. But, it would not have been helpful if the use of such arrangements had been subject to the exercise of the veto in the Security Council. There is no question; there is a dilemma here. You have stated it in your way and I prefer, because I am responsible, to state it as I have stated it.

Mr. BREWIN: I have one further question, if I may put it at this time. Did I misunderstand what you read at the very beginning. The Secretary General of the United Nations used diplomatic language, it is true, but expressed very grave fear and regret that action was taken by a regional organization without relation originally to the United Nations.

Mr. MARTIN: No. What he was talking about was the jurisdiction of the United Nations, and he said:

It is far from my intention to question the jurisdiction or the competence of regional organizations in performing certain functions, in accordance with the constitutions laid down by those organizations. But, from the point of view of the functioning of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter, I think that recent developments—

He was obviously referring to this situation. I continue:

—should stimulate some thought by all of us regarding the character of the regional organizations, the nature of their functions and obligations in relation to the responsibilities of the United Nations under the Charter.

I agree with that statement, and I said so in the House.

● (5:10 p.m.)

Mr. GELBER: Mr. Chairman, I listened carefully to the Minister's statement. I do not hear any real fundamental difference between Mr. Brewin and the Minister. I am wondering whether the United States government is not turning the Monroe Doctrine inside out. They wanted to exclude great powers which they did not like from the American continent and now they want to exclude domestic governments that they do not like. It seems to me this is a blow not only to the United Nations but also to the inter-American system. The Americans have spent many years in trying to cultivate much of the Latin-American sentiment which the United States wishes to cultivate. I am wondering whether this is a matter of peacekeeping or whether the United States is playing too active a role in the domestic politics of countries in Latin-America.

Mr. MARTIN: I listened with interest to what you have said.

Mr. PUGH: Following along on that, I listened with interest to your last answer, Mr. Minister, and I think this is possibly the answer I will get to my question. In setting out the points you wished to make in respect of enforcement action, there is no doubt you felt that the United Nations—was a “first” and a “must” and that any action which was going to be taken had to have the consensus of opinion—I believe you said—and, therefore, I am wondering in respect of the Dominican Republic—and I am referring to your words concerning the action in 1956 and the stand taken by the United States at that time—whether the action taken by the United States in the Dominican Republic possibly gave you cause to be more horrified at the manner in which they did it.

Mr. MARTIN: I know you would not want to pursue that line of questioning with me. I will say this; I believe strongly that we have to strengthen the power of the United Nations; I believe we have reached a stage in international development whereby we cannot leave to any power the authority by itself to assume a role which by the Charter belongs to the United Nations. If it is done in one instance, it well may be done in another. If we are going to assert the authority of the collective security body that we established in 1945, we must recognize that with all its limitations it is the body under whose authority such action must be taken.

Mr. PUGH: Then, sir, rather than ask you—

Mr. MARTIN: I am sure you will allow me to continue. I would like to say that this is the policy of the government of Canada, this is the objective toward which we must strive. I am not now passing judgment on circumstances in the Dominican Republic that might, from a practical consideration, warrant the view that there may have been justifiable reasons. I am not asserting that theory; but I am prepared to examine it as we are examining it.

Mr. PUGH: Was any attempt made to take this to the United Nations? You mentioned the “if”. You said it was a question of practical considerations being involved and if it had been taken to the United Nations Security Council there was going to be a veto used.

Mr. MARTIN: There would have been a veto used with regard to establishment of the O.A.S. force; the Soviet Union had given indications of that. The question of the Dominican Republic was taken to the Security Council not prior to action but shortly thereafter and was a subject of discussion.

Mr. PUGH: Is it a fair question to ask whether our views and the views you have stated in respect of this matter of enforcement action are well known to the United States and that they have been reinforced?

Mr. MARTIN: Would you mind repeating that?

Mr. PUGH: Your views on enforcement action or, shall we say Canada's views on enforcement action, probably are well known to the United States. Have our views been put to the United States since the Dominican incident?

Mr. MARTIN: I have had frank discussion about this problem with representatives of that country.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Minister, I have two questions I would like to ask; one is on the matter of the regional stand-by forces for an emergency such as in the Dominican Republic. How would you suggest we might get around the problem as it exists in the United Nations at the present time and proceed with

dispatch in the area concerned where incidents such as took place in the Dominican Republic and may well take place elsewhere arise? While arguments are going on at the United Nations and one or more of the great powers may veto such intervention by stand-by forces, what do you suggest as a logical means of getting around that?

Mr. MARTIN: In the first place I believe the principle which the former Canadian Government established, for the first time in the world I think, of setting aside a stand-by unit was a great contribution to the concept of peace-keeping. The Scandinavian countries have emulated the Canadian example and have established stand-by units.

Mr. NESBITT: I am referring to regional ones.

Mr. MARTIN: I know; I am coming to that. At the conference we held last fall, one of the conditions of the participation was that a nation had already set aside a stand-by unit or had had experience in peacekeeping operations or was prepared to give a commitment to set aside a stand-by unit. This was done, for instance, at the last minute by Iran. These are all stand-by units put forward for the use of the United Nations in a given peacekeeping situation. I believe it would be useful, to promote the concept of peacekeeping, for regional bodies themselves to have stand-by units capable of use by the regional organization and by the United Nations, it always being understood of course that the action of the regional body would have to be authorized by the United Nations.

Mr. NESBITT: At the Security Council.

Mr. MARTIN: The Security Council is the body which has the primary responsibility; it is here that we take issue with the position of the Soviet Union and France in saying that where the Security Council fails to act, then there must be some power left to the General Assembly to take action.

Mr. NESBITT: In the event of a veto in the Security Council or failure of the General Assembly to take action under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, what practical means would you suggest for getting around, say, a rapidly developing inflammatory situation.

Mr. MARTIN: Where there is a veto?

Mr. NESBITT: Where there is a veto, yes.

● (5:20 p.m.)

Mr. MARTIN: Where there is a veto?

Mr. NESBITT: Where there is a veto.

Mr. MARTIN: Well, to do exactly what was done in the Gaza Strip under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. At that time there was an inquiry of that situation and the General Assembly made a recommendation and acted.

Mr. NESBITT: Do you think it is still possible under the present conditions?

Mr. MARTIN: The Soviet Union and France take the position that this was an illegal and an unconstitutional act and thereby provides them with justification for refusing to pay. However, I do not see why this procedure could not be resorted to again and indeed this is part of the contention we make as to the residual authority which should be given to the General Assembly.

Mr. NESBITT: I have just one last question regarding specifically the Organization of American States. Have you, Mr. Minister, any information at your disposal as to how many members of the Organization of American States are actually paid up in their dues to the Organization?

Mr. MARTIN: I think we will have to get that for you.

Mr. NESBITT: I was wondering also whether perhaps at some time you might find out how many states are in arrears, and in the event that none of these states are paying—I understand that there are hardly any of them paid up—who foots the bill?

Mr. MARTIN: I will be very glad to get that information for you.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Minister, I was wondering if you could outline for us the difference between Canada's present policy in regard to the United States action in the Dominican Republic and our policy when Russia entered Hungary and also Canada's policy in relation to the Suez Canal?

Mr. MARTIN: Well, in the Suez Canal we took a definite position. In the case of the Dominican Republic we have had, as I say, private talks but I do not believe that we have all of the facts before us and I must point out that there were limitations in the discussions at the Security Council—nothing like the discussions that we had in the case of the Suez Canal largely because of the forthcoming position taken by Britain herself. I do not think I can amplify on that.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Has our policy changed in any way in regard to the three of them?

Mr. MARTIN: No.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Regan, do you have a question?

Mr. REGAN: My question has been dealt with.

Mr. CHURCHILL: May I ask one question in regard to the Dominican Republic? What was the alternative other than immediate American intervention?

Mr. MARTIN: That is the problem, Mr. Churchill. That is why I hate to make a statement that seems to be conclusive. There may have been very practical considerations involving threats to peace that left no other course open. However, I am not saying that there were but there may have been. This possibly could have been obviated if there had been a special force in the case of the Organization of American States; if there had been prior consultation and if, finally, there had been action authorized by the Security Council. However, as these preliminaries had not been given, the defence will be that the exigencies at the moment demanded the course that was taken. I am not offering an opinion at this stage.

Mr. DOUGLAS: I want to ask the Minister a question. Do I take it, Mr. Minister, that since the United States intervened in the Dominican Republic without prior consultation with the Organization of American States and the O.A.S. in turn took military action without the prior approval or subsequent approval either of the United Nations, this action cannot be covered under Article 53 of the Charter?

Mr. MARTIN: I think technically that that is true. The action taken by the United States in the first instance was taken as a means, it was alleged, to facilitate the evacuation of nationals of a number of countries who were in danger and no effort was made to obtain the approval of the United Nations in that action. However, it is a fact that the United States contributed to an immediate discussion in the Security Council of the situation in the Dominican Republic.

Mr. DOUGLAS: Of course, the news in announcing this to the American people gave as its major reason for military intervention the fact that the rebels were suspected of having been infiltrated by Communists. If this action was not covered by Article 53, do I take it that the Minister is arguing that it was covered by Article 52?

Mr. MARTIN: No.

Mr. DOUGLAS: And the regional agencies' action taken by the O.A.S. and prior thereto by the United States was consistent with the purpose and principles of the United Nations?

Mr. MARTIN: No, I was not arguing that. What I was trying to establish when I discussed the relations between the regional agencies and the United Nations was that in order to make a peacekeeping body authoritative and supportable it had to derive its authority from the United Nations. This is what the Secretary General was implying in his carefully prepared statement and with that statement I concur. I was not seeking at any time, in anything I said today, to relate the action taken by the United States in the Dominican Republic to any authority that I would argue it had under any article of the Charter.

Mr. DOUGLAS: Could I ask the Minister then what article of the Charter justified the O.A.S. in the military action it has taken?

Mr. MARTIN: Article 52.

Mr. DOUGLAS: It was justified under article 52?

Mr. MARTIN: Article 52-1.

Mr. DOUGLAS: Am I to understand then that the Minister is suggesting that the regional group may intervene militarily in a local dispute, a factional dispute within a nation without any recourse to the United Nations or without seeking and securing the approval of the United Nations?

Mr. MARTIN: As an orderly process, I would not argue that any regional body could intervene in any situation without the authority of the United Nations.

Mr. DOUGLAS: And the approval of the United Nations was not obtained and secured in this instance?

Mr. MARTIN: Bearing in mind what Mr. Churchill was thinking about, we are in the stage of development. There was a practical situation facing the world. The Security Council would not have authorized the establishment of this peace force. The veto was going to be exercised. Note was made of the existence of an O.A.S. force but nothing was done about it. I do not think that one could strictly argue that there was even a consensus or an abstention but this was a situation that is part of the developing process and I do not know, in the practical situation, what else could have been done. An endeavour was made undoubtedly by the United States to clothe the action with the international community concept. I think it was an attempt that was justified, but I am not saying that it was an attempt that was made within the clear authority of the United Nations, nor am I saying it was the kind of attempt that should be regarded as a precedent.

● (5:30 p.m.)

Mr. DOUGLAS: Mr. Martin, what you are really saying, then, is that a regional group is justified in bypassing the United Nations if it fears that the actions taken may be vetoed in the United Nations.

Mr. MARTIN: No, I did not say that. What I said was that here you had an actual situation in which there had been an intervention by a private power. That intervention was supported by invoking the assistance of member states in the area, under the umbrella of an international force. The existence of this force was noted in the Security Council. There would undoubtedly have been an attempt made to get an authorization for the use of that force by the Council but for the fact that it was known that there would have been registered a veto and, consequently, because that was the situation and because the General Assembly was not sitting and there was no way by which it could act. I do not know in the circumstances what else could have been done. But I am not saying that this in any way can be a precedent. We are now trying to build the international process. We have gone through these situations in the domestic community in the long history of our own system of law, and this is what is happening in the international field.

Mr. DOUGLAS: Mr. Chairman, would the Minister agree that it is a very dangerous doctrine which he is enunciating, that a regional group could decide, without the consent of the United Nations, to intervene in the affairs of a nation where there are factions in a state of revolution. If the Arab minority in Israel were to rise in revolt and the Arab League undertook to intervene in Israel on the excuse that they were trying to bring about peace in Israel, surely this would be on all fours with exactly what is happening in the Dominican Republic. The fact that neither the United Nations nor the Organization of American States intervened when the Bosch government was overthrown but did intervene in this instance would lead many of us to feel that primarily the United States has equated Conservatism with Communism and has reserved its right to intervene where it feels there are ideological factors with which they do not agree.

Mr. MARTIN: I am distressed that you have interpreted what I have said in that way. I have indicated that in these situations we strongly feel that unilateral action is not desirable. That is a statement of policy, a statement of principle.

What I had said was, given the limitations in the Security Council, the course that was taken was wise, it was minimal, and it was the only course; but I have never said it was a precedent. I was trying to explain that the situation was there. Some attempt seemingly had to be made to restore order. The United Nations was not able to function. Here was some kind of international operation—and I agree with you fully that unless it conforms to the principles and purposes of the United Nations it has no authority to act. I would not want your question to be interpreted in any way as indicating that I would say that, in the situation in the Middle East you envisaged, any grouping of states could take the action which you postulate unless it was consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations as provided for in Article 2.1 of the Charter—certainly not.

Mr. DOUGLAS: What consistency is there in the action that was taken with the purposes and principles of the United Nations and the statement of the President that the sole purpose of going into the Dominican Republic was that he disliked some of the people who were taking part in the revolution?

Mr. MARTIN: That is an additional point you are now raising. I was dealing with the fact that I was not aware that in the action taken by the

Organization of American States there was anything contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and I am stating that what was done was in the face of the limitations that were then present in the Security Council. But I am not in any way endorsing the possibility of the kind of action that you envisaged in the Middle East. That situation is naturally in our minds, and any action taken by any group of states in the Middle East against Israel, contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations would deserve the stricture which has been placed on it.

Mr. DOUGLAS: If the Arab League said there were Communists in the Israeli government, it would be exactly on all fours with what has happened in the Dominican Republic.

Mr. MARTIN: I find it difficult to think that these things are on all fours in the simple way in which you so ably state the issue now.

The CHAIRMAN: Because our subject is as limited as it is today, I wish members would be good enough not to pose any supplementary questions at all.

May I recognize Mr. MacEwan.

Mr. MACEWAN: I want to refresh my memory and follow up on what Mr. Douglas has said.

I recall the questions asked, Mr. Chairman, of the Minister in the House of Commons regarding this matter of Communist infiltration in the Dominican Republic. Is it correct, Mr. Martin, that you stated at that time that there were independent reports from which you and the Canadian government were satisfied that this was in fact the case?

Mr. MARTIN: I would like to see the reply I made.

Mr. DOUGLAS: I think it was the Prime Minister.

Mr. MARTIN: I think I was in London at the time. I would want to look at the answer.

Mr. DOUGLAS: I think it would be useful to have that information if it is available to the committee. I think it was the Prime Minister who gave that reply.

Mr. MACEWAN: I think it would be useful.

The CHAIRMAN: Is it agreeable that this be appended to today's evidence?

Mr. MARTIN: No, I would like to see it first.

Mr. DOUGLAS: Much of the so-called evidence presented at the United Nations was later withdrawn, and I would like to see these names before it is appended.

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps you would keep that question in mind as we proceed further, Mr. MacEwan.

Mr. MACEWAN: Yes.

I wonder if the Minister can say whether in the existing circumstances the Canadian government now feels it should be a member of the Organization of American States.

Mr. MARTIN: This introduces another subject. I am ready to discuss it because I promised Mr. Nesbitt in the House that I would do so, but I do not know whether you regard this as the appropriate moment. If you do, I would be prepared to deal with it. I do not know whether we have the time now.

Mr. MACEWAN: If the Minister would deal with it at any early date I will be satisfied.

Mr. MARTIN: I shall be very happy to do so. My position on that is both forthright and positive.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is a nice change!

Mr. WALKER: This is a change of pace!

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forest.

Mr. FOREST: Mr. Martin, does the Organization of American States have a team of representatives trying to effect a settlement, and have they made any progress in attempting to end the stalemate between the factions?

● (5:40 p.m.)

Mr. MARTIN: They are working on the situation. It is not an easy one. As you know, the United Nations sent a team of three observers and has had that limited association with the situation. We have tried to bring about some degree of normality to the situation in the Dominican Republic. We were the first to open our mission there, and after the hostilities had begun this was done as a result of consultation by a special representative, Mr. Michel Gauvin, whom we had sent to supplement the work of our personnel. This was done by him on instructions from the government, following consultations with the parties to the factional dispute, in conjunction with discussions that we had with other countries that have an interest there. I must say that the action taken in opening this mission had a very salutary effect; it did not bring an end to the hostilities but it was a bold act that I think was useful and is so regarded.

Mr. BREWIN: I would like to go back to a point which I do not think is clear in my mind.

Mr. MARTIN: May I just complete what I said previously? I would want it to be understood that the re-opening of our chancery, our mission, does not imply any recognition of the regime in control of the areas where the premises are located. I want to make this clear. We made this clear at the time.

Mr. PUGH: What is the occasion?

Mr. MARTIN: The moving of the temporary office in the residence back to the regular office in the chancery. I wanted to make it clear that the opening of this mission was not a recognition of the regime.

Mr. CHURCHILL: But this man was accredited?

Mr. MARTIN: He was accredited in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic is in a stage of factional strife and we continue to maintain a mission there, as all other countries do. It is a very essential thing that we do.

Mr. DOUGLAS: Do we recognize either of the administrations there?

Mr. MARTIN: No.

Mr. BREWIN: The question which I would like the Minister to answer is this: I understood him to say that once you could anticipate a veto in the Security Council, there was no other choice but intervention. I would suggest to the Minister that another choice on the part of the United States administration might be non-intervention. It would not have been the first time there

has been a revolution in South America. Just let nature take its course there. What right has any individual country to intervene in the internal affairs of a self-governing nation?

Mr. MARTIN: I have stated, Mr. Brewin, that the government does not believe that unilateral action in these situations is desirable.

Mr. BREWIN: Is it not one of the problems that, as Mr. Douglas I think suggested, if you equate any revolution with communism then you have a formula for constant intervention in the internal affairs of other countries? Surely this is extremely dangerous and, if nothing else, would lose the sympathy of the world for the intervening country.

Mr. MARTIN: This statement has been made sometimes and I noted it. I have said our position is that we do not believe it is desirable that there should be unilateral action. We would like the authority of the international community to be asserted in these situations.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have a supplementary question along the lines which Mr. Brewin has put forward. Have we as a country no responsibility to our nationals who may be in danger of their lives in an area where an armed revolution had broken out?

Mr. MARTIN: I think we have an obligation.

The CHAIRMAN: The bells are ringing for a division in the House.

Mr. MARTIN: I would not want it to be said that I was saved by the bell.

Mr. PUGH: I have one short question.

Mr. MARTIN: I would want to finish my answer to Mr. Churchill. I just want to say that we had, I think, 125 Canadians in the Dominican Republic. There was a Canadian ship in the Caribbean, but fairly far removed. We asked Britain and the United States for assistance in evacuating our nationals, and this was given to us by the United States. We have gratefully acknowledged their assistance in evacuating these Canadians. The reason given for the dispatch of the Marines, in the first instance, was that it was part of the process of evacuating United States nationals and those of other countries.

Mr. PUGH: My question follows that. You have said the story is not yet fully known and possibly the United States went in there to safeguard their nationals. My question is: Is there a body set up in the United Nations which is operative and could go in to safeguard all nationals?

Mr. MARTIN: No.

Mr. PUGH: Would the Minister not think it would be a good idea to set up such a body so that it could go in to protect nationals of all countries resident there?

Mr. MARTIN: If we can reach the stage where the United Nations can retrieve nationals from that kind of situation, then we will have indeed a very effective peacekeeping machinery, but it certainly does not exist now.

Mr. PUGH: Then you think it is a good idea?

Mr. MARTIN: At the present time we are dependant upon our own facilities and the facilities of other countries to relieve our nationals.

Mr. McINTOSH: You used the term para-combat. What is para-combat?

Mr. MARTIN: This was a phrase that was first coined by the Security Council in the case of the force in the Congo. It was to emphasize the limited powers of the force. There were limitations on when it could shoot, when it could use its powers. The same applies to Cyprus. These powers have become stronger but the forces there do not have the full authority that is given to a soldier in a normal war.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the members of the committee.

I hope someone noticed Miss Sharon Crowe, Registered Nurse, who was in the Speaker's Gallery yesterday. She was one of the three gallant Canadian nurses who saved the lives of civilians and military people in Santo Domingo.

We will now adjourn.





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OF
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Third Session—Twenty-sixth Parliament

1965

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: MR. JOHN R. MATHESON.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 5

TUESDAY, JUNE 29, 1965

Main Estimates (1965-66) of the Department
of External Affairs

Also Second Report to the House

WITNESS:

The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1965

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. John R. Matheson

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and Messrs.

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Brewin,
Brown,
Churchill,
Deachman,
Douglas,
Dubé,
Forest,

Gelber,
Haidasz,
Klein,
Konantz (Mrs.),
Lachance,
MacEwan,
Mandziuk,

Martineau,
McIntosh,
Nugent,
Patterson,
Pugh,
Regan,
Walker—24.

M. Slack,
Clerk of the Committee.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

TUESDAY, June 29, 1965.

Ordered,—That the present terms of reference of the Standing Committee on External Affairs be extended to enable it to submit a report to the House based on the evidence adduced by the External Affairs Committee, 1964-65, relating to the problems of hate literature and genocide which were referred by the House at the last session to the said Committee; to make recommendations thereon; and that the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the External Affairs Committee, 1964-65, on these matters, be referred to this Committee.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House.

REPORT TO THE HOUSE

TUESDAY, June 29, 1965.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs has the honour to present its

SECOND REPORT

Your Committee recommends that its present terms of reference be extended to enable it to submit a report to the House based on the evidence adduced by the External Affairs Committee, 1964-65, relating to the problems of hate literature and genocide which were referred by the House at the last session to the said Committee; to make recommendations thereon; and that the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the External Affairs Committee, 1964-65, on these matters, be referred to this Committee.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN R. MATHESON,
Chairman.

(Note,—This Report was concurred in by the House on the same day.)

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, June 29, 1965

(6)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 9.20 a.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Matheson, presiding.

Members present: Mrs. Konantz and Messrs. Brewin, Brown, Churchill, Deachman, Dubé, Forest, Haidasz, Klein, Matheson, Nesbitt, Patterson, Walker (13).

The Committee resumed consideration of motion proposed by Mr. Brewin, seconded by Mr. Walker, that this Committee seek from the House an order that this Committee's present terms of reference be extended to enable it to submit a report based on the previous evidence relating to the problems of hate literature and genocide referred by the House at the last session to this Committee; to make recommendations thereon, and that the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the External Affairs Committee, 1964-65, on these matters, be referred to this Committee.

After discussion, the motion was carried unanimously, and the Chairman ordered to report accordingly. (*See Second Report to the House.*)

The Committee agreed to sit at 4.30 p.m. this afternoon instead of 3.30 p.m.

The Committee discussed matters relating to witnesses and also briefs from organizations.

At 10.15 a.m., the Committee adjourned until 4.30 p.m. this afternoon.

AFTERNOON SITTING

(7)

The Committee resumed at 4.40 p.m. The Chairman, Mr. Matheson, presided.

Members present: Mrs. Konantz and Messrs. Brewin, Brown, Churchill, Deachman, Dubé, Forest, Haidasz, Klein, Lachance, Matheson, Nesbitt, Patterson, Regan and Walker (15).

In attendance: The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The Committee resumed consideration of Item 1 of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs.

The Minister made a detailed statement on Canada's External Aid programs and was briefly examined thereon.

Mr. Regan moved, seconded by Mr. Haidasz, that the document "A Report on Canada's External Aid Programs", previously distributed to members of the Committee, be printed as an appendix to the record of this sitting. Later, the Committee agreed, without a formal motion, to print the document as an appendix, and by leave, Mr. Regan withdrew his motion (*See Appendix "H"*).

At 5.45 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

M. Slack,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

TUESDAY, June 29, 1965.

● (9.20 a.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: Mrs Konantz and Gentlemen, Mr. Brewin's felicitously worded recommendation was to the effect that this Committee seek from the House an order that this Committee's present terms of reference be extended to enable it to submit a report based on the previous evidence relating to the problems of hate literature and genocide referred by the House at the last session to this committee; to make recommendations thereon; and that the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the External Affairs Committee, 1964-1965, on these matters, be referred to this Committee.

Mr. Brewin?

Mr. BREWIN: I do not know that there is any need to say anything further. I think the motion speaks for itself.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Walker, you were the seconder.

Mr. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, I might have done the committee a disservice at the last meeting by not explaining to them my own personal interest in this matter. This is why I have been pushing so hard to have the subject matter returned to this Committee. I represent a riding where many thousands of people at the moment are affected by the racist propaganda that is running through the country. This is why it is so keenly on my mind, and why I was a little disturbed that any decision or recommendation for action might be taken out of the hands of this Committee, just at a time when I felt we had thoroughly gone into the matter and discussed it very keenly, and sent to another committee where it would have to start all over again. Then I would have to transfer myself to the other committee because I want to follow this through personally.

It is for these reasons that I am very anxious, if the Committee sees fit, to carry on with it here. I would hope that the members who wondered about the subject matter being referred, have had a chance to see what work had been done and that after having read this they feel they have been brought up to date with other members of the committee that are here now.

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps I could add to what Mr. Walker said for the benefit of the members of the Committee who were not on the old committee. This is a problem that can arouse a good many feelings both pro and con. There was a good deal of inducement on the steering committee in the last session to handle this in a rather more dramatic way than it was handled. There were ever so many people that wished to appear. I think the steering committee tried to operate with a fairly steady hand.

Now it will be noted, I think, that there was not one representative of an aggrieved group who gave evidence before us, except indirectly through the evidence of Mr. Justice Dalton C. Wells, who had been selected because of his steadiness and his high reputation for civil liberties for many years at

the Bar of Ontario. It is true that his evidence with the Post Office inquiry became part of our own record. But many other people wished to appear, and I do not think it serves any useful purpose to run over the names. However some of these people are well known as having strong views, perhaps to the right, perhaps to the left, and to some extent themselves being the victims of racial prejudice and attack.

What we tried to do in this first series was to handle this thing in a sober way. I remember Mr. Nesbitt saying: "Well now, what are we hearing except what we already know". This is true, and what we were trying to do was to handle it in a fairly responsible way with the thought that maybe this Committee would not be in a position in any event to bring down a very specific recommendation, but only a recommendation which would be general in character. To the legal experts would be left the problem, if there were a recommendation in favour of any kind of legislation of working out such safeguards as would be necessarily required in any system of law that paid a great deal of respect to civil liberty and to the right of free speech. I think this is pretty well what we were thinking of, was it not, Mr. Patterson?

Mr. PATTERSON: I believe that sums it up very concisely.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I was the one at the last meeting who asked that the motion stand until those of us who were new on the committee this year could look at the evidence presented to the committee last year. This I have done, and I read with interest the evidence submitted to you at the last session on the subject matter of genocide and hate literature. I reached the same conclusion that I expressed in the House last year when the two bills were referred to the committee, that they were going to the wrong committee, and I am of the same opinion now. I think this committee is not the one that should be studying this particular matter. Although I think I know the desire of the committees to have some finality to their work and some continuity to their subjects, nevertheless, I think on a subject as important as this, the more people who are aware of the problem the better.

You might think that having the subject matter referred for consideration to the Committee on Human Rights, which is the committee called upon to deal with Indian affairs, human rights and citizenship, might appear to impose a delay. I think it will be a very useful type of delay because that Committee whose membership differs very largely from this one, would, if it were interested, have the same information available to it that this Committee has had. Then, if and when the subject matter comes back to the House of Commons, there will be more people informed; and this is one of the purposes of our committee work.

Another reason is that the Committee on External Affairs, in my opinion, has enough to do without considering the subject matters where results can be achieved only by means of some legislative action. That legislative action has to be considered by the Justice Department, and the Justice Committee is another committee that should be concerned with this particular problem. However, for the External Affairs Committee to involve itself in matters foreign to its investigation in a way, I think is wrong in that we will be diverted from our main task, which is the study of the very wide field of external affairs of Canada's commitments. I believe someone mentioned the

other day—perhaps Mr. Chairman himself—that there would be certain elements in the defence policy of Canada that should be part of the study of this committee, to which I agree.

Therefore, my suggestion is not in any way expressed because of any lack of sympathy with the problem which is being considered. It is a subject matter that I have given much attention over the years. But I think the method of approach would be better through the Human Rights Committee, and the material that you assembled last year, which is very valuable, could be referred to that committee. The members of that committee could do exactly what I did and what every member of the House should do—that is, read through the evidence that was given to the committee last year.

Then there is another reason which occurred to me when I was reading the material. The United Nations is still engaged in a study of the problem of racial discrimination, and I presume that that subject will be in front of the United Nations when it reassembles for its next year's work in the fall. We may be a bit premature in any conclusion that we may reach here when the United Nations appears to be moderately close to coming to some conclusions itself with regard to the problem of racial discrimination, which is really the problem relating to genocide and the hate literature matter.

● (9.30 a.m.)

Then there is still another consideration. On the order paper there are three private members' bills: Mr. Klein has one on genocide, Mr. Orlikow on hate literature and Mr. Nesbitt on group libel. These have not reached the House yet; they should reach the House for debate some time in the fall. The subject matter of those three bills might be referred to the Committee on Human Rights on that occasion.

That is the way I look on the matter, Mr. Chairman. I think that if there is some compromise that can be worked out whereby the Committee attempted to summarize what has already been accomplished and make some recommendation for further study, as well as suggest that this be done by another committee, I would be agreeable to it.

Mr. HAMDASZ: Mr. Chairman, I would like to object to one of the statements made by Mr. Churchill when he said that the subject matter of genocide and hate literature are extraneous and foreign to the External Affairs Committee. I think external affairs is very intimately connected with this topic. Within our purview are things that pertain to the United Nations, and one of the United Nations commissions is the Commission on Human Rights which is seized of this problem of genocide and hate literature. I think that the subject matter of genocide and hate literature certainly come within the purview of our interest.

Mr. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, this is such an important subject matter that I would not at all like to see this Committee divided on this question. I was wondering if the Committee agreed—and Mr. Churchill mentioned something along these lines—that rather than throw away the work that has been done by this Committee without any advice to the House on what we had done about this, we could not come up, in so far as this committee is concerned, with a recommendation and suggestions or a digest of what we have done and ask the House to send our report to the Justice Committee so that they can have the weight of the opinion of those of us who have studied it.

Mr. NESBITT: And the Human Rights Committee.

Mr. WALKER: Whatever the committee is called, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights.

Mr. FOREST: Those are two separate committees.

Mr. WALKER: This is a very large problem. I do not suggest it is just a domestic problem. This is a question of human relations all over the world. The reason why the weight of the External Affairs Committee should be behind such a recommendation is that Canada might well give the lead to some other countries in this matter. I do think this affects the External Affairs Committee. However, I agree with Mr. Churchill that the more people study this thoroughly in the Committee before it becomes the subject matter on the floor of the House of Commons, the better. Would you agree with this, Mr. Churchill? I would not like to see the subject dropped here. Surely the Committee can send its recommendations and its report and ask the House to refer it to other committees.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I would sympathize with the idea that the External Affairs Committee should not be continually charged with overseeing this particular problem although, as Mr. Haidasz has pointed out, this matter has an external affairs connotation. That was the original reason for sending it to us. Nevertheless, it is a matter of domestic jurisdiction, and Mr. Churchill made a very strong point, at least I think he did, when he said that we have plenty to do with problems of external affairs as such at the present time. I would be in favour of referring the whole matter to one of these other committees, or even to both, except for the fact that I believe we now have enough material to make a useful and sensible report. I have personally already tried to draft some notes.

There were six witnesses who, I thought, gave some excellent evidence in dealing with the subject with reference to our international obligations. I would remind the Committee that the declaration of November 21, approved unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly, explicitly called upon all states to take immediate and positive measures, including legislative measures, against the incitement to violence, and so forth, on the basis of race, colour, or origin. In other words, there was a specific request. I think Mr. Cadieux said that although this was not any formality and legally binding convention, I think his words were that there was a moral obligation and a guide line for legislation on this matter. I think we could usefully refer to the existing Canadian legislation without any trouble, and also refer to the material that has been given to us on other legislation. I would think that on the basis of that we might be able to make a fairly simple recommendation. In presenting our report to the House we might say that a further study on this matter is required and a further development of this subject and that in our opinion this would more normally fall under one or other, or both, of these committees. Frankly I would hate to see this subject dropped here. I think we can make a useful statement now. I would be sorry to see this Committee wash its hands of it, having partly assumed the task, without doing that amount of work which you think is the reasonable minimum that we could be expected to do. I would hope that the motion would be passed.

The CHAIRMAN: You will remember, gentlemen, that the last report to the House made on March 24 concluded:

Your Committee recommends that it be given an opportunity for further consideration of the advisability of Canada adopting similar legislation, and therefore, as the Committee finds that it will not be able to complete its study of the subject matter of these Bills at the current session of this Parliament, it recommends that the same subjects be referred to it early in the next session in order that the Committee may continue its study of this very important matter.

Mr. WALKER: But the House has never had a chance to concur with that report. The report was presented that day and we closed before it was considered.

Mr. BREWIN: The motion in its present form does not ask that we be given continuing authority. I think the steering committee, assisted by all the Committee, could make a worthwhile and useful report.

Mr. WALKER: Could I break in? We should make it very clear and even give more weight to your resolution if we spelled it out that we want the subject matter referred back to us for the purpose of preparing a report and a recommendation which we trust the House will subsequently send to specific committees of which we are thinking. Can we not guide this thing from here? We can add this to your recommendation so that there is no question about why we want it back.

● (9.40 a.m.)

Mr. DEACHMAN: I think that most of the things that I wanted to say have already been said, Mr. Chairman. I think our work load at the moment, if we compare ourselves with the last session, is not very heavy. You will remember that at the last session we tackled the Columbia River project, which was an enormous work load for this Committee, as well as some examination of the estimates which, I think, we undertook during the last session. Today we are looking at a relatively light work load. This matter before us is at a stage of review and report-making. I would urge, Mr. Chairman, that rather than abandon this and leave it dangling we move on and conclude the work upon which we have embarked. I would think that we should wind up the review and report-making on this aspect of our work. I might say that I find myself in agreement with Mr. Churchill, that this perhaps is a matter, in the long run, which would be handled better by the new committee on Indian Affairs, Human Rights and Citizenship and Immigration. But, I do not think that alters the fact that having undertaken the work and having come this far we should at this time complete this task rather than abandon it and leave it dangling, particularly in view of our light work load at the moment. If I might say so, the committee to which Mr. Churchill suggested that this subject might be referred immediately has a rather heavy work load to assume this year compared with ours. That committee is going to be very soon involved in the examination of the new immigration White Paper as well as Indian matters, which I think will absorb the time of that committee very fully. For this reason I find myself in concurrence with what Mr. Walker has said, with what Mr. Brewin has said and, in the long run, with what Mr. Churchill has said.

Mr. WALKER: Do not look so surprised.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, I think we are all pretty well agreed on what should be done.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you wish to say something, Mr. Patterson?

Mr. PATTERSON: Mr. Chairman, I was going to remark earlier that one of the determining factors in having this matter referred to the External Affairs Committee was the fact there was not any other committee to handle it. This matter was discussed some time ago and at that time it was decided that this was the only committee which properly could look into this particular problem.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not know by whom it was considered; certainly not by the Chairman. I was not consulted and I do not think the steering committee was.

Mr. PATTERSON: I think it was a matter of the attitude of the House, which was brought out on a number of occasions. As we know, there was not any other committee specifically committed to a study of this kind and, therefore, the External Affairs Committee was the closest thing to it; I think that is what decided the issue.

I think possibly we should wind this up as far as a report is concerned and then have it submitted to the Indian Affairs, Human Rights and Citizenship and Immigration Committee.

Mr. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, would you read the motion as it stands at the present time, together with the specific reference to the two committees.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, it seems we are all in general agreement on this question. Mr. Brewin has stated that he has made some notes, and I think that the matter should be referred to the steering committee so that we can work on a draft report.

Mr. BREWIN: But, Mr. Chairman, at the present time we have not any authority to submit a report based on the previous evidence.

The CHAIRMAN: This is the precise problem. If there was any way of hurdling that problem we could discuss the merits of the case, but I think that is premature.

The motion is:

That this committee seek from the House an order that this committee's present terms of reference be extended to enable it to submit a report based on the previous evidence relating to the problems of hate literature and genocide referred by the House at the last session to this committee; to make recommendations thereon, and that the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the External Affairs Committee, 1964-65, on these matters, be referred to this committee.

Mr. KLEIN: It might be in order to have this motion passed and, if so, when you are speaking to the motion perhaps a recommendation could be added that this subject matter be referred to the committee on Indian Affairs, Human Rights and Citizenship and Immigration as well as Justice and Legal Affairs.

Mr. BREWIN: That is a possibility. I am thinking aloud and wondering whether we could recommend that further study of this subject matter in future should be referred to the standing committee on Indian Affairs, Human

Rights and Citizenship and Immigration and Justice and Legal Affairs. Perhaps we could just add that in the motion.

Mr. KLEIN: I do not see any objection to that.

The CHAIRMAN: My very competent and experienced Clerk points out that in his view, any recommendation at the end, in effect, would be contrary to the first part: "Your Committee recommends that its present terms of reference be extended to enable it to submit a report to the House." In effect, this is what Colonel Churchill was saying.

Mr. BREWIN: With all due respect, surely we are asking that our terms of reference be enlarged for the purpose of reporting on what has been done, with further riders added that future or further study, as required, be handled by the other two committees. I do not see anything inconsistent in that.

The CHAIRMAN: Neither do I. I am wondering if there is anything presumptuous in this.

Mr. WALKER: I hope so. Let us presume something.

The CHAIRMAN: I am wondering if there is an impropriety in a committee bringing back a recommendation to the House which, in effect, tells the House what it must do in respect of other committees.

Mr. NESBITT: We are only recommending to the House.

Mr. KLEIN: I do not see why we cannot specifically do that in the report. We could make the report and say that it would be in the interest of all concerned that this be sent to the two committees for further discussion. In this way we could put it in the report and leave the motion stand as it is.

Mr. BREWIN: That would be satisfactory to me.

Mr. KLEIN: That might be the better way.

The CHAIRMAN: Would it be the pleasure of the committee then to pass this motion in its present form, which I think stresses two points: To submit a report; to make recommendations thereon.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, would you read it again, please.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you mean in full?

Mr. NESBITT: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: It reads:

That this committee seek from the House an order that this committee's present terms of reference be extended to enable it to submit a report based on the previous evidence relating to the problems of hate literature and genocide referred by the House at the last session to this committee; to make recommendations thereon, and that the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the External Affairs Committee, 1964-65, on these matters, be referred to this committee.

It seems that the operative words are: "To submit a report; to make recommendations thereon."

Mr. PATTERSON: Mr. Chairman, are we in a position to make any report? These matters have not been referred to this Committee.

Mr. WALKER: That is what this motion is for.

The CHAIRMAN: This motion is a plea that it be for this specific and limited purpose.

Mr. PATTERSON: I was just saying that the matter has not been referred to this Committee as such.

Mr. BREWIN: But we are asking the House to do that for us.

Mr. WALKER: That is right.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, can we proceed and make a report?

Mr. KLEIN: This motion is asking the House to give us the right to do things.

Mr. PATTERSON: But, can we bring in a report when a matter has not been referred to us?

The CHAIRMAN: What we are asking is that our terms of reference be enlarged. We have certain material before us now and we are asking for an enlargement of our terms of reference for this specific purpose.

Mr. NESBITT: Yes, in order that we can clean up last year's business.

Mr. WALKER: This motion is asking the House to allow us to send a report to them. This procedure certainly is in order. And, one of the recommendations will be that the House refer this matter to other committees.

Mr. NESBITT: But, we have to get permission to make the recommendation.

Mr. WALKER: Put the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: Are you ready for the motion? All those in favour? All those opposes?

The motion is carried unanimously.

Can I leave this with the Whip and, perhaps, Mr. Churchill, to see if there are any ways of perhaps obtaining concurrence in this? Would that be possible in order that we could tidy this up today?

● (9.50 a.m.)

Mr. WALKER: Do you mean in the House?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. WALKER: This is going in as a report?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. WALKER: Normally we do not move the concurrence until the next day.

The CHAIRMAN: That is right.

Mr. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, you will be presenting the report. We are acquainted with it and we can talk to our own people.

Mr. CHURCHILL: We will move for concurrence later this day.

Mr. WALKER: Yes, we can revert back to it later today.

The CHAIRMAN: All right.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, there is one other matter that I would like to bring up at this time. We all received notice that there is a meeting later this day referring, as noted on the notice, to discussions on external aid. Now at a preliminary meeting on this matter—to keep the record straight—we asked permission to sit when the House is sitting. I think we all agreed that this is very essential, particularly when witnesses may be called from abroad who have to get away or indeed when the Minister himself is giving

evidence and particularly, I might say, last week when the Minister had another duty as well, that of acting as Prime Minister. We all realize that people in that position have to be given certain leniency as to the time they have to appear.

However, as I also understood at the same meeting, it was agreed that the Minister was called first to give a series of statements on various subjects, the Viet Nam, the United Nations, disarmament and the like and, for all practical purposes, the Committee meet reasonably for the Minister's convenience. This has been done and it has been going along very satisfactorily; I am sure we are all pleased with it. Now we received a notice the other day of this Committee sitting this afternoon. It was certainly my impression that the witness was to be probably Dr. Moran, head of the External Aid Office.

The CHAIRMAN: Did it say so on your notice?

Mr. NESBITT: It stated at the committee meeting "external aid" and that is who one normally thinks of in this regard. I say, if this is the case, I think it might be well in future to call a steering committee, as has not been done yet, to decide the future course and witnesses, particularly today as there is a reasonable possibility that this may be the last day that the House will be sitting this part of the session. It is certainly not likely, unless certain unforeseen things come up, that it will be sitting past tomorrow.

A great many members of the Committee may be occupied in the House this afternoon. I think it is rather inconvenient to have this meeting today for that reason, because there may be a number of legislative and other proceedings come up. I was wondering if the Committee meeting might be cancelled because of the rather unusual circumstances. We can reassemble at the conclusion of the recess. Perhaps the Chairman might have a meeting of the steering committee to decide on our future course of action.

The CHAIRMAN: May I say one word before contributions are made on this matter. Mr. Nesbitt is perfectly correct in saying that when these estimates were referred to us we would start off with the Secretary of State for External Affairs who was pretty well preoccupied with a double task—presiding as Acting Prime Minister as well as Secretary of State for External Affairs—and who would be giving evidence only what he considered to be a fairly short series of subjects.

I must say that my notice never made any reference to Dr. Moran. When Mr. Nesbitt mentioned to me yesterday that there was a possibility of this, I was taken aback because it was clearly my understanding that we were hearing exclusively from the Secretary of State for External Affairs who wished to present some material to this Committee to ponder about before he came back for some questioning on the same subjects. Now I do not know any more than that. Does Dr. Haidasz know what the plans were?

Mr. HADASZ: All I know is that Mr. Martin is willing to appear before the Committee this afternoon if the Committee so desires and that is on the subject of external aid.

Mr. WALKER: The problem about this afternoon, is it because of the witness?

Mr. NESBITT: I thought there were four witnesses other than the Minister. We all agreed to sit when the House was sitting because we realized that he had double duties last week. The committee has tried to accommodate the Minister. I am suggesting first of all that if, in fact, there was someone other than the Minister present this afternoon, that the steering committee should meet first to decide what witnesses are going to be called. Secondly, in any event, because of the peculiar circumstances of today in the House, that it might be perhaps advisable—this could not have been foreseen when the notice came up—to cancel the meeting this afternoon because there will be a number of things going on in the House.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nesbitt, I do know that when Mr. Martin appeared the first day he placed on the table a series of four subjects, I think, and the final subject in that series was external aid. Now, he was not even clear at that point whether external aid might be brought up immediately after the discussion on Viet Nam because he regarded it as very high up on the priority list as a result of certain governmental decisions that were being taken. If, in spite of the fact that he wishes to make this representation, some feel that we should not have this meeting, perhaps it might be better to put it precisely that way.

Mr. NESBITT: We all, I am sure, have had a very excellent brief on external aid which we can ponder through during the recess. I fear we may have trouble getting a quorum this afternoon.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, there is another aspect to the matter and that is that the committee did not conclude its questioning of Mr. Martin, particularly on Viet Nam. There have been a number of recent developments, including the Commonwealth initiative, which I think we are all interested in. I think the subject of external aid is of great interest and I hope the committee will go into it. However, if we were going to meet, I would rather spend the time asking him about developments in Viet Nam which I think are of greater importance. However, I am not urging that it is necessary that we do that now. I do not know whether questioning the Minister will change the course at this stage. Still that is a subject that I would like to give priority to.

Mr. WALKER: I was hoping with our new rules and procedures on committee set-up that we might be able to prove to the House and the country that a more expedient way of handling the estimates was through committees and in that context I would dislike very much to see a committee adjourn a hearing. We have to get the estimates back to the House some time. If we put it off until the fall then we lose all the continuity of what we have done. I think all parties will have the same difficulty this afternoon in having members at the committees. I hope that we can get a quorum this afternoon, particularly when there is no more guesswork about the Minister being available. He will be here, he is ready to go and I would think that we should move on.

The CHAIRMAN: Is there any reason why, after the Minister's statement, which I think is not terribly detailed but is very important in certain aspects on foreign aid, we could not in the question period revert to Viet Nam? Everyone has had an opportunity to discuss this and has also to read the evidence.

Mr. PATTERSON: Mr. Chairman, I think if we are going to have a meeting this afternoon we ought to follow through with the original idea of having the Minister's statement and if this is the final one on external aid, then clear it up. If there is time left, then I suggest we could possibly deal with Viet Nam. However, we have already extensively questioned the Minister and had extensive debates on that issue. I think possibly it would help to round out our understanding of the whole proposition to have a meeting on external aid.

● (10.00 a.m.)

Mr. WALKER: Mr. Haidasz said the Minister will be here.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I think it is wrong to have a meeting this afternoon if this will perhaps be the last day of the session, or the second last day. On the other hand, if Mr. Martin would like to clear up the fourth part of his statement, I would not object to coming for a short meeting, but I would hope we would not get into a detailed discussion of the external aid programme. We have the document in front of us. I would leave that to Mr. Martin, and I would agree to a short meeting. There is always some difficulty in having committee meetings on the closing day. This is not a good thing. We have done pretty well this session. In about 52 days we have done a good deal of work. The committee system will have a good chance to show its effectiveness next fall. The advice of Mr. Walker will not be any better than the committee work that has been done in other years. Estimates have been referred to the Estimates Committee, and things of that nature. Nevertheless, the House is showing keener interest in committee work, and committees will get a good run in the fall. I would leave it at that. If Mr. Martin feels he would like to make a statement, I am prepared to come and listen to him, but I would ask you not to call the meeting at 3.30.

Mr. WALKER: That is too early.

The CHAIRMAN: Four o'clock?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would say 4.30. If the Prime Minister will be making a statement on the Commonwealth Conference, and there may be other statements, we might not want to meet before 4 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN: Is it agreed that without a change of notice we will wait until the end of orders of the day?

Mr. WALKER: Let us say we will meet at 4.30.

Mrs. KONANTZ: Provided Mr. Martin will come.

The CHAIRMAN: If not, would you leave the Chairman in the position of being able to arrange a cancellation of the meeting because of pressure in the House?

Mr. WALKER: The understanding is that we will meet at 4.30 if the Minister will come.

Mr. NESBITT: And the subject will be a statement on external aid.

Mr. BREWIN: I wonder if I might raise another subject? I have received, and I guess other members have, a brief from the World Federalists on the Viet Nam situation. I think it is a very good brief. I believe that this organization wants its president, Mr. Burchill, to speak to the Committee. I know we cannot

arrange this before the recess. Is there some way whereby the steering committee can decide who will present their material?

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps this is something that all members of the Committee would want to consider very carefully. I do not imagine it is a matter which we are free to determine ourselves right now. The subject before us now is consideration of the estimates. I am not sure whether we can consider now whether we should solicit, I suppose by invitation, certain people who have indicated a willingness to come. I know that Professor Burchill worked quite hard on this brief, as have a number of others. For instance, Mrs. Virginia McDonald has been very active on this. All these people have given a lot of time to their submission. I have a letter dated June 16, 1965, from Mrs. C. B. Macpherson, President of the Voice of Women, in which she asks me whether we are prepared, as a committee, to receive briefs or submissions. There have been a series of letters from Professor H. S. Ryan, Q.C., of Queens University, who has been one of a group to prepare a very detailed study with respect to nuclear disarmament which, he says, in his judgment, is a matter that comes within the purview of our committee. However, at the moment the reference before us is not Viet Nam, is not disarmament, is not these other things, but rather estimates.

Mr. HADASZ: I agree.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, my point is different. I will not say this critically; however, the steering committee has not met. We had extremely worth-while and interesting evidence presented to us by outside experts. This was reviewed by the steering committee to see who could usefully present evidence.

The CHAIRMAN: But this was not on estimates.

Mr. BREWIN: All I am suggesting is that some time soon the steering committee meet and review its program. I do not know whether we should finish the estimates first and then make a program but I think the steering committee should meet and plan the future work of this Committee to make it as useful as possible. This sort of problem regarding what to do with briefs and so on, should be considered by the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I certainly understand that at the conclusion of any evidence given by Mr. Martin there will be no further meeting without a decision by the steering committee on further witnesses. Of course we have not quite come to that point as yet. Maybe all members could think about the problem that was raised by Mr. Brewin. We do have groups in Canada that are prepared to give sometimes hundreds of hours of research to a problem. It may well be that it would perhaps be better for us to seek to enlarge our terms of reference. On the other hand, that may not be necessary.

Mr. PATTERSON: I do not think so.

Mr. HADASZ: Let us get on with the estimates first.

Mr. PATTERSON: We would be inundated with this kind of thing.

Mr. CHURCHILL: My feeling is that we should deal with the estimates first and get them back to the House of Commons. If all the committees would do that, then the House of Commons will be able, in the fall, to get the main estimates passed and not live just on interim supply. That is what the Committee should do.

Mr. HADASZ: I agree with Mr. Churchill. That is the only sound way of proceeding from now on.

The CHAIRMAN: I suppose there is no prohibition against distribution to members of the External Affairs Committee of any material prepared by any interested groups.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I do not think we should entertain representations from our own experts because we have the estimates to deal with and this is a matter which can only be dealt with by the experts of the department and by departmental officials. If we have time to deal with the other matters, then perhaps it would be a matter for the steering committee to decide. However, I would not want to set up a precedent that we are preparing to hear outside representations at this time.

Mr. WALKER: May I suggest that your steering committee get together, Mr. Chairman, as quickly as you think is advisable and map out the program that you could present to this Committee?

Mr. CHAIRMAN: Would it be premature to do this before adjournment of this session?

Mr. WALKER: This is up to you. My own view is that it is never premature to get a program lined up even if you have to alter it later. You have received requests from organizations to appear before this Committee. As long as these are left in abeyance, people might think that the External Affairs Committee does not care about their presentations. On the other hand, they may think that your lack of decision is acquiescence and that they are going to be asked to come. I think we should lay out guidelines as quickly as possible for the type of program or subjects that we are able to undertake or wish to undertake in this Committee.

● (10.10 a.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: Would you like to say something, Mrs. Konantz?

Mrs. KONANTZ: Mr. Chairman, I think a program that is as important as this one is takes a little time to work out and I would not like to see such a program drafted in a hurry. Someone asked if we would mind if briefs from various organizations were sent to the members. For my part, I would welcome them. I have read the World Federalists' bief on Viret Nam as well as several others which have been sent to me. If we do receive these in advance we then could decide what groups we would like to hear.

Mr. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, may I state that subject matters we deal with in this Committee are referred to us by the House of Commons either by way of a particular subject matter or through various bills. I personally do not know what our jurisdiction is in respect of outside bodies. I would like to hear the steering committee's recommendations in this request.

Mr. BREWIN: I would ask that the members of the steering committee look into these matters.

Mr. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, my suggestion is that the steering committee should meet quickly.

Mr. BREWIN: My suggestion would be that we leave this matter to the steering committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Is the steering committee prepared to meet following this meeting?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I assume that the steering committee may simply discuss it and then make recommendations to the committee of the whole.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes. Any recommendations which come from the steering committee would be brought before the whole Committee for concurrence or rejection.

Mr. WALKER: Or, for alteration.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, or for alteration.

Mr. HADASZ: As was mentioned, the terms of reference of this Committee are decided by the House.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, we have made arrangements for the remainder of the day. We are meeting with the Minister, if he is able to appear. Because there are a great many things going on today I would suggest that the Committee adjourn at this time.

AFTERNOON SITTING

TUESDAY, June 29, 1965

● (4.40 p.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have the pleasure to have with us the Secretary of State for External Affairs who will be making a statement on the subject of foreign aid.

Hon. PAUL MARTIN (*Secretary of State for External Affairs*): Mr. Chairman, this is the final statement that I had indicated I would like to give. I would like to review with the Committee today some aspects of our external aid achievements and the policies behind them. This is the first opportunity that I have had to make a detailed statement. We have had questions from time to time in the House but these have not encouraged or given an opportunity for a review of a very important aspect of the foreign policy of any government in the developed part of the world. We all remember when Canada as founding member of the Colombo Plan sought its first parliamentary appropriation for economic development assistance in the amount of \$400,000. We have now allocated over \$200 million in the last year and this represents a measure of the tremendous improvement in our external aid effort. Since this appropriation of \$400,000, Canadian assistance programs have grown progressively as domestic circumstances would permit, until, as I say, last year they exceeded an allocation of \$200 million for assistance to the developing countries in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America.

During the past two fiscal years our assistance has doubled in volume and its geographical coverage has been expanded to include approximately 90 countries, 63 of which received Canadian assistance in one form or another during 1964. During the past fiscal year commitments of Canadian funds have reached a record level, and a larger number of Canadians are serving abroad under the aid programs than ever before in our history. Similarly, a record number of training programs for students from the developing countries were arranged in Canadian academic and business institutions.

I thought it might be helpful if I outlined at the outset some of the achievements which marked the Canadian program in the fiscal year 1964-65. I am

not trying in this review to paint extravagantly what has been done. There is much more that I am sure we will have to do. However, while it is necessary to recognize this fact, I think it is also right that we should recognize the measure of our present achievement. It is vital now in the case of any country to be concerned about the state of the developing nations. No foreign policy can be complete that does not take this into account. I think we can understand this aspect of our responsibility if we are better informed on the extent of our present achievement.

Our grant assistance, including our bilateral aid programs and our contributions to multilateral agencies, increased by almost 50 per cent in 1964.

We introduced a new development loan program in the amount of \$50 million, on terms as concessional as those offered by any donor country. Indeed the Director General was told the other day that our soft loan program offered the kind of conditions that were unique and that might be regarded somewhat as a model.

Increases were authorized in our contributions to multilateral organizations, including a pledge to double our subscription to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

For the first time a separate item was included in the estimates for emergency relief to permit a quicker response by Canada to appeals following natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods and cyclones. We have sporadic requests for assistance. I have one on my desk now to meet a situation that has just arisen in Yugoslavia and in conjunction with which there will be a favourable response by the government.

A special food aid program was introduced for countries which desire this form of assistance from our country. The initial appropriation was \$15 million, and we are asking this to be increased by \$5 million for a total of \$20 million to meet the requests that we are getting from some of the developing countries.

Notable increases were authorized in our allocation of funds to areas with which Canada has special or historical links. Our allocations for the French-speaking states of Africa were increased by 13 times. The amounts for Commonwealth Africa were doubled, while the allocations to the Caribbean, mainly for the former units of the Federation of the West Indies, were increased fivefold. We undertook a development assistance program in Latin America on a bilateral basis for the first time by earmarking \$10 million of our development loan program for exclusive use in that area. We used the Inter-American Development Bank as the agency to pick the project which, of course, must be approved by the government. Our first assistance was for a project in El Salvador in the amount of some \$3 million, and we are now reviewing the balance of this program which represents the first moneys that we will have provided to Latin America.

More than 1,800 training programs were arranged last year as compared with 750 in 1960. I say that not by way of trying to suggest that what we are doing is better than what was done by the former administration because there has been a progressive improvement in our external aid and I would hope that this was one area where we could minimize political controversy because of its importance to our country and its importance to the receiving countries. During that same period when we rose to 1,800 from 750 in 1960 the number of Canadian professors, teachers and advisers sent abroad under the aid programs increased from 83 to a total of 545.

Continuing emphasis was given to help in the educational field through the construction, equipping and staffing of schools and the supply of large quantities of audio-visual aids. I must say that I have emphasized, in co-operation with my officers, the importance of seeking to provide much of our assistance in improving the educational standards of the receiving countries. Now many of the capital projects, of course, are in the category of educational aid, but I have a strong feeling that to the extent that we can improve the educational standards of the developing nations we will be meeting one of the primary and the most important objectives in external aid. It will be apparent by an examination of the statistics that there is a gradual increase in the amount of money that is being made available for educational purposes.

● (4.50 p.m.)

In 1964 all aid votes were placed on a non-lapsing basis, which not only provides more flexibility in the use of the funds, but will also facilitate longer term planning by those who have the responsibility in the government service of advising the administration on aid questions. Also, in an attempt to achieve greater flexibility, all bilateral aid funds for 1964-1965 authorized by parliament were in one main vote in the estimates rather than in a series of non-transferable votes.

Last year, for the first time, we made a general offer of training at the subprofessional level for prospective instructors in trade and technical schools. The response has been good and we hope to increase it substantially this year.

An inadequate knowledge of French or English has been a handicap for some students who have been recommended for training in Canada. We are seeking to overcome this problem through revised language tests to be used in overseas selection procedures, and through special instruction in Canada either in advance of the new academic year or during inter-sessional periods.

A number of new administrative procedures have served to make service abroad more attractive and thus stimulate recruitment in Canada. A notable improvement has been to relate allowances to the cost of living in individual countries instead of paying a flat percentage.

The establishment in 1964 of a special course in public administration for senior overseas government officials was in line with our policy of arranging group training programs in those techniques in which Canada appears to have special expertise. We have found that this practice promotes greater efficiency and permits a more economical use of available aid funds. Additional group courses are being planned.

Last year at the time of the Commonwealth Educational Conference in Ottawa, last August, we announced the introduction of a scheme for research fellowships to encourage visits to Canada by senior academic and public education personnel under the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan.

As a result of the market expansion in the commodity portion of our grant aid last year, a record amount of counterpart funds was generated in several recipient countries. These funds enable the developing countries to meet the local costs of major capital projects. More than one overseas government has expressed its appreciation of the counterpart system which is helping to ease the serious shortage of local currency.

A good example of this was the announcement made the other day at McGill by Prime Minister Shastri of the establishment in Delhi of an institute that would permit the pursuit of higher Indian studies, and that this was made possible as a result of the use of counterpart funds.

This has been a brief summary of a number of advances made during the year, and I might now expand on a few of the more significant of these.

Dealing first with the non-lapsing nature of our aid funds, I should like to emphasize the importance of this feature of the Canadian program. The experience of all donor countries, including Canada, has demonstrated that expenditures will always lag behind allocations in any given period. This is readily understandable when one considers that after a request has been received, time is required to investigate the economic and technical feasibility of the project, locate suppliers of specialized equipment, arrange for its manufacture, recruit qualified personnel, negotiate the various contracts involved, and carry out shipments to sites thousands of miles away. Climatic conditions, especially in the monsoon areas, will frequently cause a suspension of work and will always determine the date on which a project can be started.

This time lag between allocation and expenditure, is, of course, more pronounced in the early stages of any new program, when the overseas countries must first become familiar with Canadian capabilities, and we must learn of their priorities.

Our program, as I said a while ago, covers three continents. We have had a long and successful association with the nations of southeast Asia through the Colombo Plan, but more recently our attention in Canada has been directed to an increasing degree to the developing nations of Africa and the Caribbean, and as I mentioned, for the first time, we are now providing soft loans limited this year to \$10 million to Latin America.

We signed with the president of the Inter-American Development Bank an agreement dealing with the principles of co-operation between that organization and the external aid office. I regret that the director of that bank, who was here yesterday, could not have been here today, because I intended to bring him to this committee and introduce you to him.

In making the decision to work through the Inter-American Development Bank we recognized that in its five years of operation it had become a major instrument for the promotion of economic and social development of its member countries, and we are relying on its acquired background, experience and information to assist us in determining which projects in Latin America we should assist out of the admitted limited funds that we have made available for Latin America in the first year.

I believe that we are the first non-member country of the Inter-American Development Bank to use this facility by entering into this agreement; but it is interesting to note that several other key countries are now in the process of negotiating agreements along the same lines, with the Inter-American Development Bank.

I have already indicated that our first grant of some \$3.0 million, I think, to El Salvador represents our first venture in the field of external aid to Latin America.

Now I am sure that we all recognize that the injection of capital alone is not sufficient to ensure adequate development, and that the local people

must be trained in the knowledge and skill required to operate and maintain capital projects, if a developing country's resources are to be productive.

The countries of Africa to which we are giving increasing attention are, in particular, urgently in need of help in the field of education.

Each year the demands increase for additional schools, new universities, for places in our academic institutions, and for professors, teachers, and advisers who can be sent from Canada.

We are now, for instance, faced with the responsibility of picking a vice-chancellor for a new university. They have asked us to do this and we will, as well as providing funds to make possible his administration. This is a very essential thing to do in a particular country, because we recognize the advantage of carrying out training in the environment where the student will be later living, and with the type of equipment that will be available to him.

We now fully support the principle of regional training, and to that end we have placed particular emphasis on the strengthening of existing facilities in overseas countries, or in helping to create new ones when necessary.

● (5.00 p.m.)

In this endeavour we favour what I might describe as composite projects, which include the building, staffing and equipping of schools and institutes, while bringing to Canada for training selected personnel who will later return home to replace the Canadian members of the staff. A few examples of this type of activity in 1964 are the technical institutes in India, Kenya and Tanzania, a trade school in Ghana, a teacher training college in Malaysia, —where incidentally we supplied equipment last year for 53 vocational schools—a school of accounting in Pakistan and four primary schools in the islands of the West Indies. In the recruiting of staff for these secondary schools we have had the valuable support of the departments of education in all of the 10 provinces of Canada. With their willing co-operation, which has included the creation of provincial boards to interview resident applicants, we were able last year to place approximately 260 secondary school teachers in the developing countries. Our recruiting program this year has been so successful that in September, when the new academic year begins, we will have more than 550 teachers serving abroad. Now, I think this represents on the part of those that have been engaged in this work in this country a very remarkable achievement. These teachers go for a period of two years. They leave their particular schools in Canada and they receive a small period of training beforehand. It is truly an impressive record which has been established in this area by those engaged in this program.

In an effort to achieve the maximum effect we are concentrating on the recruitment now of teacher-trainers, and although the numbers in Canada are limited more than 50 per cent of the Canadian instructors abroad now are in this category.

The close co-operation which has been provided by the Department of Education in the province of Quebec has resulted in a substantial increase in the number of French speaking personnel who will be in the field next year. At the present time 72 French speaking university and secondary school staff

are abroad under the Canadian aid program and this number will be increased to 170 next September.

When helping to establish a new course or faculty at an overseas institution of higher education, we have found that one of the most effective methods is through a contractual arrangement whereby a particular Canadian university accepts the responsibility for the provision of a minimum number of professors for a period of years, as well as the training in Canada of counterparts with all costs, including any required equipment, being met from government aid funds. Under this arrangement, the overseas university receives the direct support and has available the full resources of a Canadian university as well as the opportunity to establish valuable continuing links between the two institutions. I think this was a program that was first initiated under the previous administration and, if my memory serves me right, the University of British Columbia was the first participating university. By way of example is the work being done by the University of Toronto in establishing an engineering college at Mangalore in India and a department of anasthesia at the University of Lagos in Nigeria; the University of British Columbia in setting up a school of business administration at the University of Malaysia; the University of Manitoba is staffing faculties of engineering and agriculture at the University of the North-east in Thailand. Negotiations are under way with a number of other Canadian universities for projects of a similar nature.

In addition to these contractual arrangements, both English and French language universities in Canada have made available faculty members for service under our aid programs in 16 developing countries. A typical example is one I am now reviewing with Father Levesque, a university in the small African State of Ruanda. This is a homogeneous country and lends itself to the experiment. We have supplied their equipment and the nucleus of a staff consisting of some 30 French speaking personnel for the new National University at Butare. In this new country right in the heart of Africa Canada is supporting the energetic efforts of Father Levesque, head of a non-denominational state university in his endeavour to create an educational opportunity for future generations in that little country.

Last April 8 I stated in the House of Commons that we welcomed the proposal made by the President of the United States for a greatly expanded co-operative effort for economic development in Southeast Asia. And, I indicated that because of our special interest in this area we would be prepared to play our full part in contributing to the success of a broader co-operative plan. It will be recalled that only a few days earlier the Prime Minister of Canada had proposed that the Mekong River project be enlarged in such a way as to make Southeast Asia a centre of international, social and economic development.

I can tell the members of the committee one regional project which has been given very high priority by the interested countries is a proposed power station at one point on a tributary of the Mekong River in Laos. Now, very recently the United States government announced its willingness to consider a major contribution to the cost of the first stage of the project, now estimated at some \$27 million. Other developmental projects for Southeast Asia are also being discussed.

Of particular importance is the fact that since April more active consideration has been given to a long standing proposal to establish an Asian develop-

ment bank, and intensive studies are under way as to the methods through which both Asian and non-Asian countries might be associated with such an institution.

In the weeks ahead we shall be exploring ways and means in which Canada can expand its activities in this area because, as you know, we already have participated in a number of important undertakings. For example, Canada played a leading part in the joint survey of the Mekong Delta some years ago, before the President announced his program of \$1 billion. It should not be forgotten that the United Nations now has spent \$172 million along the Mekong, and we were entrusted with almost the first assignment, which was the mapping of the area. I think our contribution has been a little under \$3 million. The mapping survey which Canada carried out will be of invaluable assistance to the countries of Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand as they carry out their development plans. Only the other day we approved a feasibility study for the improvement of the highway system in Thailand, this at a cost of some \$500,000. So, we are conscious of the need of participating in a program of economic development in this area of Southeast Asia. One would hope the day would soon be at hand when the conflict in that area of the world will have subsided and when the collective resources of the nations of the world can be devoted to trying to increase the standard of living of the people in Indochina, Thailand and throughout South and Southeast Asia. I think this booklet, *A Report on Canada's External Aid Program*, has been tabled. The contents indicate the area of assistance and the kind of assistance. We hope we now will have allocated some \$226 million including long term export credit financing that is not mentioned on page 2 in the introduction section of this pamphlet. The total given there is \$132.6 million. That is taken up of some \$60 million for economic, technical, educational and other assistance, the International Food Aid Program in the amount of \$22 million and special loan assistance for developing countries. You will find this more adequately stated on page 5.

● (5.10 p.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: Would it be agreeable that this pamphlet be appended to the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence so that this evidence will be intelligent to those who study it from outside this committee?

Mr. REGAN: It is quite lengthy.

Mr. MARTIN: I do not know what your distribution would be, but those following the evidence of the committee would find this very valuable information.

Mr. WALKER: What is involved, Mr. Chairman? Is this available to all members of the House from the Minister's department? Has it been sent to all members?

Mr. MARTIN: No, but it could be. I was thinking of the public as well.

Mr. REGAN: It probably is best to have it published. I would so move.

Mr. CHURCHILL: What is the motion?

Mr. REGAN: That it be printed with the evidence.

The CHAIRMAN: As an appendix to today's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence.

Mr. NESBITT: There must be quite a number of copies of this available.

Mr. CHURCHILL: What is wrong with distributing it separately? It is a document of 27 pages.

Mr. MARTIN: We can do that. My only thought is that people complain that they do not know what is being done in external aid; they complain that such and such is not being done, and often when they are given the facts they are very genuinely surprised. The officers of the department thought this would be a good way of informing a number of people. However, if it is preferred to do it this other way, we can have it done.

Mr. WALKER: I think that possibly what is confusing us is who it is to go to. I presume that anyone who receives the regular Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of this Committee will be interested in this. Does the public get the report of the Committee in large quantities?

Mr. MARTIN: They have to ask for it.

The CHAIRMAN: There are many people who do subscribe to it.

Mr. NESBITT: If such people write in and ask for the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence would it be best to send this along with it? This is a very excellent document and could be sent along with the minutes. We know it takes a long time, with the translation, to get the reports of this Committee and if we keep putting these things in, it takes that much longer. If copies of this are available they could be attached to the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence.

Mr. REGAN: I think there is a convenience involved in having it contained all in one unit. Since we are going into recess, we hope in the almost immediate future, I do not think the delay involved in having the minutes printed is a factor in this particular case. I agree with my hon. friend that this is an excellent document and, since the department has indicated there is some benefit in having it all in one unit so that anyone who wishes it can get it without chasing around for it, I think the original motion should stand and be voted upon.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, you are in a very awkward position, because you do not have a quorum, and you now have a motion in front of you.

The CHAIRMAN: I notice the motion is seconded by Mr. Haidasz. May we suspend the vote on this matter until later. It has been both moved and seconded. May we leave this until the conclusion of Mr. Martin's remarks.

Mr. NESBITT: Being of Scottish extraction I would think it would be better if we spent the extra money involved on the foreign aid program; it would be better, even if it is not all that large.

Mr. MARTIN: I should like to say finally that I know all Canadians are properly concerned with the quantity or volume of our country's aid, but I think it is important we should not overlook what at the recent meeting of the O.E.C.D. was thought to be a very important contribution to the Canadian program; that is the way the emphasis was given to the factor of quality.

I say this not by way of personal pride, because this is something that is done by those working in the public service in this area, but for some time the quality of our external aid stands very high. This is due not only to a careful collection of projects but also such factors as the skills of our engineers, the personal and professional qualities of the Canadians who serve abroad,

and our readiness to observe wherever possible the priorities established by the developing countries themselves.

For example, Canada did not insist on using its aid funds solely to create monuments in the form of capital projects, but was one of the first two countries to respond to the urgent request of India and Pakistan for non-project assistance at a time when commodity aid was so vitally needed to strengthen the industrial base. The other day I was pleased to note that Lady Barbara Ward, in her Harvard studies made particular mention of the importance of the commodity aid in her assessment of the five year plan of Pakistan.

Another important consideration for the developing countries is the terms on which aid is given. Our terms are among the most generous offered by any donor nation. Last year, in an attempt to relieve the debt servicing burden of the recipient countries, the bulk of our aid was made available in grants with no repayment involved and in interest-free long term loans. As the developing countries themselves have pointed out, \$1 million of this type of assistance is much more valuable than larger amounts in the form of repayable loans bearing interest of 3 per cent or higher.

The Development Assistance Committee of the O.E.C.D. which is the principal co-ordinating body of the Western effort, was formed to permit exchanges of experience among aid-giving countries and to find ways of improving and making more effective the over-all program.

At last month's meeting in Paris, following a searching and critical examination of the Canadian program by the Secretariat and representatives of the 13 member countries, it was observed that Canada is leading the way in providing easier terms of aid. The hope was expressed that we would continue to increase our appropriations but, at the same time, satisfaction was registered of the progress Canada had made and the direction in which, in this area, we appeared to be moving. There was particular reference to the fact that the program was not going in just one specialized direction but contained a balance of capital projects, technical and educational assistance and urgently needed commodity aid. When I speak of quality, I have in mind the terms of our aid, the way it is tailored to meet the economic problems of developing countries, and the calibre of our teachers, advisers and projects.

● (5.20 p.m.)

I would like to take this opportunity to pay public tribute to the men and women from every province of Canada and from our northern territories who have undertaken assignments in such diverse fields as public administration, soil sciences, marketing, engineering and metallurgy. Those now in the field are of every age and discipline. Our youngest, for instance, is a biologist in Tanzania, who is 24; our veteran, an agricultural expert in Pakistan, aged 71. Many of these people have undertaken these responsibilities under remarkable circumstances. I had in to see me last Wednesday an executive of one of the largest corporations in Canada, a man whose salary is in six figures, who offered to go to a country and undertake a particular program.

This kind of service—which I pick out of a hat—is I think an indication of a growing realization in our country and in other countries that we will achieve peace in our time not merely by dissolution of political problems but by recognizing the problems that face the underdeveloped nations of the world. Regrettable, however, is the fact that our programs—our multilateral programs

and our bilateral programs—of those of all countries in the donor group, have not really bridged the gap between the standards of living in the developed and in the developing countries. The gap is greater. The United Nations have sought to recognize this problem in the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

A year ago the largest international conference in human history met in Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations to establish what is known as U.N.C.T.A.D. This United Nations Trade and Development Organization is under the directorship of one of the great economists of Latin America, one of the great Latin Americans of our time, Raúl Prebisch, and it has as its objective the attempt to improve the trading patterns and trading opportunities of the underdeveloped nations of the world. This will place a growing obligation on the developed countries, the countries that have been foremost in GATT. But I believe I would not be fully giving you this initial statement on external aid if I did not say that we attach considerable importance to this organization, which itself is going to be a challenge to the affluent part of the world, including ourselves. We are greatly concerned in the United Nations, as I said at one of the last meetings, with the problem of peace-keeping, of guaranteeing effective mechanisms in the United Nations to deal with peacekeeping. We should not lose sight of the fact that these underdeveloped nations of the world are less concerned with that problem than they are with the steps that we are prepared to take, individually and collectively, in trying to meet their problems of underdevelopment.

I think that is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nesbitt.

Mr. NESBITT: I think the report that has been given to the Committee—the Minister's statement—is very excellent. The format and the layout are particularly good. I think it was most informative and interesting, and it is something we can digest and ponder over during the recess; and we can put our questions at a later date.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I think I agree with Mr. Nesbitt that this is an excellent and interesting report. I for one am very enthusiastic about the progress that has been made, but sometimes it seems to me when we are looking at the good things we have done that we do not judge ourselves by sufficiently harsh standards.

Am I wrong in concluding from something I have read that the Minister himself suggested that he was not too happy with the fact that, measuring it in total, our figure was running at about 5 per cent of our gross national product and that he would like to see it closer—almost double that amount—to \$400 million. I think that is the figure that would be closer to the one per cent that many international organizations have suggested, I think, as a good measuring stick.

My recollection is that the O.E.C.D., at its trade organization meeting, and the United Nations Organization itself, several times suggested a minimum standard from donor nations of one percent of their gross national product.

We should certainly be pleased with the excellent work that is being done, but until we live up to that standard should we be complacent?

Mr. MARTIN: I was hoping to create the impression that I was not complacent. I was also trying to invite the committee to believe me when I said that my appreciation of this problem causes me to recognize that, regardless of what administration has had responsibility, there has been a sincere conviction that this was an important area of Canadian foreign policy. I would be distressed if I had created any other impression.

● (5.30 p.m.)

The other day I was in Toronto speaking to the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, and I thought I was speaking privately to a newspaperman but he quoted everything that I had said, and I regret that it was not a completely correct quotation. However, he did quote me, and I was naturally a little embarrassed by it; and that is what you have had reference to. However, I have recommended and am recommending a program to my colleagues. We are now working through a three-year program and we are in the second year. There will be a gradual rise in our expenditures. It is true that we are away below the one per cent of gross national product. No country in O.E.C.D. is donating over one per cent, except, I think France and Portugal. We are under one half of one per cent. This figure of one per cent of gross national product was postulated by Barbara Ward because of her pre-eminence in this field. This figure has stuck as an objective figure to reach. If we were to give one per cent it would be around \$400 million. However, I do not think we are going to reach \$400 million next year or the year after. I would hope that we would reach that figure within half a decade.

Mr. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a supplementary question. In comparing the figures that those countries have reached of one per cent, is military equipment included?

Mr. MARTIN: Under some figures it is included by some countries.

Mr. WALKER: This may put us in a poor light in view of the assistance that we are giving to Tanzania or Nigeria.

Mr. MARTIN: That form of military equipment is not included.

Mr. NESBITT: How about export credits?

Mr. MARTIN: Oh yes. You will see on page 5, there is a bilateral grant aid of \$60 million, bilateral development loans \$50 million, flood aid, including \$7 million supplementary, which we asked for, amounting to \$22 million, bilateral export credits of \$76 million, multilateral grants of \$9.6 million and subscriptions to I.D.A.

Mr. NESBITT: Are those included in that one per cent?

Mr. MARTIN: Oh, yes, in the less than one per cent.

Mr. DEACHMAN: May I ask if the figure that you gave us for France was taken before or after she got out of Africa?

Mr. MARTIN: Pardon?

Mr. DEACHMAN: May I ask if the figure you gave us for France was taken before or after she was out of Africa?

Mr. MARTIN: It was a figure for 1963.

Mr. BREWIN: Could I ask a supplementary?

The CHAIRMAN: I wonder if this could be the last supplementary. Then I should like to recognize Mr. Regan, Mrs. Konantz and Mr. Walker.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I want to raise a point of order. My point of order is simply this; this meeting was called for the express purpose of getting the ministerial statement and not for a discussion of it. We have other things to do today and I want it recorded in the minutes that this meeting was opened without a quorum which I think was discourteous to people who are not present.

We waited this morning for a considerable period for a quorum. Then the other day we waited about an hour and a half for a quorum and it would be within my rights to have everything struck off the record at this meeting. I hope that this will not be a precedent for other meetings of this committee.

This is a parliamentary committee and we have no authority from parliament to meet without a quorum. The subject matter is very interesting and the minister's statement has been appreciated. However, I hope and I insist that this be not a precedent for any future meetings. I think we should adjourn now.

The CHAIRMAN: Then, Mr. Churchill, if your feeling is that there should be an adjournment, I am sure that the members would be most happy to consider that and to take cognizance of this because we can certainly continue the questioning at some later date.

We have a quorum. Are the members now prepared for a vote on the motion of Mr. Regan, seconded by Dr. Haidasz with respect to printing material which was referred to by the Minister in various points throughout his evidence? If so, all those in favour?

Mr. CHURCHILL: My point of order was raised before there was a quorum present.

The CHAIRMAN: I appreciate that. There have been, of course, Mr. Churchill, more than a quorum number at different times. However, they have come in and have left. We have taken notice of this. We have over a quorum now.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Was the meeting started with a quorum present?

The CHAIRMAN: No. As a matter of fact, there was not a full number but, Mr. Churchill, you will recall the discussion that took place at another committee which you and I have the honour to serve on, that is the Defence Committee. There it was indicated—and it was established over a period of months very successfully—that when there was no vote, no decision taken, the Chairman, as a habit and as a practice, commenced the hearing when there was a Minister present in order that he could make a statement. If that is not acceptable, sir, then there is another possibility which some committees, the Food and Drug Committee, have already considered and that is they have asked permission of the House to operate with a smaller quorum. I was hoping that the members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs would be so zealous about attendance at these meetings, these series of hearings, particularly at this time with the Minister present, that this question of reducing the possible quorum would not be necessary. I think there has been extraordinarily good attendance of Committee members. Do you take objection to the vote at this point?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Oh, yes, I certainly do.

The CHAIRMAN: May I hear anybody else to discuss this question?

Mr. REGAN: Mr. Chairman, probably—

Mr. CHURCHILL: I raise my point of order again. If you are going to put motions now and carry on discussions, I will have to insist that the whole proceedings, up to the time when you had a quorum, which was about 5.32 p.m., be struck out of the record. Either we work by the rules or we do not and that is the situation.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we are just faced with this, that if Mr. Churchill wishes to take this position, we should precisely do that. That is exactly what it amounts to. We have had fifteen members of this Committee present today; some have come here and have left. There are fourteen members in attendance at the present moment and there is nothing new in what is being done today because at the very beginning of our proceedings it was made manifestly clear, I believe, to all members of the committee, that the Secretary of State for External Affairs intended to make his presentation, I think, in four stages and one of the stages was on this immensely important matter of overseas aid. Therefore, I am in the hands of the Committee.

Mr. REGAN: On the subject of my motion, I am quite prepared, now that there is a quorum here, to repeat the motion and have it again seconded. On the other hand, inasmuch as this was our arrangement in the early part of the meeting and there was no suggestion at that time that the matter should be struck from the record because there was not a quorum, I am inclined to feel that any such action on the part of Mr. Churchill would have had to be taken at that time. Whether you rule that he can now take such action or not, as a member of this Committee, I for one am not prepared to be blackmailed in not proceeding with legitimate business by a threat to have the preceding portion of our meeting stricken from the record.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure we recognize Mr. Churchill and I am sure that we do not intend to impugn any motives. Mr. Churchill very properly is concerned that this important Committee will be conducted in a businesslike fashion and obviously this is my intention and purpose. I really believed what I was doing was acceptable to the members of the Committee or I would not have continued in this fashion. It was not my intention to permit anything to take place in this Committee which would be of a decisive character. I was following what certainly was suggested very recently, within the last two days, in our Defence Committee with Mr. Churchill present.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I am quite content with my statement on the record. I am asking now on privilege that this word "blackmail", or the intention that I am blackmailing this Committee be struck from this record.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure Mr. Regan did not mean it.

Mr. REGAN: I am sorry if the hon. Member took the word in the narrow context. I used it in a very general way and I certainly meant no offence to him.

Mr. CHAIRMAN: I am sure Mr. Regan will be a kind colleague and withdraw that statement.

Mr. REGAN: I certainly will.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Patterson, do you have a question?

● (5:40 p.m.)

Mr. PATTERSON: I was just going to say, Mr. Chairman, that I think in some of the standing committees we have established a fairly harmonious process or procedure in dealing with the business that is before us. I think possibly a very fine example was the Defence Committee, and I think the External Affairs Committee is another place where in the past relations among the members of the Committee had been extremely harmonious and amiable. It is unfortunate that an adamant position is being taken today on either side which would tend to destroy that spirit which would enable us to proceed with our business. Maybe we could find some compromise. It would be unfortunate, I think, if we found ourselves in the position where all that the Minister has said today and all the information he has given were to be expunged from the record. On the other hand, I think that possibly it would not do the Committee any good to have a motion forced at this time, and if we could find ground for compromise it would be to the advantage of the entire Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: The only matter that concerns me as the Chairman—and believe me it is not to press against Mr. Churchill or Mr. Nesbitt—is this business of rejection of a particular document. One of the things that I am concerned with as your Chairman is that whatever comes through this Committee in printed form is intelligible and two or three points were made which I thought were material to the testimony of the Secretary of State for External Affairs. He did not ask me to introduce this matter but I do habitually. I do not know how we can delay this matter because obviously our proceedings are going to be printed and studied by members of this Committee and other Members of the House.

Mr. BREWIN: May I make a peace-making suggestion, that we deal, without a formal motion, with what we are going to do with this? I personally do not think it is that important whether it go out separately or as an appendix. Nobody has said the meeting was entirely irregular. Perhaps there was a lack of quorum at the beginning but there is an adequate quorum now. We have received a useful statement.

The CHAIRMAN: Today we are in the position that brings up a point. Mr. Churchill will recognize that his party has seven representatives on this committee.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is not up to the Chairman to draw attention to party representation on this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: There may be a valid reason why they are in the House, because today is an important day. It was pointed out this morning, I think by Mr. Nesbitt, that there may be reasons why so many members of our Committee would actually like to follow the deliberations in the House of Commons, but if we are faced with this matter of not commencing except when certain persons are present, I do not know whether we can continue because we are certainly not going to have a minister of the crown sitting here indefinitely.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Why not? We have to sit here.

Mr. MARTIN: I will be happy to sit with Mr. Churchill.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill has made the suggestion that we suspend our meeting for this afternoon. I wonder if we could come to a decision with respect to the motion. I do not particularly care how it goes. There is a motion by Mr. Regan, seconded by Mr. Haidasz.

Mr. NESBITT: Could you, Mr. Chairman, find out from Mr. Moran how many of these copies are available?

Mr. H. O. MORAN (*Director General, External Aid Office*): I am not sure of the exact number. Originally there was a sufficient number for the members of the committee, and a run-off would be necessary for additional copies.

The CHAIRMAN: There are 24 members on the Committee.

Mr. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, may I make a suggestion? If the previous motion were withdrawn, would the Committee agree to a motion along the following lines: That anybody who requests a copy of the proceedings of the minutes today should also receive a copy of this document as part of the material standing behind the Committee report? If such a motion were made, would it be acceptable?

The CHAIRMAN: It has been brought to my attention by my very competent clerk that we are dealing with two departments here, the Printing Bureau and the Department of External Affairs. I do not quite understand Mr. Walker's suggestion.

Mr. WALKER: My suggestion is that the distribution office who have the Committee reports—and I presume they give them to whoever asks for them—

Mr. MARTIN: May I make a suggestion?

Mr. WALKER:—send this document out with the Committee report.

Mr. MARTIN: I would be happy if Mr. Churchill would assist me in this. It would be very helpful from our point of view because we get a lot of requests for these Committee reports, if we could send to the universities and so on one document including what we have said today. This is a matter for the Committee to decide. If it could be done that way, Mr. Moran I think would find that helpful and so would I. However, I am in the hands of the Committee.

Mr. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, in line with what the Minister said, this would become an appendix to the Committee's report. Does this not cover what you want, Mr. Minister?

Mr. MARTIN: All under one cover. This would be easier.

The CHAIRMAN: Would this be acceptable without a motion?

Mr. NESBITT: The only predicament is that this document is an excellent document and it is very readable but the report is printed in small letters which makes it very difficult to read. This is a better presentation, and it would be better if this format could go with the Committee report.

Mr. HADASZ: But this is a different size and it would create difficulties in the Library.

Mr. REGAN: Perhaps Mr. Churchill would allow this motion to pass if there is over-all agreement that there will be no further questioning today. I understand this is his main point; that he does not feel we should go into the questioning of the Minister today inasmuch as the meeting was called specifically for the purpose of receiving the Minister's statement.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is quite true. I always like to co-operate with the Minister. If it is his wish that the whole thing be printed under one cover, I am agreeable.

Mr. MARTIN: We would find that convenient.

The CHAIRMAN: Would it be possible to agree to that without a motion? Would the previous motion be withdrawn?

Mr. REGAN: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: I want to point out that Mr. Nesbitt was quite aware of the difficulties that this meeting would present to some members of the Committee in the House. I am sure it was not by intention that this meeting was held particularly at this time.

Thank you very much for your presence.

The meeting is adjourned.

APPENDIX "H"

A REPORT ON CANADA'S EXTERNAL AID PROGRAMS
JUNE 1965

CANADA'S DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

INTRODUCTION

This report summarizes activities under Canada's bilateral development assistance programs in the fiscal year 1964-65.

Appropriations and Expenditures

Funds for aid purposes for which the External Aid Office has operational and administrative responsibilities were appropriated under the following Votes:

Grants: Vote 35

- | | |
|---|--------------|
| 1. Economic, technical, educational and other assistance
(including International Emergency Relief): | 60.6 million |
| 2. International Food Aid Program: (including \$7 million
supplementary) | 22.0 " |

Loans: Vote L14A

Special loan assistance for developing countries:	50.0 "
	<hr/> 132.6 million

The fiscal year 1964-65 saw a major growth in Canadian development assistance programs. The provision of assistance under the established grant aid program and the new Food Aid program reached record levels, notably in providing more capital assistance, more advisers serving abroad and more training places in Canada. The year also saw the inauguration of a number of important policy and programming improvements.

Food Aid

In 1964-65 Parliament approved for the first time the establishment of a separate food aid program under which the External Aid Office is able to purchase food products to meet not only part of the Canadian contributions to U.N. Food Programs but also the needs of countries which request this form of Canadian assistance. Last year some \$22 million worth of wheat and flour was purchased under this special appropriation for shipment to less developed countries. This amount includes a supplementary appropriation of \$7 million approved near the end of the fiscal year to meet the emergency food situation in India.

Development Loans

While making additional funds available for grant assistance in 1964, Canada further strengthened its aid arsenal with the introduction of a new development loan program. In the past fiscal year \$50 million was authorized

by Parliament on a non-lapsing basis. Parliament is being asked to set aside a similar amount in 1965-66. The terms of these loans are comparable to those of the International Development Association (IDA); that is, up to 50 years maturity, non-interest bearing, ten year grace period and 3/4 of 1% service charge. This loan program, which is regarded as a logical extension of Canada's grant aid program, has of course led to an increase in the level of Canadian aid but more important it has permitted a continuation of the highly concessional terms on which Canadian assistance has been offered. Conscious of the debt-servicing problems of the developing countries, Canadian assistance to countries such as India and Pakistan, whose debt-servicing problems are attracting increasingly greater attention, has been provided on liberal terms.

Capital Aid

Canadian capital aid has taken a wide variety of forms and sizes (see Table "A"), ranging from the provision of some of India's and Pakistan's largest hydro-electric and irrigation dams to less spectacular but no less necessary projects such as equipment for the University of Rwanda library and the supply of diesel locomotives to British Guiana. In addition, capital aid sometimes takes the form of industrial metals, fertilizers and pesticides. During the year 32 Canadian engineering and consulting firms were under contract to the External Aid Office while orders were placed with several hundred suppliers. The description of the individual country programs in the following sections of the paper gives a detailed list of capital aid projects. In summary, it may be said that out of this broad list of undertakings there emerges a clear pattern of emphasis in the four major fields of power, indicates that the developing countries believe that there are four areas in which Canada is pre-eminently qualified to render capital assistance. This may be assumed because Canada acts only in response to requests submitted by various countries for help on projects which have been included, wherever possible, in the national development plans drafted by the recipient government.

These fields represent some of the most important and direct contributions that can be made to economic and social development:

Power is a key element in development and therefore it is natural that the larger and older Asian countries, who have both raw materials and vast domestic markets, have tended to give priority to electrification. Hydro-electric, thermal and nuclear power developments have been built with Canadian assistance as have the transmission lines needed to carry the power to the areas where it is required. India and Pakistan have been the principal beneficiaries but smaller countries like Ceylon, Guinea, and Malaysia have also received assistance in this field.

Transport facilities are also a vital part of the economic infrastructure. Canada is currently undertaking either engineering studies or actual construction of bridges in Guinea, Burma, and Jamaica; airport development in Ceylon and Trinidad; and port development in Trinidad, Barbados, Grenada, St. Vincent, Dominica, Antigua, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Singapore.

Natural Resources—Canada has done a good deal to assist various countries to learn more about their agricultural, mineral, forestry and fisheries potential and to develop techniques for effective exploitation. For example, we are engaged in fisheries work in Malaysia, Ceylon, Pakistan, Nigeria and Uganda; forestry in Tobago, Kenya and Nigeria; water resources development in Montserrat, St. Kitts, Nevis & Anguilla; geological surveys in India and Uganda; and natural resources mapping surveys in Malaysia, Nigeria and Tanzania.

Education—Education has been the fastest growing of all the major fields. It illustrates in a unique way the complementary nature of capital and technical assistance. As an example of our capital assistance work, we have provided equipment for scores of schools in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean (53 technical and trade schools in Malaysia alone) and last year we began the actual construction of school buildings in a number of countries. Canada played a part in building three engineering institutes in India, a trades training centre in Ghana, a residence at the University of the West Indies in Trinidad, and four elementary schools in Grenada, Dominica and Antigua. Under our educational assistance program Canada sponsored training programs and courses of study for over 1,800 overseas students from 63 different countries and sent abroad almost 400 teachers and professors. The new emphasis on education can be illustrated by the fact that 4 years ago only 43 teachers and 5 professors were serving abroad under the official aid programs. In addition to teachers, Canada also provides technical experts for overseas service in such diverse fields as public administration, medicine, soil science, fisheries, plant pathology, electrical engineering and metallurgy. These technical advisers when added to the number of professors and teachers serving abroad represent a total of 545 individual Canadians under contract to the External Aid Office. Since 1960 annual expenditures on fees or allowances, transportation and related costs for experts, teachers and trainees have risen from approximately \$1 million to some \$9 million. As will be seen from Tables "B" and "C", the numbers of trainees from developing areas studying in Canada has more than doubled during that time, while the number of Canadian professors, teachers and technical assistance advisers serving abroad has increased nearly seven-fold.

It is Canadian policy to undertake wherever possible composite projects—building and equipping schools and colleges, providing staff for the early years of operation, and training in Canada selected personnel who later return home to form the permanent staff of such institutions.

University Contracts

It has been found that one of the most efficient ways of assisting Universities in developing countries to establish new faculties or departments is by entering into contractual arrangements with Canadian Universities. Contracts have been entered into with the University of British Columbia with respect to schools of Business Administration at the Universities of Malaya and Singapore and the Department of Adult Education at Rajasthan in India; with the University of Toronto for the establishment of a Regional Engineering College

in India and for the Department of Anaesthesia at the University of Lagos in Nigeria; and with the University of Manitoba in connection with the staffing of the Agriculture and Engineering Faculties at the new University of the North-East in Thailand. Similar contracts with other Canadian Universities are under consideration.

Emergency Relief

Last year an item of \$100,000 was included in the Estimates for emergency relief to permit a quicker response to appeals than was possible when no special appropriation for this purpose existed. During the year contributions were made for relief of distress in the wake of civilian disturbances in British Guiana and Cyprus, and of cyclone and tidal wave damage in Pakistan, Vietnam, Ceylon and India.

Participation of Other Canadian Agencies

An essential feature of the Canadian assistance program is the important contribution made to it by other agencies including federal and provincial government departments, by Canadian industry, by universities and by Canadian voluntary organizations. Their contributions, which are indispensable to the success of the official Canadian aid program, may take the form of comment and recommendations with respect to capital projects; assistance in recruiting teachers and university staff; or the arranging of training programs with provincial and federal government departments, with Canadian industry and with Canadian voluntary agencies.

A number of voluntary groups in Canada are doing a great deal of good work in developing countries particularly through supporting Canadians at work overseas and collecting various supplies and goods. This work constitutes a valuable part of the overall Canadian aid effort.

Self-Help

Because donors including Canada attach great importance to the principle of self-help, most projects are undertaken on the understanding that the recipient country will make a contribution in the form of local costs. Under the Canadian program the overseas government is normally expected to meet such costs as local transport, housing, labour, materials and land, and at the same time is required to make personnel available who can be trained to operate the project on its completion. As will be seen in Table D the proportion contributed by the recipient government varies from project to project depending on its nature and on local capabilities. In all cases, however, the recipient country is a full partner in a co-operative undertaking directly related to its own economic, educational or social development.

Multilateral Aid

In addition to providing bilateral assistance, Canada is also a substantial contributor to a number of multilateral aid programs such as the U.N. Special Fund, U.N. Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, U.N. Children's Fund and the International Development Association. The External Aid Office is not directly involved in these financial contributions but it does work closely with the International Agencies in implementing programs, particularly in the recruitment of Canadian experts for U.N. work and by helping to arrange training

courses. In 1964-65, Canada contributed \$17.5 million to these multilateral aid activities. In addition, as stated previously, a portion of the Food Aid funds were used to support U.N. food programs.

Canada is also closely associated with international institutions designed to effect co-ordination of the various bilateral programs of donor countries. Regular meetings are held of consortia and consultative groups for countries such as India, Pakistan and Nigeria where donor countries join with the World Bank in considering the development needs of the country concerned and co-operate in seeking the most effective way to meet those needs. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD is the principal co-ordinating body of the Western aid effort. Canada is an active participant in this Committee which was formed in 1961 to improve the terms, volume and effectiveness of aid. One of its most useful techniques is an annual aid review which enables members to examine each other's aid efforts and to compare experiences.

Export Credits

Both World Bank Consortia and DAC categorize as aid those credits which have maturities in excess of 5 years and consequently Canada, like other donor countries, when recording their annual amounts of assistance, includes loans made under Section 21A of the Export Credits Insurance Act. These loans which are advanced by ECIC do contain an aid element in that their long maturity periods enable developing countries to procure capital goods which they would be unable to purchase on normal commercial terms. During the past fiscal year ECIC committed \$76 million in long-term loans to developing countries.

Total Canadian Aid Effort

A summary of the total official Canadian aid effort for 1964-65 is as follows (the first three programs being the operational responsibility of the External Aid Office):

	Millions of Cdn. \$
Bilateral Grant Aid	60.6
Bilateral Development Loans	50.0
Food Aid (including \$7 million supplementary)	22.0
Bilateral Export Credits	76.0
Multilateral Grants	9.6
Subscriptions to IDA	7.9
Total	226.1

THE COLOMBO PLAN

The Colombo Plan for economic development in South and South-East Asia, of which Canada was a founding member in 1950, held the 16th meeting of the Consultative Committee in March 1964. At this meeting in London it was agreed that the Colombo Plan should be extended for a further period of five years from 1966 to 1971. The Consultative Group also noted that, as in earlier years, there were wide disparities over the past year in the rate of growth in national terms of GNP among developing countries in the Colombo Plan region. There were also great differences between the rates of increase in population and the committee recognized the implications of population growth for the possibilities of achieving an early substantial improvement in living standards.

It was acknowledged that international co-operation, through the provision of capital and technical assistance, amounting to \$2,165 million during the year, continued to play an important role in the development process, and that the task ahead for all members of the Plan, in raising standards of living, remained great. The principal donor countries are Australia, Britain, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the U.S.A., but it is encouraging to note that several regional members are now extending some technical assistance to their neighbours.

Since 1951, and including the fiscal year 1964-65, Canadian contributions under the Plan have amounted to \$528,678,000. The chief recipients of Canadian Aid under the Colombo Plan have been the Commonwealth countries of Ceylon, India, Malaysia and Pakistan, which have accounted for over 90% of Canadian expenditures. Other non-Commonwealth countries in the area, however, are also eligible for Canadian assistance, and capital and/or technical assistance has been given to, or is planned for, countries such as Afghanistan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, Maldives Islands, Nepal, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. Canadian assistance under the Colombo Plan, as with the other bilateral aid programs undertaken by Canada, takes the form of either grant aid or special development loans.

In addition to participation in the Colombo Plan, Canada also contributed during 1964-65 to the economic development of a portion of the region through a \$7 million grant to the Indus Basin Development Fund.

COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

Ceylon

To the end of the fiscal year 1964-65 Canada has allocated to Ceylon under the Colombo Plan total assistance to the value of about \$29 million for economic development purposes.

Over the last few years Canada has assisted Ceylon through the carrying out of an aerial survey and geological survey and through the construction of capital projects such as transmission lines, a fish refrigeration plant and the expansion of power producing facilities. The transmission lines have not only assisted in the interconnection of the power systems of the East and West sectors of the Island, but have also made available much needed electricity to the industries, villages and schools located throughout the Gal-Oya Valley. During 1964-65 Canada continued to assist Ceylon with the expansion of the Mutwal Fish Refrigeration Plant which was built earlier as a Canadian Colombo Plan project.

Canada agreed to supply equipment and the services of consulting engineers to complete the rural electricity grid in the Gal-Oya Valley. This project, when completed, will add 24 miles of local transmission lines to the 200 miles previously financed by Canada.

Commodity assistance to Ceylon has consisted primarily of flour and railway ties. Under the 1964-65 program, \$1 million worth of flour was provided to Ceylon.

A Canadian electrical engineer, experienced in the management of small hydro-electric systems, continued as an adviser to the Gal-Oya Development Board on generation and transmission maintenance problems.

During 1964, 33 Ceylonese trainees studied in Canada. Four trainees were enrolled in an industrial teachers' training course in Winnipeg.

India

Total Canadian assistance to India under the Colombo Plan to the end of the fiscal year 1964-65 was \$273 million.

In the State of Madras, Canadian and Indian engineers continued to work on Stage III of the Kundah Hydro-Electric project which will provide an additional 240,000 kw. of electric generating capacity to meet the industrial demands of the area. Canada's contribution in engineering services, generating equipment and other materials for this third stage will total some \$21.8 million over a five year period scheduled to end in 1965.

In addition, work began on the Idikki-Hydro-Electric Power project. This project included the damming of the Periyar and Cheruthoni Rivers in the State of Kerala and the construction of a hydro-electric generating plant capable of producing 500,000 kw. of power. The Canadian component of the project will consist of \$25 million to provide engineers and technicians (who will be responsible for design and construction), construction equipment, generating plant equipment and transmission line facilities.

During 1964-65 Canada agreed to:

- (a) assist India in a geological survey which would assist with the development and exploitation of India's natural resources. This would be phased over a three to five year period, at an estimated total Canadian cost of \$9,500,000 and would involve geological and geophysical studies and the training of Indian workmen in modern methods of mineral exploration and mining techniques;
- (b) expand the Umtru Hydro-Electric power generating station, located in the State of Assam, resulting in an increase in plant generating capacity of 2,800 kw. The Canadian contribution will cover the services of consulting engineers and technical equipment at a total Canadian cost of \$650,000. In addition, Canada will provide electrical transformers and lightning arrestors, at an estimated cost of \$2.8 million;
- (c) provide newsprint, aluminum and other commodities to the value of \$10.9 million to assist India in making the maximum possible utilization of its existing industrial capacity. In view of the critical foreign exchange position, India has asked donor governments to give the highest priority to such commodity aid;
- (d) provide further commodity aid in the form of \$7 million worth of wheat under the regular Food Aid program. In addition, a supplementary grant of \$7 million was made at the close of the fiscal year to meet an emergency food situation in India;
- (e) provide four Cobalt Therapy Units and accessories for the treatment of cancer and for research;
- (f) provide replacement units and spare parts for the Canada/India Nuclear Reactor which was originally built under Canadian auspices at Trombay, 25 miles north-east of Bombay. The Canadian cost

of the equipment is estimated at \$1 million. Work also continued during the year 1964-65 on the water loop for the Canada/India Reactor which has an estimated total Canadian cost of \$800,000;

- (g) provide a range of construction equipment for economic development projects at a cost of \$3.5 million;
- (h) provide diamond drilling, geophysical and mechanical equipment to meet the needs of the Oil and Gas Industry of India at a Canadian cost of \$1.2 million.

Under the technical assistance program, in 1964-65 ten teachers and two advisers were assigned to programs in India. Canadian professors of mechanical, electrical and civil engineering held positions at the Regional Engineering College, Mangalore.

The major fields of study of the 246 Indian trainees in Canada were medicine, surgery, nuclear power and steel making. The 20 Indians being trained at a Canadian steel mill were to be the last under this particular program which has extended over several years and has 88 graduates to date.

A summary of the Canadian program for 1964-65 is as follows:

	(million \$)
Grants	Geological Survey .100
	Trombay Reactor Spare Parts 1.000
	Cobalt Therapy Units .300
	Equipment for Oil & Gas Industry 1.200
	Construction Equipment 3.500
	Technical Assistance .750
	Commodities 10.900
	<hr/>
	17.750
Less Carry Over from 1963-64	.750
	<hr/>
	17.000
Food Aid	14.000
Development Loans	10.000
	<hr/>
Total	41.000

Pakistan

Total Canadian assistance to Pakistan under the Colombo Plan to the end of the fiscal year 1964-65 was \$178 million. Work was continued on the following existing projects:

- (a) Bheramara-Goalpara Transmission Line—which is 110 miles long and will connect the Canadian financed steam generating plants at Bheramara and Goalpara. The Canadian contribution will consist of transmission line materials, sub-station equipment, construction equipment and the services of consult-engineers to design and oversee the construction of the project. In addition, Canada has agreed to assist building a 15 mile extension from this line to Ishurdi. The total Canadian cost for these lines is estimated at \$5.5 million.

- (b) Comilla-Sylhet Transmission Line—which will be approximately 140 miles in length, and will connect the steam power plants at Fenshuganj and Sylhet with the main grid system of East Pakistan at Siddhirjanj. Canada will provide services and equipment similar to the Bheramara-Goalpara Transmission Line, described above, at an estimated Canadian cost of \$5.8 million.
- (c) Sukkur Thermal Electric Power Plant—located in West Pakistan—Stage I was commissioned in March 1965 and consists of 50,000 kw. thermal power generating plant and approximately 600 miles of transmission and distribution line. Canada's contribution consists of plant equipment, transmission line facilities, and the services of engineers to design and oversee construction, at a total cost of \$22 million.
- (d) Chittagong Land Use Survey—a survey of the capabilities of some 33,000 square miles of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in East Pakistan, with a view to an integrated development program. Canada's cost is estimated at \$700,000.
- (e) Khulna Hardboard Plant in East Pakistan will have a productive capacity of 30 million square feet of $\frac{1}{8}$ " board annually. A Canadian firm will be responsible for design, overseeing construction and will also train Pakistani technicians in its operation. In addition, Canada will also supply some materials and equipment for construction for the mill. The estimated Canadian cost is \$1.9 million.
- (f) Lahore Refugee Housing in West Pakistan will provide accommodation for approximately 28,000 refugees on a site which will also be developed for industry. The Canadian contribution of \$2 million will be in the form of construction equipment and building materials.
- (g) Sangu Multipurpose Project was completed this year. Canada provided \$355,000 to cover the cost of consulting engineers and survey equipment for a preliminary engineering study of the hydro-electric and irrigation potential of the Sangu River.
- (h) Pakistan Fishing Industry. Canada has offered to provide up to \$4 million for the purchase of nylon fishing twine and other forms of fishing equipment for the fishing industries of East and West Pakistan.

At the behest of both Pakistan and the World Bank, Canada has complemented its project assistance with commodity aid which is vitally needed to help Pakistan's economy overcome problems resulting from foreign exchange shortages. This aid took the form of \$6 million in industrial commodities such as copper and aluminium and \$3.65 million in food aid.

Training for 161 Pakistani students was arranged during the year 1964. Study programs were established for, amongst others, a harbour master, a veterinarian, a metallurgist, and a road design researcher.

During this period under review, 7 Canadian advisers and 3 Canadian teachers served in Pakistan. Among this group were 2 specialists in wheat breeding and three university professors.

A summary of the Pakistan program for 1964-65 is as follows:

		(million \$)
Grants	Bheramara-Goalpara Transmission Line	.200
	Ishurdi Extension Transmission Line	.200
	Comilla-Sylhet Transmission Line	.600
	Sukkur Steam Plant	2.400
	Chittagong Land Use Survey	.225
	Equipment for Fishing Industry	1.200
	Commodities	6.000
	Technical Assistance	.600
		<hr/> 11.425
Less Carry Over from 1963-64		.425
		<hr/>
		11.000
Food Aid		3.650
Development Loans		7.000
		<hr/>
		21.650

Malaysia (Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah)

Aid funds totalling \$14,056,000 have been made available to Malaysia since the Colombo Plan began. More than \$9 million of this amount has been in capital assistance and the remainder in technical assistance. In addition, one million dollars of soft loan funds were allocated to Malaysia under the new development loan program. No commodity assistance has been provided.

Canada's participation in the development of the Malaysian national television system came to an end this year. The system which is designed largely for adult education has been in operation for over one year now, and the Canadian consulting engineers and technical advisers associated with it have returned home.

The program under the direction of the University of British Columbia to establish schools of business administration at the Universities of Malaya and Singapore continued satisfactorily. Seven Canadian professors served at these universities in the past year.

Canadian consulting engineers continued work on the study of the feasibility of developing the hydro-electric resources of the Perak River. It is estimated that the report will be completed in December of this year.

During 1964-65 Canada undertook several new projects. The Natural Resources Survey will form the basis of a program to develop Malaysia's forestry, agricultural and mining industries. Among other things this project involves the aerial photographing of 50,000 square miles and the provision of 11 advisers to assist the Malaysians in the analysis and utilization of the survey data of the Malayan mainland. Equipment worth approximately \$3,000,000 is being supplied to 53 comprehensive and secondary trade schools for the teaching of such subjects as carpentry, auto mechanics and electronics. These projects continue Canada's long term program of assistance to educational institutions under which other schools have been provided with equipment at a cost of \$458,500 prior to the period under review. Fifty two-way radios have been provided for use at isolated jungle posts by the Aborigine medical service.

A bandsaw mill and ancillary equipment is being provided to a government school in Sarawak to train sawmill operators in modern methods of log conversion. Canadian consulting engineers are undertaking two feasibility studies; a survey of several proposed water and sewerage projects, and an appraisal of the proposed harbour development on the Island of Blakang Mati, Singapore.

A summary of the Canadian 1964-65 capital assistance allocations is as follows:

Natural Resources Survey	\$1,000,000
Vocational School Equipment	1,500,000
Feasibility Study of Harbour Development, Singapore....	200,000
Feasibility Study of water & sewerage projects	200,000
Equipment for sawmill training school	250,000
Two-way radio for medical services	300,000
	<hr/>
	\$3,450,000

During 1964, 21 teachers and 56 advisers served in Malaysia giving a combined total of 77. In many instances the positions filled by Canadian teachers and advisers have a close relationship to Canadian capital projects. For instance, a fisheries co-operative expert continued as an adviser on the operation of a fisheries development which Canada helped establish on the East Coast of Malaya. Canada participated in the founding of the Technical Teachers Training College, Kuala Lumpur, and in 1964 five Canadian advisers held positions in this College which will provide some of the teachers staffing the 53 technical schools receiving Canadian equipment.

Two hundred and thirty-eight Malaysians were trained in Canada in the period under review, more than for any other Colombo Plan country. One group of 18 studied methods of instruction in Canadian technical institutes. Five Malaysians studied Canadian television production techniques as part of a continuing program in this field associated with the capital project mentioned above.

NON-COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

Burma

To the end of the fiscal year 1964-65 Canada has allocated to Burma under the Colombo Plan total assistance to the value of \$5.7 million for economic development purposes and technical assistance.

The major capital project undertaken by Canada under the Colombo Plan in Burma is the Thaketa Bridge, spanning the Pazunduang River to connect with Rangoon with its suburb of Thaketa. The Canadian contribution includes Canadian supplies of steel, construction materials, bridge machinery and some construction equipment, together with the services of Canadian engineers to design and supervise erection of the bridge. Burma has allocated counterpart funds to the project which were derived from earlier sales of Canadian wheat provided under the Plan. Burmese engineers were brought to Canada to work with Canadian engineers during the design stage of this project as part of a training program.

Radium needles to be used in the treatment of cancer were supplied to the Mandalay General Hospital.

One Canadian adviser, a Radiotherapy Technician, is serving at the Mandalay General Hospital helping to treat cancer patients with a Canadian

Cobalt Therapy Unit previously given to Burma, and, at the same time, training Burmese technicians in the operation of the Unit. Twenty-six Burmese students were attending Canadian educational institutions in 1964.

Indonesia

Since 1953, up to the end of the fiscal year 1964-65, funds totalling \$4 million have been made available by Canada to Indonesia for development purposes, a high percentage of these funds being devoted to the supply of wheat flour. In 1964, 63 Indonesian students were enrolled at Canadian Universities and Technical Schools.

South Vietnam

The total allocation of Canadian aid to Vietnam under the Colombo Plan to the end of the fiscal year 1964-65 totalled \$2 million, predominantly in the form of technical assistance and wheat flour. In 1964, 141 Vietnamese students were enrolled in French language universities in Canada and one technical expert served in Vietnam. Seven advisers are presently under recruitment for postings to that country from Canada.

Thailand

A Cobalt Therapy Unit was supplied by Canada for use in the treatment of cancer at the Chulalongkorn Hospital in Bangkok. 45 Thai students were enrolled in Canada and 3 technical experts were sent to Thailand during 1964. One of these experts made recommendations that will result in 9 professors from the University of Manitoba being sent out to set up faculties of Agriculture and Engineering at the University of the North East. Total Canadian commitments in Thailand since 1956-57, when Thailand joined the Colombo Plan, amount to \$763,000.

OTHER NON-COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

(Brunei, S. Korea, Laos, Nepal, Philippines and Cambodia)

The Canadian contribution to these countries in the past has been almost exclusively in the form of technical assistance. Total funds allocated as at the end of the fiscal year 1964-65 amounted to \$1,838,000. 9 Canadian advisers served in the area and Canadian institutions enrolled 66 students in 1964.

1965-66 Program

Through a combination of self-help and external assistance, the countries of the Region have made a number of striking advances; e.g., in raising the GNP, diversifying their economies, improving education, reducing the incidence of malnutrition and several types of disease. The task is obviously formidable, however, in an area which comprises only 1/16 of the world's land mass and yet contains over 1/4 of its population. The basic challenge is to ensure that the developing economies keep pace with the fast growing human resources of the area. In recognition of the continuing needs, Canadian economic assistance to the Colombo Plan members of South and South-East Asia will increase in 1965-66, particularly with regard to technical assistance. Some of the new Colombo Plan members such as Afghanistan and the Maldive Islands will be sending trainees to Canada for the first time;

others will be increasing the flow of students and it is expected that the numbers of Canadians sent out as advisers and teachers will also be greater than in previous years. Capital assistance will be used in the Region wherever financially possible and in accordance with general aid principles. Educational projects are in great demand in the smaller countries for the improvement of standards; surveys for transportation and food distribution are another priority as is agricultural development generally in the area.

COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN AREA

Because of Canada's substantial interest in the Commonwealth territories of the West Indies, this geographic area became the first, after the Colombo Plan, into which a Canadian aid program was extended. In 1958, the Canadian Government announced that it wished to assist the West Indies Federation in its economic development efforts and that accordingly it was prepared to grant, subject to Parliamentary approval, a total of \$10 million over a five-year period commencing in the fiscal year 1958-59. This program continued even after the dissolution of the Federation, but obviously some changes had to be made in it. With the separate independence of Jamaica and Trinidad, Canadian diplomatic missions were established on these Islands and assistance was carried on through bilateral negotiations. At the same time, Canada accepted a series of requests from the dependent territories, the so-called "Little Eight" Islands.

The original undertaking of a \$10 million, five-year program expired on March 31, 1963. In advance of this date, the Government agreed that Canadian aid to the West Indies area should continue as in preceding years. At the same time, the Government also agreed that British Honduras and British Guiana, which together had formerly been receiving about \$100,000 worth of annual assistance under a separate program for other Commonwealth countries, should be brought into the general Caribbean scheme. Accordingly Parliament was asked to provide \$2.1 million for Canadian aid to the Commonwealth countries and territories of the Caribbean area in 1963-64.

Following the announcement in November of 1963 by the Secretary of State for External Affairs that the Government intended to increase substantially the level of development assistance to the Commonwealth territories of the Caribbean, a total of \$9 million in grants and special development loans was made available for use in this area in 1964-65. Approximately \$5.5 million of this consisted of funds under the new development loan program. The first loan agreement under this program was concluded with Trinidad and Tobago, and further agreements with both Trinidad and Jamaica are now in the final stages of negotiations.

During 1964-65, almost 10% of funds available to the Caribbean area was used for technical assistance involving the provision of 58 teachers and technical advisers and the training of 189 students from the area in Canada. In addition, the following projects, initiated in previous years, were continued:

- (a) the supply of port handling equipment to Barbados, Grenada, St. Vincent, Dominica, Antigua, Montserrat, and St. Kitts, the cost of which will total \$450,000;

- (b) the construction of primary schools and warehouses in Grenada, Dominica, Antigua, St. Kitts and St. Lucia. The Canadian cost will be nearly \$1.5 million, and the four schools will be ready for use in the 1965-66 academic year;
- (c) the construction phase of storage and distribution facilities for emergency water supplies resulting from the earlier water survey carried out by Canada in St. Kitts. It is expected that a further construction program will be undertaken in 1965-66. Cost of this program to date has been \$405,000;
- (d) the installation of an aircraft guiding system at Piarco Airport in Trinidad. This project will be completed early in 1965, and the total cost to Canada will be approximately \$150,000;
- (e) the provision of a fishing vessel to help in the development of the Jamaican fishing industry. Total costs are now expected to be \$125,000.

Several new projects were undertaken during 1964-65:

- (a) well-drilling equipment and technical aid to the Amerindians, fire engines, diesel locomotives, highway maintenance equipment, university staff and technical assistance for British Honduras as part of a program worth more than \$1 million;
- (b) technical assistance to the value of \$68,000 was given to British Honduras;
- (c) grant aid of \$500,000 for Trinidad and Tobago for technical assistance, fire fighting equipment, development surveys for roads, water, and harbours. At the same time we have agreed to provide lumber, port equipment, prefabricated factory shells and rural electrification equipment to the value of \$3 million under the special development loan program;
- (d) grant aid to Jamaica to the extent of \$500,000 for technical assistance, school equipment, and water pipe for a rural distribution system. Development loans in excess of \$2.3 million have been extended for the construction of the Olivier Bridge, for the installation of a sewerage project in Harbour View Heights, a suburb of Kingston, and for the construction of rural schools and teacherages.

COMMONWEALTH AFRICA

Canada first undertook a separate program of assistance for Commonwealth countries in Africa in the fiscal year 1961-62. In that year and in each of the two subsequent fiscal years, \$3.5 million was appropriated by Parliament for the Special Commonwealth Africa Aid Program. Fourteen countries in Africa, of which nine are independent, have participated in this program; it has been Canadian practice to concentrate assistance in the independent Commonwealth countries of Africa. Limited amounts of technical assistance have been extended to the smaller dependent territories. Canadian assistance has been directed primarily to Nigeria, Ghana and Tanzania with Kenya, Uganda and Sierra Leone also receiving significant levels of assistance.

As part of Canada's expanded aid programs, grant allocations to Commonwealth Africa were doubled last year. Increased expenditures related principally to the provision of teachers and advisers and training facilities in Canada. In addition, discussions were begun with a number of African countries on projects which would be suitable for special development loan financing.

A high priority has been assigned by Commonwealth African countries to educational and technical assistance and Canada's aid program has traditionally been concentrated in those sectors. Each year larger numbers of qualified Canadians have been available to undertake assignments in Africa as teachers and technical assistance advisers. The number of Canadians serving in Africa financed by Canadian aid funds rose from 189 in 1963-64 to 278 in 1964-65. In the past fiscal year there were nearly 400 African students receiving training in Canada as compared to 278 the previous year.

The following paragraphs describe the programs in each of the Commonwealth countries and territories of Africa in somewhat greater detail.

Independent Countries

Gambia

Four trainees from Gambia were undergoing training in Canada during 1964-65 under Canadian Government auspices.

Ghana

Considerable progress has been made on the construction of a Technical Training Centre in Accra which Canada is assisting by providing architectural services, pre-fabricated Canadian building materials, workshop equipment, instructional staff and training for Ghanaian staff members.

Construction began in April 1964 and is expected to be completed by December 1965. The Province of Saskatchewan has agreed to provide 15 members of the staff of the Technical Training Centre commencing in the fall of 1965; the same authorities have undertaken to train nearly 20 Ghanaians who will over the next two years join the staff of the Accra Centre.

Two smaller projects were underway during the year; one, the chemical analysis of cocoa leaves and beans (which was carried on at a Canadian laboratory), was completed and the other, involving the supply of educational and agricultural equipment to a community agricultural project in Northern Ghana, continued.

48 Canadian teachers and university professors and 38 technical advisers were on assignment in Ghana during the year. The advisers included etomologists, veterinarians, medical technicians, geologists and advisers in road transport, irrigation and land reclamation.

97 Ghanaian students were on courses in Canada during 1964-65; of this number, 38 arrived during the year.

Kenya

The forest inventory and its associated training program, which was started in January 1953, continued during the fiscal year under review. Two Canadian firms have been carrying out this work under contract to the External Aid Office. The initial phase of the contract was completed in May 1964 and extensions have been agreed to. A total of \$750,000 has been allocated to this

project of which a major feature has been a training program for Kenyan foresters. In all, more than 40 Kenyans have received training and experience in conducting a forest inventory program.

24 Canadians were on technical assistance assignments in Kenya during the past year of whom 10 were teachers. There were 23 students in Canada on medical, agricultural, veterinary science, engineering and co-operative courses.

Malawi

During the year Canada agreed to undertake a feasibility study for the establishment of a pulp industry in Malawi. This industry when established would exploit plantation forests in the Vipya Highlands.

Two Canadian nursing advisers commenced assignment during the year and six students from Malawi were on training courses in such fields as agriculture and education in Canada.

Nigeria

With the largest population of any African State (some 55 million) Nigeria has traditionally been the country to which the most substantial amounts of Canadian assistance have been directed. The major project has been the aerial mapping and airborne geophysical project in southern and western Nigeria; mapping has been carried out in each of Nigeria's four regions. Four Canadian companies, of whom three are now at work in Nigeria, have been engaged on this project in which the Nigerian Government is participating by providing needed local support including transportation, accommodation and services for Canadian personnel engaged on it.

Work was completed on a study carried out by a Canadian company on the development and utilization of natural gas resources in Southern Nigeria. In addition, four new projects were initiated. These were a rural water development feasibility study in Western Nigeria; a forest inventory in the Eastern region; a feasibility study into the establishment in the Lagos area of industries associated with fisheries; and the supply of data processing equipment to the Federal Ministry of Education. In addition a study was completed preliminary to the construction of a technical high school at Benin City.

Canada's program of technical assistance in Nigeria also expanded during the year. A total of 66 advisers, university professors, teachers and technical assistance advisers were on assignment in the country during the year; of this number three were doctors on the staff of the Department of Anaesthesia at the University of Lagos Medical School and 57 others were on various teaching assignments.

During the year, 43 Nigerians were on training awards at Canadian Universities and with Federal and Provincial Departments and Industry. Of this number, 33 arrived during the year.

Sierra Leone

Work continued on the establishment of a secondary school for boys at Koyeima in Central Sierra Leone for which Canada has agreed to supply architectural services, pre-fabricated building materials, and some staff members.

Five Canadian teachers took up assignment in Sierra Leone during the year to bring the total there in 1964-65 to seven. 24 Sierra Leone students were on courses in Canada, principally at the University level where their courses included economics and engineering.

Tanzania

A number of new capital projects were begun in Tanzania in 1964-65. These included an aerial mapping survey covering some 31,500 square miles of the south-eastern part of the country for which \$1 million has been allocated; the supply of instructional equipment to Dar-es-Salaam Technical College; the supply of vehicles for the National Parks Service for a road building program as well as vehicles and equipment for the medical services.

In addition to capital projects, there were 37 advisers, teachers and university staff serving in Tanzania under the Canadian aid program. The advisers were in such fields as development planning, film production, and wild life biology. 27 Tanzanian students were in Canada on such courses as public administration, surveying, accounting and forestry.

Uganda

During the year Canada provided the Uganda Geological Survey with additional precision instruments in connection with a national geological survey being carried out there and also agreed to make a further contribution of vehicles for the survey. For the same survey, Canada has made available 5 geological advisers.

Other capital projects undertaken or continued during the year were the supply of handicrafts equipment for 100 junior secondary schools; a gill-netter fishing boat and nets for the Ministry of Fisheries and cinema vans for an adult education program.

During the year, in addition to the 5 geologists, 15 Canadian teachers and technical assistance advisers were on assignment in Uganda and 20 Ugandans were on training awards in Canada.

Zambia

Four students from Zambia received training in Canada during 1964-65 and a Canadian adviser carried out a study of an agricultural mechanization project.

*Dependent Territories**Basutoland*

A Canadian lecturer in co-operation and adult education continued his assignment at the University of Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland during 1964-65 and an adviser on Workmen's Compensation administration was made available to the Government of Basutoland. 20 students from Basutoland were studying in Canada during the year.

Bechuanaland

A co-operatives and a nursing tutor were at work in Bechuanaland during the year and two trainees from that country were on courses in Canada.

Mauritius

One Canadian fisheries technologist and three teachers were on assignment in Mauritius during the year and 16 students from the island were training in Canada.

Rhodesia

Three Canadian teachers served in Rhodesia during the year and 19 Rhodesians, 10 of whom were on teacher training courses, studied in Canada.

Swaziland

Three trainees from Swaziland were on courses in Canada during 1964-65 and an adviser on Workmen's Compensation Administration (who also served in Basutoland) carried out a brief assignment there.

1965-1966 Program

Most of the capital assistance projects begun in 1964-65 will continue in 1965-66. In addition, a number of new projects for which Canadian assistance had been requested during 1964-65 are expected to be undertaken in the current fiscal year. These include a road survey project in Nigeria, and additional mapping work in Tanzania. Besides these projects, Canada has agreed to conduct a study of capital assistance requirements in the educational field in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

Expenditures for technical assistance purposes are expected to continue to increase significantly during 1965-66 as the services of additional Canadian teachers and advisers are made available to Commonwealth countries in Africa and an increased number of students from those countries come to Canada for courses at Canadian universities, vocational institutes and for attachment to Federal and Provincial Government departments and with Canadian industry.

ASSISTANCE TO FRENCH-SPEAKING AFRICA

In the three years preceding the fiscal year 1964-65, the Canadian program for assistance for Francophone Africa (that is the twenty-one countries which were formerly French or Belgian dependent territories) was devoted exclusively to assistance in the educational field. In each of those three fiscal years, \$300,000 was appropriated by Parliament, the funds being used to meet the costs of supplying teachers for service in the area, training places in Canada for students and for educational equipment.

The Government decided in November 1963, to undertake a larger and more effective program in Africa. Last year \$4 million (or more than 13 times the level available in the previous fiscal year) was allocated to the French-speaking states. Of this amount, \$500,000 was specifically earmarked as a contribution to the U.N. Civilian Fund for the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville). At the same time, the original concept of the program was broadened. Thus in 1964-65, although educational assistance still absorbed the great majority of Canadian aid funds for the area, it became possible to consider and to implement other types of development assistance projects. The services of technical assistance advisers were made available and a number of important capital projects were initiated.

Whereas in 1963-64 some 30 secondary school teachers and university staff were on assignments in Francophone Africa, the number rose to 89 in the fiscal year under review. Five technical assistance advisers also saw service in the area. There were in Canada 40 students from 9 countries. Capital projects were undertaken in 8 countries, of which the largest were in Cameroun, Guinea and Rwanda.

The programs for individual countries are described in more detail in the following paragraphs:

Cameroun

Feasibility studies were undertaken for 2 bridge construction projects, one in the East and the other in West Cameroun, and consideration was given to supplying equipment and materials for agricultural stations in Western Cameroun and radar navigational aids for the important air traffic centre at Douala.

In addition during the year, 17 secondary school teachers were on assignment in Cameroun and 9 students from Cameroun underwent training in Canada.

Central African Republic

1 Canadian teacher of home economics was on assignment in the Central African Republic during the fiscal year.

Chad

Preliminary studies were carried out for the establishment of an agricultural training college for which Canadian building materials, equipment and staff may be required.

Under the technical assistance program, 7 Canadian teachers of languages were on assignment in Chad during the year.

Congo (Brazzaville)

Two Canadian teachers were on assignment in Congo (Brazzaville) during the year and 2 students from the country received training awards to enable them to attend Canadian universities.

Congo (Leopoldville)

A contribution of \$500,000 was made to the U.N. Civilian Fund for the Congo to meet the costs of maintaining over 30 Canadian teachers and technical advisers engaged on U.N. assignments in the Congo.

There were as well 17 students from that country receiving training in Canada under Canadian aid auspices during the year; of this number, 15 were on a specially arranged public administration course.

Dahomey

3 Canadian teachers of mathematics and science were on assignment in Dahomey during 1964-65.

Guinea

A number of capital projects were undertaken during the year. These included preliminary feasibility studies for the construction of 4 bridges, 2 small hydro-electric stations and a rural electrification scheme. These studies were carried out by 2 Canadian consulting engineering firms. Canada also agreed to supply Guinea with road building equipment, principally graders, worth \$170,000.

Under technical assistance arrangements two Canadian teachers were on assignment in the country during the fiscal year and 2 agricultural education advisers were provided for short-term assignments.

Ivory Coast

3 Canadian teachers of mathematics, French, and geography were supplied to the Ivory Coast during the year and one student from that country received a Canadian training award.

Canada also agreed to supply the Ivory Coast with a quantity of audio-visual equipment.

Malagasy

Canada agreed to supply Malagasy with paper needed for a text book production centre which has been established as part of a nation-wide literacy development program.

3 students from Malagasy received training in Canada during the year.

Mali

7 Canadian teachers of mathematics, science and languages were on assignment in Mali during the year. In addition two students from that country began agricultural courses in Canada.

Morocco

7 Canadian teachers were on assignment in Morocco during the year and 3 Moroccans received training awards for study in Canada.

Rwanda

One of the major projects being carried out by Canada in Francophone Africa is the assistance being provided to Rwanda in the establishment of a National University at Butare. During 1964-65 the services of 24 members of the staff of the university were made available under the Canadian assistance program. In addition, Canada agreed to supply equipment for the library and is considering a number of other proposals for the expansion of the university's facilities.

Senegal

Canada undertook to supply Senegal with equipment and vehicles for the audio-visual demonstration centre which is being established near Dakar and also made available the services of 1 teacher plus training places in Canada for 2 Senegalese students.

Togo

7 Canadian teachers were on assignments in Togo during the year and Canada also supplied audio-visual equipment.

Tunisia

2 teachers of physical education were on assignment in Tunisia during the year and 1 student from that country received a training award for study in Canada. In addition, a preliminary investigation was carried out by officials of the Quebec Department of Agriculture and Laval University for an agricultural training institute for which Canadian equipment and staff may be provided.

Upper Volta

Canada agreed to supply Upper Volta with a quantity of audio-visual equipment.

Regional Assistance

Besides the advisers and teachers, whose assignments to specific countries are outlined above, Canada also undertook surveys of requirements in medical and broadcasting fields. A medical adviser visited Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to determine the need for Canadian assistance in this field and 2 advisers from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation carried out similar assignments in the Cameroun, Guinea, Senegal, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.

1965-66 Program

More than 100 additional Canadian teachers will take up assignment in Francophone Africa in September 1965, and the services of additional advisers are being sought to meet new requests from the governments of the developing countries. Capital projects are under consideration in Central African Republic, Morocco and Gabon, in addition to those for which preliminary studies have already been carried out. These include carrying out an aerial mapping program in Morocco and equipping a technical college in Bangui, Central African Republic.

LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM

Canada's first bilateral assistance to Latin America began when \$10 million was earmarked for exclusive use in that area from the new development loan fund approved by Parliament toward the end of 1964.

Our program is being carried out in close conjunction with the Inter-American Development Bank, which has been given the responsibility for the selection and initial examination of projects for financing with these funds, though Canada is consulted at all stages. The Bank has submitted a number of projects for preliminary study in Ottawa, and is processing those projects which appear feasible. The Cabinet has recently given approval to the first of these projects, a \$3,240,000 loan to the Port Commission of Acajutla, El Salvador, to permit a program of expansion for that port. Other projects will be proposed for Canadian approval in the near future.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

This appropriation was initiated in 1958 for the purpose of giving Canadian technical assistance to those Commonwealth countries not included in Canada's other bilateral aid programs such as the Colombo Plan. As separate programs were initiated for Africa and the Caribbean, this program has dwindled in size. In 1964-65 only Hong Kong received assistance under it with seven students being trained in Canada.

COMMONWEALTH SCHOLARSHIP AND FELLOWSHIP PLAN

The Plan is designed to provide opportunities for Commonwealth students to pursue advanced courses of study in other Commonwealth countries. The scholarships are intended for men and women of high intellectual promise who may be expected to make a significant contribution to their own countries on their return from abroad. Although this is a program of scholarly exchange

it nevertheless is of particular benefit to the developing members of the Commonwealth who gain additional access to the educational facilities of the older members of the Commonwealth.

The Plan was conceived at the Montreal Trade and Economic Conference held in 1958. The general outlines of the scheme were established at a conference held at Oxford in 1959 and the academic year 1960-61 marked the first year of operations. At Oxford it was agreed that a thousand scholarships would be made available under the Plan of which number Britain was to provide half and Canada one quarter.

The number of Commonwealth scholars studying in Canada since the inception of the scheme has been as follows:

1960-61—	101
1961-62—	184
1962-63—	221
1963-64—	230
1964-65—	234

Approximately 80% of these scholars have come from developing countries: 38% from Asia, 19% from Africa, 13% from the Caribbean area and 10% from elsewhere.

The number of Canadians who have taken up awards in other Commonwealth countries has been as follows:

1960-61—	17
1961-62—	35
1962-63—	33
1963-64—	41
1964-65—	42

The overall responsibility for the Plan in Canada rests with the External Aid Office which also undertakes the administration of its financial aspects. The Canadian Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Committee, which is composed of members from representative universities across Canada, advises on and assists with the academic aspects of the program and arranges for the selection and placing of scholars in Canadian universities. The Canadian Universities Foundation provides secretariat services for the Committee.

The External Aid Office makes the necessary administrative and financial arrangements both for bringing scholars to Canada and maintaining them during the tenure of their awards. The External Aid Office assumes financial responsibility for the scholar's transportation to and from Canada as well as for a certain amount of local travel when this is required by the student's course of studies. In addition, the External Aid Office pays the scholar's tuition fees and all other compulsory university fees. The scholars receive a monthly stipend to cover their cost of living as well as special allowances for the acquisition of clothing, books and equipment. They are entitled to free medical and dental care during their stay in Canada.

The delegates to the Third Commonwealth Education Conference reviewed the operation of this Plan noting that the total target of 1,000 awards was within sight of achievement and that the awards made under the Plan have won an enviable reputation in the academic world. The Conference concluded that the next few years should be regarded as a period for consolidation after which

the number of awards considered necessary should be reviewed. In the immediate future, however, it was felt that more rapid progress would be made by concentrating on the institution and development of other forms of assistance. To this end, the Canadian Commonwealth Fellowship Plan has been established for the 1965-66 academic session. The Plan involves the award of up to three Research Fellowships, each for one academic year, tenable at Canadian universities and up to five Visiting Fellowships for shorter periods both for university professors and for those working in the field of Public Education. In both types of Fellowships, the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Committee will, in co-operation with representatives of the National Conference of Canadian Universities and Colleges and the Canadian Education Association, be responsible for the selection of candidates for these fellowships.

TABLE A

Allocation of Bilateral Grant and Loan Aid Funds to Projects
FY 1964-65

Type of Assistance	% Total Aid	
<i>Construction</i>		
Power Plants and Transmission Lines	14.2	} 12.8
Industrial and Research Plants	3.6	
Roads—Bridges—Harbours	2.7	
Sewerage	1.3	
<i>Equipment</i>		
Aircraft and Ships3	} 14.1
Agriculture and Forestry5	
Fisheries and Ports	2.6	
Telecommunications5	
Construction	5.5	
Non-Project, non-commodity and other	4.7	
<i>Surveys</i>		
Ground and Aerial	7.6	7.6
<i>Institutions</i>		
School and Workshops	6.9	} 7.4
Hospitals and Laboratories5	
<i>Commodities</i>		
Wheat and Flour	17.2	} 38.3
Metals and Asbestos	10.8	
Fertilizers and Pesticides	6.2	
Pulp, Paper and Railway Ties	1.4	
Miscellaneous (Sulphur, Rapeseed, etc.)	2.7	
<i>Technical Assistance</i>	10.8	10.8
Total	100.0	100.0

TABLE B

Students and Trainees in Canada Under
Canadian Aid Programs
1956-64*

Year	South and South East Asia	Caribbean	Africa	Commonwealth Scholarship Plan	Total
1956	370	—	—	—	370
1957	391	—	—	—	391
1958	400	5	3	—	408
1959	479	27	22	—	528
1960	541	30	40	100	711
1961	553	4	80	204	841
1962	621	14	134	274	1043
1963	824	77	218	304	1423
1964	953	189	358	320	1820

*Calendar Years.

TABLE C

Advisers and Teachers Serving Abroad Under
Canadian Aid Programs
1956-64*

Year	South and South East Asia	Caribbean	Africa	Total
1956	52	—	—	52
1957	59	—	—	59
1958	57	5	2	64
1959	54	13	7	74
1960	58	16	9	83
1961	62	11	53	126
1962	85	18	130	235
1963	110	33	199	343
1964	116	74	352	542

*Calendar Years.

TABLE D

Some Typical Projects Underway Showing the Division between
the Estimated Canadian and Local Government
Contributions (in millions Canadian \$)

Project	Canadian Share	Local Government Share
South and South East Asia		
<i>Ceylon</i> Katunayaka Airport	4.400	1.200
<i>India</i> Geological Survey	9.500	48.000
Kundah Hydro-Electric Project		
Stage III	21.800	29.300
Idikki Hydro-Electric Project ..	25.000	108.000
<i>Pakistan</i> Comilla-Sylhet Transmission		
Line	5.800	6.640
Sukkur Thermal Power Plant ..	12.840	9.128
<i>Malaysia</i> Perak River Hydro-Electric Survey900	1.085
Geological Survey	1.500	.500
Africa		
<i>Nigeria</i> Mapping and Airborne Geophysics Survey:		
Phase I	1.850	.125
Phase II	1.350	.125
<i>Ghana</i> Trades Training Centre900	.540
<i>Kenya</i> Forest Inventory Survey750	.100
Caribbean		
<i>Little Eight</i> Schools and Warehouses (Dominica, Antigua St. Kitts & St. Lucia)	1.475	.100
Water Storage and Distribution (St. Kitts, Nevis, Anguilla) ..	.405	*
<i>Trinidad</i> VOR System for Piarco International Airport150	*
<i>British Guiana</i> Highway Maintenance Equip. ..	.500	*

*Figures for Local Costs for these projects are not available at the present time. The recipient countries are providing land, buildings, and other items such as local labour.

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